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PREFACE 
 
 
 
 
 
The complexity of the international peace and development agenda in our times and the 
multiplication of different international networks, configured in different ways according to the 
subject matters, highlight the need for a renewed multilateralism. The increased presence and 
activism on the international scene of non-state actors - working alongside nation States - such as 
transnational corporations, civil society networks, local authorities, regional organizations, 
intergovernmental organizations, clearly shows that state sovereignty is no longer the Alfa and the 
omega of international negotiations and international actions. 
 
When dealing with global challenges, such as climate change, pandemics, environmental bio-
diversity, terrorism, human trafficking, international financial and currency stability, it is clear that 
state boundaries constitute neither a defining element of the challenges nor the sole element of the 
solutions. States are no longer the only necessary entity to define and implement responses to global 
challenges. Without the involvement of the private sector, of different expressions of civil society 
and of regional groupings, it may prove impossible to devise effective international actions in many 
domains, chief among them the provision of global public goods. 
 
While the UN remains the legitimate and global forum and the framework where global challenges 
are and should be tackled, it is becoming ever more clear that the participation of other actors in 
global policy definition and in the application of concrete international measures is not only desirable 
but also indispensable. Fortunately and with great foresight, the UN charter already identified this 
need and envisaged the collaboration of the UN and regional organizations in its Chapter VIII. 
 
Among non-state actors, regional and other inter-governmental organizations have particularly and 
progressively come to participate, in different ways, to the definition of the necessary responses to 
global challenges and in the application of concrete international actions, such as peacekeeping 
operations. In the last few years, just to give an example, the collaboration between the United 
Nations and the European Union has increasingly acquired a breadth and an intensity that benefits 
development and humanitarian international work very significantly, as shown in the annual 
publication “Improving lives”, prepared by the UN Team in Brussels. 
 
The United Nations University (UNU) is a UN entity that combines sound academic work with a 
policy-advice mandate. The Bruges based UNU research and training program on Comparative 
Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS) has with this new impressive publication, helped to 
provide a scientific underpinning to the collaboration between the UN and regional and other 
intergovernmental organizations in the critical area of peace and security. The data collected and the 
analysis carried out in this publication constitute an important reference document to understand the 
mandate and capacities of these institutions, at a moment when the opportunities for wider 
cooperation are multiplying.    
 
 
 
Antonio Vigilante 
 
Director of the United Nations in Brussels 
 
 5 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
 
 
 
Regional organizations are an inescapable feature of international politics. Virtually all countries in 
the world are members of at least one regional or other intergovernmental organization. In a 
globalized era of assertive competition and porous borders, the orthodox notion of nation-state is 
undergoing a major overhauling, which creates conditions for alternative political actors, such as 
regional organizations, to come to the forefront. Since the end of the Second World War, regional 
organizations have traditionally been formed around economic, political or environmental objectives. 
However, over the last decades these organizations have gradually penetrated into the peace and 
security sphere and developed their capacities in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, or post-war 
reconstruction. In Europe, Africa, Asia, or the Americas, regional and other intergovernmental 
organizations have been empowered by the UN and national governments to maintain peace and 
security concurrently.  
 
Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan noted in his report ‘A Regional-Global Security 
Partnership – Challenges and Opportunities’1 (2006) that, “even in a future situation in which the 
various roles of partner organizations are clarified, the partnership [with the UN] will not be 
effective if the vast discrepancy in the capacities of the regional and other organizations around the 
world is allowed to continue.” But what are their capacities? 
 
In order to answer this question, the UN Department of Political Affairs – Unit on Cooperation 
with Regional Organizations has mandated the United Nations University (UNU-CRIS) to conduct 
the first systematic study of the integral capacities of all regional organizations with a security 
mandate. In the view of the project team, this included assessing the (i) organizational capacity (legal 
mandate and organic structure), (ii) resource capacity (financial and human assets), and (iii) 
operational experience (ground record) of each organization. The team has conducted interviews in 
the field, submitted a questionnaire to the organizations and carried out desk research in order to be 
able to survey the capacities of 21 organizations that are regularly invited to partake in the High 
Level Meetings between the UN and regional and other governmental organizations. The general 
conclusions of the Survey follow: 
 
 
Organizational Capacity 
 
1. The organizational capacity of the organizations surveyed is generally satisfactory and 
undergoing rapid change. There exist, however, fundamental differences of outlook and style 
among the organizations, reflecting different perceptions of threat, historical experience and 
cultural background, with correspondingly different strategies towards the maintenance of peace 
and security and the respective roles of the UN and regional (and sub-regional) organizations. 
 
2. All organizations (except CARICOM, COMSEC, and CPLP) have a legal mandate in peace 
and security issues. Either established in their founding documents or provided by in specific 
protocols, most organizations have adopted legal provisions that guide them in the 
operationalization of their security-related activities. As far as the organic structure of the 
organizations is concerned the capacities are heterogeneous. The most developed capacity is in 
early warning, conflict prevention and (non-military) peacemaking.  
 
                                                
1 A/61/204 (paragraph 85).  
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3. In organizations such as ECOWAS, EU, and IGAD, the conflict prevention and early 
warning capacities are notable, even if the formation of a continental early-warning mechanism 
in Africa, the “Continental Early Warning System”, has been lagging behind. Other 
organizations such as ECCAS, IOF, LAS, PIF, OAS, and SADC are planning to establish early 
warning mechanisms. Nevertheless, due to lack of political will or financial resources, they are 
not yet fully operational.  
 
4. Other organizations have adopted a code of conduct and established mechanisms for the 
peaceful settlement of disputes (mediation, good offices, arbitration). Organizations such as 
COMSEC, EU, IOF, and OAS have a very substantial peacemaking capacity (both in terms of 
legal mandate and organizational structure). Others, however, are less structurally prepared 
(ASEAN, CPLP, ECCAS) and their interventions are normally limited to either temporary or 
politically insignificant actions. 
 
5. The peacekeeping and enforcement capacity is being developed currently by only a few 
regional agencies for their regions, most notably in Africa (e.g. ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD 
[EASBRICOM], SADC) but also by CIS, CSTO, LAS, or PIF. Only the AU, in collaboration 
with sub-regional organizations, to date has commenced the process of building a structured 
regional/sub-regional standby capacity of national forces, while some others rely on directly-
contributed national force capacity for crisis management. However, the African security 
architecture is still marked by financial constraints, lack of military training, and poor national 
coordination. Some organizations – CIS, CSTO, EU and NATO - have the resources and the 
political will to undertake global enforcement responsibilities on behalf of the UN outside their 
membership zones when required and authorized to do so.   
 
6. As far as peacebuilding is concerned most organizations still lack a clear strategy on post-war 
reconstruction that goes beyond the mere exercise of election observation. Exceptions are the 
AU, which has adopted recently a new peacebuilding program, and the EU, OAS, and OSCE 
which have deployed missions to help countries recuperating from a violent conflict 
(reconstruction and reconciliation). 
 
 
Resource Capacity 
 
7. In so far as resource capacity is concerned, it was concluded that there exists a vast discrepancy 
in resources between regional/sub-regional and some of the other intergovernmental 
organizations. This pertains in particular to financial capacity which affects human capacity and 
thus operational capacity.  The result is a highly-skewed regional-global security mechanism that 
reflects global imbalances in wealth and power. As to financial capacity, some organizations have 
very scarce resources. The meager budgets of CPLP, ECCAS, or IGAD impose severe 
constraints on the work of these organizations. The same applies to human resources. Some 
organizations are run by 20-50 staff (CPLP, ECCAS, IGAD), whereas others reach 25,000 (EU). 
Moreover, if we evaluate not only the quantitative but also the qualitative human capacity of the 
organizations, it stands out that in several of them, but mainly in the African ones, the staff is 
poorly trained and often lacks motivation.  
 
8. Furthermore, the financial and human resources have to be studied and analyzed as a very 
relative factor in the survey of the organizations, as they differ largely in nature and mandate. It 
is very difficult to compare organizations devoted solely to regional cooperation in peace and 
security, with others devoted to regional integration (using large parts of their budgets for the 
creation of a Single Market, or integrating their national agricultures). 
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Operational Experience 
 
9. Finally, most organizations have a long operational experience on the ground. In peacekeeping, 
for instance, regional and other intergovernmental organizations have deployed approximately 
30 missions since the end of the Second World War. These missions, carried out by the AU, 
COMSEC, CIS, ECOWAS, EU, LAS, NATO, OAS, OSCE, PIF, and SADC have been 
deployed in Africa, the Balkans, Central Asia and the Pacific.  
 
10. All organizations surveyed have some experience in peacemaking. Even when not supported 
by a clear mandate or by effective organizational capacities, regional organizations have engaged 
in mediation, arbitration, and good offices. COMSEC, ECOWAS, EU, IOF, OAS for instance 
have ample experience in peacemaking. It would be difficult to envisage the outbreak of a 
conflict in Latin America, Europe, or Africa which would not spark an immediate response from 
a regional or sub-regional organization.  
 
11. As regards peacebuilding missions, AU, EU, OAS, and OSCE have large experience: either 
through the implementation of structural programs that are targeted to prevent post-conflict 
societies to fall back into a pattern of violence (e.g. good governance, poverty eradication, 
democratization) or, more narrowly, through the deployment of election observation missions. 
 
There exists potential for regional and other governmental organizations to engage in effective 
collaboration with the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security.  The 
full potential of that partnership, however, has yet to be realized. A sustained and collective effort 
will be required through rational planning and mutual assistance to reach the Secretary-General’s 
vision of an effective ‘regional-global security mechanism’. 
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ACRONYMS 
 
 
 
ACP - African-Caribbean-Pacific Group 
AMIS – African Union Mission in Sudan 
AMISOM – African Mission in Somalia  
APSA - African Peace and Security Architecture 
ARF – ASEAN Regional Forum 
ASEAN - Association of South East Asian Nations  
ASEM – Asia-Europe Meeting 
ASF – African Standby Force 
AU - African Union 
BSECC - Black Sea Economic Cooperation Council 
CARICOM - Caribbean Community 
CARIFTA – Conference of the Caribbean Free Trade Association 
CDC – Community of Democratic Choice 
CFSP – Common Foreign Security Policy 
CEMAC – Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States 
CEN-SAD - Community of Sahelo-Saharan States 
CEWARN – Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (IGAD) 
CEWERUS - Conflict Early Warning and Response Units (IGAD) 
CEWS – Continental Early Warning System 
CIAV-OAS – OAS International Support and Verification Mission 
CIS - Commonwealth of Independent States  
COE - Council of Europe 
COMSEC – Commonwealth Secretariat 
COMESA – Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
COPAX – Conseil de Paix et Securité de l’Afrique Centrale 
CPLP - Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries 
CRIS – Comparative Regional Integration Studies 
CFRD – Collective Forces of Rapid Deployment (CSTO) 
CSTO - Collective Security Treaty Organization  
DDR – Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation 
DPA – Department of Political Affairs 
DPKO – Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo 
EAC - East African Community 
EASBRIG – East African Standby Brigade 
EC - European Commission 
ECA – Economic Commission for Africa (UN) 
ECCAS - Economic Community for Central African States 
ECOMIL – ECOWAS Mission in Liberia 
ECOMOG – ECOWAS Monitoring Group 
ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States 
ECOWARN – ECOWAS Early Warning and Early Response 
EDA – European Defense Agency 
ERRF – European Union Rapid Reaction Force 
ESCAP – United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
ESF – ECOWAS Standby Force 
ESDP  - European Security and Defense Policy 
EU - European Union  
EUFOR – European Union Military Mission 
EUPOL – European Union Police Mission 
EUISS – European Union Institute for Security Studies 
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EUJUST – European Union Rule of Law Mission 
EUPAT – European Union Police Advisory Team 
EUSC – European Union’s Satellite Centre 
EUSEC – European Union Security Sector Reform Mission 
EW – Early Warning 
FAO – Food and Agriculture Organization 
FEWER – Forum for Early Warning and Early Response 
FOMUC / FOMAC – Central African Multinational Force  
FYROM – Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
GCC - Gulf Cooperation Council 
GUAM - Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova 
HLM – High-Level Meeting 
HR – Human Rights 
HRR – Humanitarian & Refugee Relief 
IADC – Inter-American Democratic Charter 
IC/GLR – International Conference on the Great Lakes Region  
ICJ – International Court of Justice 
ICPAT – IGAD Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism 
IFOR – Implementation Force (NATO) 
IGAD - Intergovernmental Authority for Development 
IGADD - Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development 
IGO – Intergovernmental Organization 
ILO – International Labour Organization 
IOF - International Organization of Francophonie 
IOM – International Organization for Migration 
ISAF – International Assistance Force 
ISESCO – Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
ISIS - Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN) 
KFOR – Kosovo Force (NATO) 
LAS - League of Arab States  
MAES - African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros 
MAPP - Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia (OAS) 
MARAC – Central African Early Warning System 
MDG – Millennium Development Goals  
MICIVIH – International Civilian Mission for Haiti 
MINUGUA – United Nations Mission in Guatemala 
MoU – Memorandum of Understanding 
MONUC – United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
MRU - Mano River Union 
NAC – North Atlantic Council 
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NCRS – NATO Crisis Response System 
NEPAD – New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
NFP – National Focal Points 
NIS – Newly Independent States 
NIWS – NATO Intelligence Warning System 
NRF – NATO Response Force 
OAS - Organization of American States 
PROPAZ – Programme on Development of Resources for Peacebuilding in Guatemala (OAS) 
OAU – Organization of African Unity 
OCHA – Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN) 
OECS - Organization of East Caribbean States 
ODA – Official Development Assistance 
OHCHR – Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
ODIHR – OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
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OMC – Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) 
ONUB – United Nations Operation in Burundi 
OPRC – Office for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts (OAS) 
OSCE - Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
OIC - Organization of Islamic Conference 
PIF - Pacific Islands Forum 
RAMSI – Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (PIF) 
RATS – Regional Antiterrorist Structure (SCO) 
RECs – Regional Economic Communities 
REWR – Regional Early Warning System 
RO – Regional Organization 
SADC - Southern African Development Community 
SADCBRIG – SADC Standby Brigade 
SC – Security Council 
SCO - Shanghai Cooperation Organization 
SEANWFZ – Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone 
SFOR – Stabilization Force 
SG – Secretary General 
SHIRBRIG – Standby High Readiness Brigade  
TAC - Treaty of Amity and Cooperation  
UNAIDS – United Nations Joint Programme on HIV/AIDS 
UNAMID – United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur 
UNAMIS – United Nations Advanced Mission in Sudan 
UNCCD – United Nations Convention Against Desertification 
UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UN-DESA – United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
UNGA – United Nations General Assembly 
UNHQ – United Nations Headquarters 
UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund 
UNLO – United Nations Liaison Office 
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees   
UNMEE – UN Mission in Eritrea-Ethiopia 
UNEP – United Nations Environment Programme 
UNITAR – United Nations Institute for Training and Research 
UNMIK – UN Mission in Kosovo 
UNMIL – United Nations Mission in Liberia 
UNMIS – United Nations Mission in Sudan 
UNODC – United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime 
UN-OHRLLS - UN Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, 
Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States 
UNOWA – United Nations Office for West Africa 
UNMOT – United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan 
UNOMIG – United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia 
UNPROFOR – UN Protection Force 
UNSAS - United Nations Stand-by Arrangements System 
UNU – United Nations University 
UPD – Unit for the Promotion of Democracy 
VUB – Vrije Universiteit Brussel (Free University of Brussels) 
WACSOF – West Africa Civil Society Forum 
WANEP – West African Network for Peacebuilding 
WFP – World Food Programme 
WHO – World Health Organization 
WMD – Weapons of Mass Destruction 
ZOPFAN – Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ASEAN) 
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PART I 
THE SURVEY 
 
OBJECTIVES 
The objective of the present project is to survey the capacities of the different regional and other 
intergovernmental organizations cooperating with the UN in its goal of developing a regional-global 
security mechanism, as stated by the UN Secretary General in the 5th High Level Meeting (HLM) 
between the UN and Regional and other Intergovernmental Organizations, in 2003. 
 
The need to develop a detailed survey of the capacities (organizational and resources) and 
operational experience of regional and other intergovernmental organizations in the field of conflict 
prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding, emanates from 
recognition that, within the UN System,  there is a considerable lack of knowledge, based on reliable 
data, pertaining to regional organizations.   
 
The goal of the present survey is to rectify this problem eventually aiming at the establishment of a 
permanent regional database, through which, the developments of each organization can be 
documented and updated. 
METHODS 
This Survey is based on the results of a combination of a questionnaire, desk research and 
interviews.   
 
Questionnaire 
The Questionnaire was composed of twenty nine questions pertaining to the size of the 
organizations’ human and financial resources, legal identity, organizational structure, decision-making 
processes, operational capacities and their historical experience in the maintenance of peace and 
security, acting in their own capacity and in cooperation with the United Nations. It was designed by 
UNU-CRIS, UN-DPA and UN-DPKO and submitted to the organizations between May and 
November 2005. Some of the answers are still pertinent today and were thus integrated into the 
second version of the Survey. 
 
Desk Research 
The project team (composed of five researchers and one research assistant) undertook coordinated 
research into various aspects of the capacities of UN partners. It was judged more appropriate to 
keep such research distinct from the response information, in order to preserve the integrity of each. 
 
Interviews 
In addition, in 2007 the Project Team visited the following countries for discussions pertaining to 
the second version of the survey or for general information-gathering: Belgium, China, Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, France, Portugal, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, and Zimbabwe. In the 
first version of the Survey, the project coordinator Dr. Kennedy Graham had visited the following 
organizations: African Union (Addis Ababa), League of Arab States (Cairo), Council of Europe 
(Strasbourg), Association of South-East Asian Nations (Jakarta), Pacific Islands Forum (Suva), 
Organization of American States (Washington, DC), Economic Community of West African States 
(Abuja), European Union/European Commission (Brussels). Some of the data collected for the 
purpose of the first version of the Survey was still pertinent and therefore included in the second 
version.  
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CONCEPTS 
In the course of the study, it became apparent that some clarification of concepts and terminology 
was required if any degree of consistency were to be achieved among all participating organizations.  
The difficulty encountered, as with other UN studies on similar subjects, is that many of the 
concepts employed in the official conduct of international relations are left undefined, often for 
good political reason.  Nonetheless, this does not assist in clarifying a common position on issues 
that are inherently complex and dynamic.  The project team has therefore sought to add clarity to the 
conceptual dimension of the issues involved, or at the least to record the conceptual basis on which 
it felt bound to proceed. It is recognized that no official pronouncement exists regarding the use of 
these concepts.  Indeed, it became apparent in the course of the study that, to some extent, UN 
partners are employing concepts of peace and security and an associated terminology in different 
ways.  If left unresolved, this situation will militate against a common understanding that should 
underpin an effective operational regional-global partnership.  It is, moreover, imperative that any 
concepts and terms employed are compatible with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, 
and are able to be ‘placed’ within its various chapters and articles. 
 
Capacity 
It was judged important to be clear about what elements of capacity were involved in a ‘capacity 
survey’.  In the view of the project team, this included organizational capacity, resource capacity 
(both human and financial), and operational experience. These elements are deemed to be necessary 
features of the ability of a regional organization to partner effectively with the United Nations in the 
maintenance of international peace and security.  
 
• Organizational Capacity  
 It indicates the general structural ability of a UN partner to make decisions and ensure their 
implementation from headquarters – for purposeful action in the maintenance of peace and security.  
The mandate to act in peace and security, the decision-making capacity of its principal organs, and its 
secretariat capacity to implement decisions (both its own decisions and those taken collectively in the 
high-level meetings) are central to the overall effectiveness of the relationship between the UN and a 
regional organization. 
 
• Resource Capacity  
This term refers to the size of a UN partner to undertake effective and sustained action in the 
maintenance of international peace and security.  Sufficient human resources, in terms of numbers 
and expertise, and sufficient financial resources to cover the costs of peace and security operations 
of various kinds, are each a sine qua non conditions for effectiveness in such a partnership.  The 
United Nations, itself confronting problems of financial capacity, nonetheless has minimum capacity 
to undertake some peace operation missions.  Its limitations, however, force it to seek partnerships 
with regional and other intergovernmental organizations, which in some cases face even greater 
limitations themselves.  
 
• Operational Experience 
This term encapsulates the procedural ability of a UN partner to undertake action in-the-field in the 
maintenance of peace and security. This depends on the mandate and mechanism (through legal 
instrumentation) that the partner has developed to put into action the decisions it may have taken in 
conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement or peacebuilding2. 
                                                
2 The ‘conceptual structure of peace’ adopted in this study is therefore as follows: pre-conflict: (a) Conflict Prevention 
(early warning, strategic analysis, preventive diplomacy; preventive deployment); mid-conflict: (b) peacemaking 
(through pacific settlement, without the use of armed force), (c) Peacekeeping (inter-state truce monitoring, based 
on consent), (d) peace enforcement (intra-state missions, with enforcement mandates), (e) collective security (against 
inter-state aggression); and, finally, post-conflict: peacebuilding. It is understood that events on-the-ground and the 
progression of policy do not respond to any rigid sequence that might be implied above.  Such events and policy 
tend to be historically cyclical rather than linear. No society has been without conflict and many harbor memories 
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Early Warning 
The Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER) defines early warning as the 
“systematic collection and analysis of information coming from the areas of crises for the purpose of 
anticipating the escalation of violence; development of strategic responses to these crises; and 
presentation of options to the critical actors for the purpose of decision making”3. 
 
Conflict Prevention 
‘Conflict prevention’ has been defined as “Actions, policies, procedures or institutions undertaken in 
particularly vulnerable places and times in order to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related 
forms of coercion by states or groups, as the way to settle the political disputes that can arise from 
destabilizing effects of economic, social, political and international change”4. It includes: (a) 
preventive diplomacy: mediation, conciliation, negotiation; (b) preventive deployment: the fielding of 
peacekeepers to forestall probable conflict; (c) preventive disarmament: destroying old weapons and 
reducing small arms in conflict areas; and (d) structural prevention: political, institutional and 
developmental efforts at root causes. 
 
Peacemaking 
‘Peacemaking’ refers to the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease 
hostilities and negotiate a pacific settlement of their dispute. It involves negotiation, enquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, good offices – applied after a dispute has 
crossed the threshold into armed conflict. 
 
Peace Enforcement 
’Peace Enforcement’ signifies the use of force by a UN or UN partner against one of the parties to 
enforce an end to hostilities or maintain stability once hostilities have ended. On several occasions 
the Security Council has authorized member states to use ‘all necessary means’, including force, to 
achieve a stated objective (within the mission’s mandate contained in the Security Council resolution 
under Chapter VII) in situations where consent of the parties is not required.  
 
Peace enforcement is often referred to as ‘robust peacekeeping’ but it is suggested here that, for the 
sake of clarity, the term ‘peacekeeping’ should be confined to missions with a Chapter VI (or ‘six-
and-a-half’) mandate as described below. 
 
Peacekeeping 
Peacekeeping is distinguished from peace enforcement in two fundamental ways: (i) the mission is 
dependent on the consent of the host member state; and (ii) the mission has a mandate to use force 
only in self-defense. Peacekeeping may be seen as of two types: 
Traditional Peacekeeping – usually pertaining to interstate conflict: 
 •  Conflict Prevention: deployment of troops to prevent the outbreak of conflict or spill-over 
 of conflict across borders; 
 • Ceasefire Verification: stabilization of conflict situations after a ceasefire, creation of an 
 environment for the parties to reach a lasting peace agreement; 
Modern Peacekeeping:  
 •  Peace Implementation: assistance in implementing comprehensive peace agreements; 
 • Governmental Transition: leading States or territories through a transition to stable 
 government, based on democratic principles, good governance and economic development. 
                                                                                                                                                  
and grievances that regenerate continuing tension, whether inter- or intra-state.  For that reason peacebuilding and 
conflict prevention are operationally joined, completing the ‘cycle of peace’ (and, if the structures and techniques 
fail, the ‘cycle of violence’).   
3 FEWER (19 February 1997), “Mission Statement”, York: FEWER, p. 1. 
4 Michael Lund (1997). Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflicts: A Revised Guide for Practitioners. Washington, DC: 
Creative Associates International, p.3. 
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Peacebuilding 
‘Peacebuilding’ refers to “post-hostility actions, military and civilian, taken to forestall future 
eruptions by strengthening structures capable of consolidating a political settlement”5. This term 
pertains to assistance to countries and regions in the transition from war to peace.  It includes: 
 • Demilitarization, Demobilization, and Rehabilitation 
 • Security Sector Reform 
 • Institution-building, including police and judicial systems 
 • Good governance and human rights promotion 
 • Election-monitoring and political participation 
 • Economic and social development 
SELECTION OF ORGANIZATIONS 
The organizations surveyed comprised those which have been invited for the High Level Meetings 
between the United Nations and Regional and Other Intergovernmental Organizations, and which 
have been working in the peace and security field. 
 
Some 21 such partners were thus selected, of which 11 responded to the Questionnaire (identified 
with *).  
 
• African Union (AU) 
• Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
• Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
• Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 
• Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) * 
• Commonwealth Secretariat (COMSEC) * 
• Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP) * 
• Council of Europe (COE) * 
• Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 
• Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
• European Union6 (EU) * 
• Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) 
• International Organization of Francophonie (IOF) 
• League of Arab States (LAS) * 
• North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) * 
• Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) * 
• Organization of American States (OAS) * 
• Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) * 
• Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) * 
• Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 
• Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
 
Some other organizations involved in regional integration or cooperation activities of various kinds 
have a security mandate, but have not, to date, attended any High-Level Meeting. The project team 
identified thirteen such organizations.7 These have not been included in this Survey since they have 
not participated in the high-level meetings.   
                                                
5 Alex P. Schmid (1998). Thesaurus and Glossary of Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Terms. London: FEWER. 
6 The EU is comprised of the Presidency, the Council and the Commission, and all three entities are represented 
separately in the high level meetings. The Commission responded to the Questionnaire. 
7 African-Caribbean-Pacific Group (ACP); Black Sea Economic Cooperation Council (BSECC)*; Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); Community of Democratic Choice (CDC); Community of Sahelo-
Saharan States (CEN-SAD); Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA); East 
African Community (EAC); Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa States (CEMAC); Georgia, 
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CLASSIFICATION OF ORGANIZATIONS 
Central to the development of a formal partnership between the United Nations and regional and 
other intergovernmental organizations is the constitutional basis of the relationship. This section 
considers the founding documents of each UN partner in the Survey, to consider the nature of its 
identity in order that the potential comparative advantage of each partner within the overall 
partnership can be more clearly understood.  Two questions arise in this respect:   
 • Whether a UN partner is an ‘agency’8 or ‘arrangement’ as laid down in Chapter VIII of the 
 United Nations Charter; and  
 • Whether the partner is ‘regional’ or ‘other inter-governmental’ as the terms are now 
 employed by the United Nations in the High-Level Meetings.  
 
Distinction between ‘Agencies’ and ‘Arrangements’ 
The accepted distinction between ‘agency’ and ‘arrangement’ concerns the degree of formality of the 
entity in question. A regional agency is a recognized organization with legal personality and an 
organizational structure (i.e. secretariat) located in a member country. A ‘regional arrangement’ is a 
grouping of States under a treaty for a specified common purpose without any organization to 
‘personify’ that arrangement. In this second case,  organizational functions are carried out by the 
member states themselves.9    
 
The above distinction has to date carried limited significance in international diplomacy but it is 
likely to have legal significance in the future as the United Nations and its partners seek to formalize 
and strengthen the operational partnership for peace and security. The capacity of a UN partner to 
conclude formal agreements with the United Nations and otherwise to act as an independent entity 
in international law is a sine qua non of a strengthened operational partnership over the longer term.  
 
Distinction between ‘Regional’ and ‘Other Intergovernmental’ Partners 
The distinction between Chapter VIII and other chapters of the Charter has recently been brought 
into focus in the course of the review of UN practices and procedures undertaken over the past 
years: 
 • The High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, of November 2004, stressed the 
 need to make fuller and more productive use of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.10  It noted 
 the distinction between ‘regional organizations within the meaning of Chapter VIII’ and 
 alliance  organizations.11    
 • At the Sixth High-Level Meeting between the UN and regional and other 
 Intergovernmental Organizations (2005), participants recognized that: 
“interested regional and sub-regional organizations will pursue joint activities under the umbrella of high-
level meetings under Chapter VIII of the Charter while other intergovernmental organizations will 
                                                                                                                                                  
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova (GUAM); Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); International Conference on the Great 
Lakes Region (IC/GLR); Mano River Union (MRU); and Organization of East Caribbean States (OECS).  
* The BSECC attended the 3rd UN Security Meeting with Regional Organizations (October 2005) but has not, to 
date, attended the high-level meetings. 
8 The terms ‘agency’ and ‘organization’ are taken here to be synonymous.  
9 This distinction between a ‘regional agency’ and a ‘regional arrangement’ is based on Simma B et al, eds. The Charter 
of the United Nations: A Commentary (OUP, Oxford; 1995); see especially p.694.    
10 “The ability of the Security Council to become more proactive in preventing and responding to threats will be 
strengthened by making fuller and more productive use of the Chapter VIII provisions of the Charter of the United 
Nations than has hitherto been the case.” A More Secure World: Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, A/59/565, 29 November 2004, para 270. 
11 “In recent years, such alliance organizations as NATO (which have not usually been considered regional 
organizations within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the Charter but have some similar characteristics) have 
undertaken peacekeeping operations beyond their mandated areas. We welcome this so long as these operations are 
authorized by and accountable to the Security Council. In the case of NATO, there may also be a constructive role 
for it to play in assisting in the training and equipping of less well resourced regional organizations and States.”  A 
More Secure World, para 273. 
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partner with the United Nations under the other Charter provisions, in response to the distinction made 
by the High-level Panel to that effect.”12 
 
In view of these comments, it was judged appropriate to identify, for the purposes of the Survey, 
those organizations whose activities may be regarded as within the meaning of Chapter VIII and 
those other organizations that will engage in partnerships with UN under other provisions of the 
Charter.  For the purpose of this Survey, ‘other intergovernmental organizations’ diverge from 
‘Chapter VIII organizations’ in the sense that they either (a) have a mandate to operate outside their 
geographical area of jurisdiction, (b) have a collective defense mandate and are, therefore, geared to 
defuse extra-regional threats, or (c) their membership coverage clearly does not abide by regional 
geographical parameters. 
 
 
 
CLASSIFICATION OF PARTNERS 
 
  
Agencies 
 
 
Arrangements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regional and  
Sub-regional 
 
(Chapter VIII) 
 
. African Union (AU) 
. Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
. Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
. Council of Europe (COE) 
. Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS) 
. Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) 
. Intergovernmental Authority for Development 
(IGAD) 
. League of Arab States (LAS) 
. Organization of American States (OAS) 
. Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 
. Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) 
 
 
 
. Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN)13 
 
. Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
 
. Pacific Islands Forum (PIF)14 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Other 
Intergovernmental 
 
(outside chapter 
VIII) 
 
. European Union (EU) 
. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
. Common Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) 
. Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) 
. Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries 
(CPLP) 
. International Organization of Francophonie (IOF) 
 
 
. Commonwealth Secretariat 
(COMSEC) 
 
 
 
                                                
12 Conclusions of the Chairman of the Sixth High-Level Meeting Between the United Nations and Regional and Other 
Intergovernmental Organizations, A/60/341 and S/2005/567, Annex I, para. 7. 
13 In the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter (12 December 2005), ASEAN leaders 
recognized the importance of having ‘an appropriate institutional framework’ to confer legal personality, determine 
the functions and develop the areas of competence of ASEAN’s key bodies. The ASEAN Charter was finally signed 
on 20 November 2007 and will enter into force after ratification by the 10 member states. Then, ASEAN will 
become a regional ‘agency’. 
14 PIF was established as an arrangement by the 1971 communiqué.  At its 36th Leaders Meeting in October 2005, 
PIF adopted a formal Agreement establishing the Forum as an international organization.  This will come into force 
when ratified by all 16 Forum members and at that stage the PIF will become a ‘regional agency’. 
  Table 1. Classification of Partners 
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Although the Charter does not address the issue, it may be a natural inference to regard the activities 
of sub-regional organizations as also falling within the meaning of Chapter VIII.15 For the purpose 
of conceptual clarity, this study has applied consistent terminology in distinguishing regional, sub-
regional, and ‘other intergovernmental’ organizations. The term ‘partners’ is used to refer to all 
organizations and arrangements (regional, sub-regional and other intergovernmental), which have a 
partner relationship with the United Nations, and have attended the high-level meetings. 
 
As is evidenced from the responses to the Questionnaire, the nature of the various partners differs 
widely and thus their potential cooperation with the United Nations, in terms of comparative 
advantage and the ‘added value’ they bring to bear on the partnership, will differ. These differences 
are likely to become more apparent, and more productive and efficacious, over time as the 
partnership strengthens and becomes streamlined. Different partners will perform different 
functions in the overall fabric of peace and security – conflict prevention, peacemaking, 
peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding.   
 
It needs to be noted, however, that there is no such clarity or consistency in the policy-making 
sphere of intergovernmental relationships, at the United Nations or elsewhere. The task ahead is to 
determine, on the basis of their respective mandates and capacities, which partners have the potential  
to cooperate most effectively with the United Nations in which areas, both geographically and 
functionally.  None is excluded; each has a role to play.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
15 In the absence of any explicit guidance from the UN Charter, the whether such activities of sub-regional 
organizations might come within the meaning of Chapter VIII as of right or through delegation of a regional 
organization remains an open question.  Legal guidance on this point could perhaps be sought from the UN’s Legal 
Counsel. There is, however, no clarity over any hierarchical relationship between regional and sub-regional 
organizations in terms of their relationship to the United Nations; and it would be beneficial to the strengthening of 
the ‘regional-global partnership’ if this were achieved.  Work is underway through dialogue between the African 
Union and the five Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in streamlining the relationship between regional and 
sub-regional agencies 
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African Union (AU) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 
In 2000, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) transformed itself into the African Union (AU). 
The OAU, founded in 1963 on the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference, drew 
criticism throughout the 1990s for its lack of intervention as conflicts erupted in several African 
countries. Frustration at its ineptness led African leaders to launch the AU, an organization with a 
structure modeled on that of the European Union. Fifty-three countries in Africa are members of 
the AU16. According to the Constitutive Act of the AU (signed in 2000) and the Protocol Relating to the 
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU (signed in 2002), the organs of the organization 
are: 
 
• The Assembly, comprises the heads of state. It meets at least once a year and is the AU’s main 
decision-making body. Assembly members elect an AU chairperson, who holds office for one year. 
The current chairman is President John Kufuor of Ghana. 
 
• The Executive Council is composed of foreign affairs ministers of individual states. The Executive 
Council is responsible to the Assembly. 
 
• The Commission, comprises ten commissioners holding individual portfolios who manage the day-
to-day tasks of the AU and implement AU policies. The Commission reports to the Executive 
Council. In 2008 Jean Ping, former Foreign Minister of Gabon was elected as AU’s chairperson for a 
4-year term. The Commission includes the Departments of Peace and Security17, and the 
Department of Political Affairs. 
 
• The Peace and Security Council (PSC), set up in 2004, is a collective security and early-warning body 
mandated to respond to conflicts and crisis (preventive diplomacy, early warning, peacemaking, 
peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace building, and humanitarian action). It has fifteen member 
states representing all five sub-regions of the AU (Central, North, East, South and West), elected for 
two or three year terms, with equal voting rights. The PSC should meet at least twice a month. There 
have been months, however, when it met much more often18 19. 
                                                
16 Morocco is the only African country that does not belong to the AU. 
17 DPS includes the following Divisions: Conflict Management Division (CMD), Peace Support Operations 
Division (PSOD) and the Defense and Security Division (DSD).  
18 The decision-making process of the P&S Council is as follows: (1) Situation: conflict that requires attention; (2) 
Report: the Chairperson of the AU Commission produces a report on the situation. It receives inputs from several 
AU officials and from field staff; (3) Meeting of the PSC Committee of Experts: the Experts (1 representative per member 
state represented in the P&S Council + 2 members of the Commission) meet informally/formally up to 3 days 
”[We are] determined to enhance our capacity to address the scourges of conflicts on the 
Continent and to ensure that Africa, through the African Union, plays a central role in bringing 
about peace, security and stability on the Continent” 
Protocol Relating to Peace and Security Council (Preamble)  
Founded in 2000 (Constitutive Act of the African Union). 
Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. 53 Member-States. 
www.africa-union.org 
 
Mandate in Peace and Security: 
. Constitutive Act, article 3-f/g (2000);   
. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council  
  of the African Union (2002) 
. African Union Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections  
  in Africa (2002) 
. Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force (2003) 
. Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defense and Security Policy (2004) 
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• The Pan-African Parliament was established in 2004 to “ensure the full participation of African 
peoples in governance, development, and economic integration of the Continent.” This body 
debates continent-wide issues and advises AU heads of state. It currently has advisory powers only, 
but there are plans to grant it legislative powers in the future. It is composed of 265 parliamentarians 
selected by the member state parliaments. The Pan-African Parliament is based in Midrand 
(Johannesburg). 
 
• The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC). Established in 2005, ECOSOCC seeks to 
build partnerships between African governments and civil society. It will include African social 
groups, professional groups, NGOs, and cultural organizations. ECOSOCC currently has interim 
members serving two-year terms - it is expected to become fully operational in 2007-2008. 
 
• The Court of Justice. In 2004, the AU agreed that the regional African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights would be merged with the Court of Justice. A draft protocol for the merger is presently under 
consideration. The Court is located in Arusha, Tanzania. 
 
• The Financial Institutions. The AU charter names three bodies: the African Central Bank, the African 
Monetary Fund, and the African Investment Bank. Of these, only the African Investment Bank has 
been established, but it is not yet functional. It will be based in Tripoli, Libya. 
 
Drawing from the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, also known as the Cairo 
Declaration (adopted by the OAU in 1993), the AU adopted, in 2002, the Protocol Relating to the 
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU. Besides the Peace and Security Council, the 
Protocol also established a Panel of the Wise, a Continental Early Warning System, an African 
Standby Force, and a Peace Fund. 
 
• The Panel of the Wise is composed of five highly respected African personalities, each representing 
one of the AU sub-regions, and plays a conflict prevention and peacemaking role20. After the 
approval by the PSC in November of the “Modalities for the Function of the Panel”, it has been 
officially launched in December 200721.  
 
• The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) consists of an observation and monitoring center (the 
Situation Room), responsible for data collection and analysis on the basis of an indicators module22; 
                                                                                                                                                  
before the P&S Council meeting scheduled to address the situation. Their role is to engage in constructive dialogue 
in order to produce a framework at the end. Conventionally, Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt (even if not members 
of PSC) are contacted and their opinion is taken into consideration; (4) Meeting of PSC: final decision is taken 
(normally the framework is approved); (5) Publication. 
19 According to an AU official the most salient shortcoming of the PSC is “the laziness of P&S Council members”. 
Generally, members come to the meetings without background preparation. They lack knowledge and sometimes 
true motivation. The embassies are poorly equipped with human resources and lack research capacity for P&S 
Council members to prepare themselves conveniently before the discussions.  
20 The five members of the Panel, which includes Salim Ahmed Salim, Brigalia Bam, Ahmed Ben Bella, Elisabeth K. 
Pognon and Miguel Trovoada, have been appointed in January 2007 for a three-year period. 
21 A workshop with the presence of several experts in mediation was also held in December 2007 in order to help 
the AU in framing the work of the Panel. 
22 The Situation Room uses primarily open media sources and emphasizes potential, actual and post-conflict 
situations, elections, and humanitarian problems. In addition, it also uses data generated by AU’s 12 field missions, 
although the briefings are often hindered by communication problems. The Situation Room is funded by German 
GTZ, British DFID, Danish DANIDA, and USAid. The staff is 13 people (2 communication assistants and 11 
analysts), who work on a 3-shift basis. It produces two types of reports on a daily basis: Daily News Highlights 
(compiled by open media sources and distributed to a large audience), and Daily Report (compiled using field mission 
data and distributed only internally). Periodically, it also issues Flash Reports whenever there is breaking news, Weekly 
Updates on Somalia and Sudan, and Compiled Reports on particular issues when requested by Commission staff.  A 
roadmap has been produced for the development of the CEWS. However, the roadmap still needs to be costed and 
programmed to allow for monitoring and evaluation of its implementation.  
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and the monitoring centers of the African sub-regional organizations (ECCAS, ECOWAS, SADC, 
IGAD). However, the circulation of data between the AU and the sub-regional organizations is still 
non-existent due to lack of political motivation and funding constraints. The MoU between the AU 
and the sub-regional organizations (signed in January 2008), and the creation of liaison offices at the 
AU by the sub-regional organizations (operational since early 2008) will likely remove some of these 
obstacles. Despite these impediments, CEWS is not paralyzed and some progress, even if is very 
limited, has been attained23. According to the AU Early-Warning Expert, Mr. Charles Mwaura, the 
harmonization of the different early-warning mechanism is not problematic. The only possible 
exception could be the integration of SADC’s data - since it is based upon intelligence sources.  
 
• The AU Standby Force (ASF) will be constituted by multidisciplinary contingents, with civilian and 
military capacity. It will be composed of five or six brigades of 3,000 to 5,000 troops stationed 
around Africa by 2010. At the 3rd meeting of the African Chiefs of Defense Staff (ACDS), held in 
Addis Ababa in 2003, a ‘Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force 
(ASF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC)’24 was adopted. The establishment of ASF, however, 
is lagging behind schedule. Most sub-regional organizations are setting up their brigades with no 
clear supervision from the AU, whereas others – namely the central and the northern brigades – are 
in a standstill.  
 
• The Peace Fund provides financial resources for peace support missions and other operational 
activities related to peace and security. It funded, for instance, parts of AU’s peace efforts in Darfur. 
  
Finally, in terms of organizational capacity, it is important to retain that, based on the 
recommendations of the 2001 report from the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty entitled ‘The Responsibility to Protect’, the AU has recognized the right to intervene in 
internal conflicts, in case circumstances are grave “namely war crimes, genocide, and crimes against 
humanity” (Protocol, Article 4-j; Constitutive Act, article 4-h25). 
RESOURCE CAPACITY 
In total the AU has presently a staff of approximately 700, of which roughly 30 work in peace and 
security related issues (in headquarters)26. The number of staff and the level of qualifications is 
visibly inadequate to deal effectively with the new work being generated by the wider mandate of the 
AU compared to the OAU and the demands of member states. AU’s expansion has outgrown the 
physical capacity of the headquarters to sustain it. To the initial complex founded in the 1960s, a new 
Congress Center was added in 2003 and, in 2009, a new 23-stories office building will be finalized 
(built by China at a cost of USD $150 million). 
 
The budget of the AU for the year 2007 amounted to USD $133 million. A total amount of USD 
$96 million is to be contributed by member states on the basis of the approved scale of assessment; 
whereas USD $36 million is earmarked for specific programs secured from partners. Of the assessed 
contributions of member states, 75 percent of the budget is paid by Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria 
and South Africa. The African Union finances are hampered by the importance of payment arrears. 
In 2007, AU finances experts estimated that a total of US$106.8 million in payments was still 
                                                
23 The AU seems to be making some progress both in terms of data collection (acquisition of software and 
hardware) and in terms of analysis (the ‘Strategy for Conflict Assessment Handbook’ has been drafted). The 
Conflict Management Division has also organized a meeting, in 2007, with civil society groups to assess what kind 
of input they could give to CEWS. 
24 The Framework Document calls for the establishment of the ASF in two phases: in phase one (up to 30 June 
2005), the objective was to establish a strategic level management capacity, whereas in phase two (1 July 2005 to 30 
June 2010), it is envisaged that the AU would have the capacity to deploy and to manage complex peacekeeping 
operations. 
25 It was reiterated in ‘The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations’ - the AU’s 
response document to the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. 
26 The exact number seems to be unknown for all AU officials interviewed. These figures are estimative. 
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outstanding. Moreover, only seven member states were up to date with their payments while 21 
member states were a year or more in arrears. 
 
Major donors to the AU Commission include the European Union. The support of the EU to the 
AU is centered on the African Peace Facility27. It was agreed upon at the EU/ACP Council of 
Ministers (11 December 2003), and it allows EUR €250 million to be used in (a) support to African-
led peace support operations, (b) capacity building of African peace and security architecture. 
According to EU guidelines, “each operation to be financed from the Peace Facility will have to be 
initiated by the AU and/or the sub-regional organizations (…). As a general rule, when a sub-
regional organization takes an initiative, this initiative shall have the political approval of the AU.”28 
The Peace Facility has been used to fund the AU missions in Sudan (AMIS I and AMIS II), AU 
Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC), the AU Mission in Somalia 
(AMISOM), Multinational Force of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community - 
CEMAC (FOMUC), staff recruitment and training in the REC’s, and for capacity building of the 
Peace and Security Department of the AU – namely the organization of ASF workshops, staff 
recruitment, and creation of liaison offices between the AU and REC’s (located in Addis Ababa and 
inaugurated in early 2008)29. Despite the budget initially earmarked, the Peace Facility ended up 
disbursing up to EUR €375 million until the end of 2007. Aware of the need to increase its financial 
commitment, the EU agreed in April 2006 to provide EUR €300 million under the 10th European 
Development Fund so that the African Peace Facility can continue its activities for another three-
year period (2008-2010).  
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Conflict Prevention and Peacemaking 
The AU has been instrumental in conflict prevention and peacemaking efforts. In Sudan, it helped 
negotiate an initial ceasefire and hosted peace talks from 2004 onwards between the Sudanese 
government and representatives of Darfur's rebel groups in Abuja, Nigeria. The talks which 
proceeded with the support and close cooperation of international partners, including the United 
Nations, resulted in the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on 5 May 2006. In Togo, the AU 
reacted forcefully to the unlawful takeover of the Togolese presidency by Faure Gnassingbé 
following the death of his father, President Gnassingbé Eyadéma, in February 2005. Similarly, it 
intervened with peacemaking efforts following the military coup in Mauritania, in August 2005. In 
Sudan, in 2005-2006, the AU Special Envoy and Chief Mediator for the Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks, 
Salim Ahmed Salim, has worked diligently (although not successfully) in bringing the parties 
together. In Côte d’Ivoire Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic 
of Congo, in their capacities of AU Mediators, have carried out numerous initiatives to move 
forward the peace process. During 2005, the African Union was also instrumental in deterring 
tensions between the DRC and Rwanda. The AU even envisaged at one point sending 
peacekeepers to eastern-DRC. In Chad, in December 2005, shortly after the government declared a 
'state of belligerency' with Sudan, the AU sent delegates to both nations and the AU’s chairman 
proposed a five-way, one-day summit grouping the leaders of Egypt, Libya, Chad, Sudan and Nigeria 
to solve the conflict. In 2007, AU mediators visited Sudan, Chad and the Central African 
Republic to try to ease tensions created by the Darfur crisis. In 2008, the AU attempted to mediate 
between government and opposition parties in Kenya. 
 
Peacebuilding  
The Conflict Management Division (CMD) has adopted a Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development 
Program and has produced a ‘Handbook on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development’, which 
                                                
27 The legal basis for the Peace Facility derives from the Cotonou Agreement (Article 11).  
28 Paragraph 7.2.2. of the Financing Proposal. AIDCO/12/04-EN (Rev.2), page 13. 
29 The African peace support operations have received the bulk of the Peace Facility’s budget: AMIS, €305.6 
million; FOMUC, €23.4 million; AMISOM, €15million; Comoros, €5million.  
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serves as the guidelines for the program’s application. According to CMD’s Expert in Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction and Peace Building, Dr. Naison Ngoma, the Program was designed to be a flexible 
document that is adjustable to the environment of the country (or sub-region) where it is meant to 
be employed. The Program has received inputs from the sub-regional organizations. AU officials 
acknowledge that AU’s post-war reconstruction capacity is still not robust, but the new Handbook 
will aid the organization in being more pragmatic and more targeted.  
 
As far as election observation is concerned, the AU has recently dispatched observers to elections in 
Algeria (2004), Botswana (2004), Burundi (2005), Chad (2006), Ethiopia (2005), Ghana (2004), 
Lesotho (2007), Malawi (2004), Mauritania (2007), Mauritius (2005), Mozambique (2004), Niger 
(2004), Nigeria (2003 and 2007), Senegal (2007), South Africa (2004), Tanzania (2005), Uganda 
(2005), Zambia (2006), and Zimbabwe (2005). The African Union has also been involved in the 
monitoring of the constitutional referendum in Mauritania (2006). In 2002 it adopted a Declaration on 
the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa. 
 
Peacekeeping and Enforcement 
• Burundi (April 2003 - May 2004) - the mandate was to supervise, observe, monitor and verify the 
implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement (also known as Arusha Agreement for Peace and 
Reconciliation for Burundi), signed in August 2000, in order to further consolidate the peace process 
in Burundi.30 In 2004, the UN took over the peacekeeping operations from the AU (ONUB).  
 
• Sudan/Darfur (August 2004 - ) - it helped broker a cease-fire between the government of Sudan 
and rebel groups. It initially had fewer than one hundred observers in Darfur to monitor the 
agreement, but gradually increased its presence to include soldiers and police. By 2005, the AU had 
nearly 7,000 troops in Darfur. A more sizable, better equipped UN peacekeeping force was originally 
proposed for September 2006, but due to Sudanese government opposition, it was not implemented. 
AMIS' mandate was extended repeatedly throughout 2006 and 2007, while the situation in Darfur 
continued to escalate. On January 1st 2008, AMIS was finally replaced by the United Nations – 
African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). 
 
• Burundi (January 2007 - ) – The mandate of the AU Special Task Force in Burundi is to facilitate 
the implementation of the Dar es Salaam peace agreement of June 2006, between the government 
and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL (commonly known as “FNL”) - the most extreme Hutu group, which 
had not taken part in the Arusha Agreement. The force is composed of the South African Battalion 
that served under the UN Mission in Burundi. It has been re-hatted under the AU mandate when the 
UN mandate came to an end on 31 December 2006. 
 
• Somalia (March 2007 - ) – the objective is to carry out support for dialogue and reconciliation by 
assisting with the free movement, safe passage and protection of all those involved in a national 
reconciliation congress involving all stakeholders. It includes assistance with the implementation of 
the National Security and Stabilization Plan, and contribution to the creation of the necessary 
security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance. The mission has a Chapter VII 
mandate. AMISOM is expected to comprise 8,000 troops but by January 2008 only a batch of 1,500 
AU peacekeepers from Uganda and around 400 from Burundi have been deployed. 
 
• Comoros (May 2007 - ) – the African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the 
Comoros (MAES) is composed of approximately 300 soldiers and police. The objective is to re-
establish peace and security to the archipelago. The fighting was sparked when Mohamed Bacar, the 
leader of one of the islands (Anjouan) refused to stand down as the constitution demands if he wants 
to run again for president. The AU condemned the attacks on Anjouan “as well as acts of 
harassment that have been committed in the island.” In October 2007, the AU also decided to 
                                                
30 The original budget that the AU drew up for AMIB was USD $225 million, eventually reduced to USD $135 
million for the first year. 
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impose individual sanctions on 168 leaders of Anjouan by freezing their foreign accounts and 
restricting their ability to travel. The AU’s first engagement in Comoros, in order to prevent the 
fragmentation of the Comoros federation, dates back to 1997-1999 when it was still the OAU. To 
date it has deployed 6 missions to stop electoral processes from mutating into political turmoil. 
According to Peace Support Operation Division’s officials interviewed (PSOD), all missions in 
Comoros have been deployed under the Cairo Declaration and not the AU Constitutive Act. They 
are not, therefore, peacekeeping operations but rather military observation missions.  
COOPERATION WITH THE UN 
The World Summit Outcome Document (2005), the report of the Secretary General pursuant to 
UNSC Resolution 1631 entitled “A Regional-Global Security Partnership: Challenges and Solutions” 
(2006), and the UN Security Council “Presidential Statement on the Relationship Between the 
United Nations and Regional Organizations, in Particular the African Union, in the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security” (28 March 2007) provide information about the interaction 
between the AU and the UN. The World Summit Outcome Document pledged to “support the 
development and implementation of a ten-year plan for capacity-building with the AU” (italics added), in 
recognition that, of all regions worldwide, African is in the greatest need. The Plan constitutes the 
central element of UN-AU strategic partnership. The program, which nurses African’s native 
ambitions, will cover ongoing partnerships and a wide range of areas including conflict prevention, 
early warning and electoral assistance, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, governance, human rights, and 
the rule of law; disarmament, humanitarian response, economic, social, trade and development, 
human settlements, recovery and food security, education, culture and health. 
 
Consultations to agree on a framework for enhancing the UN’s support to the AU under the aegis of 
the capacity building plan are ongoing. In 2006, a high level delegation of UN staff, composed of all 
relevant UN Department and agencies visited Addis Ababa, to discuss a strategic framework. In 
November 2006, the UN and the AU signed a Declaration on Enhancing AU-UN cooperation in 
the fields of peace and security. In June 2007 it was agreed to hold, at least once a year, joint 
meetings between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council either in Addis 
Ababa or New York.  
 
Also of interest, actions were taken at the regional level to organize the activities of the agencies and 
programs of the UN system around 9 thematic clusters covering the priority areas of the New 
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). The goal was to enhance the coordinated response 
of the UN system in support of NEPAD. This Regional Consultations Mechanism (RCMs) is a 
framework for consultations aiming to fast-track program implementation system-wide by the 
United Nations. Those meetings are convened by the Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) 
and held on an annual basis, at the headquarters of the Commission, in Addis Ababa. So far 8 
regional consultations have been organized (last one in November 2007). Since 2006, one of the 
thematic clusters is dedicated to peace and security (sub-divided in peacebuilding, human 
rights/reconciliation, and peace and security architecture). UN-DPA has been designated to convene 
this cluster31. 
 
Moreover, a number of important multilateral initiatives have been launched in recent years, aimed at 
promoting peace and development in Africa. They include the United Nations New Agenda for the 
Development of Africa in the 1990s, the UN System-wide Special Initiative on Africa, the Tokyo 
International Conference on African Development, the United Nations Program of Action for the 
Least Developed Countries for the 1990s, and Commitment 7 of the Copenhagen Declaration on 
Social Development. 
 
In the spirit of partnership, the UN has cooperated with the AU and its sub-regional organizations, 
which are playing an increasingly prominent role in the maintenance of peace and security, electoral 
                                                
31 Other participants include UNLO, UNHCR, ILO, OHCHR, FAO, IOM, DPKO, WFP, UNAIDS, and WHO. 
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assistance and the promotion of good governance in Africa. Four out of the seven current United 
Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa are composed of “re-hatted” African troops originally 
deployed under the auspices of either ECOWAS or the African Union. The Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has carried out a number of activities aimed at assisting the AU 
Commission to develop its long-term institutional capacity to plan, deploy and manage complex 
multidimensional peacekeeping operations, including the establishment in Addis Ababa of a UN 
Assistance Cell in support to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS); and participated in AU 
consultations and workshops in connection with the operationalization of an African Standby Force 
(ASF). DPKO has been involved in peacekeeping training exercises for African troops and police at 
various African Centers of Excellence - the units responsible for the strategic and operational 
training of the sub-regional peacekeeping forces. It has also provided technical advice for the 
enhancement of the operations of the AU’s Situation Room32. The UN has also established a small 
assistance cell at the headquarters of the AU Commission in Addis Ababa, under the authority of the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Sudan, with the primary task of supporting 
AMIS. 
 
Despite these important milestones, the AU and the UN still need to agree on a clear division of 
roles and responsibilities. There are pertinent questions on the degree of the collaboration between 
both organizations (e.g. the UN logistic assets that could be put at the disposal of the AU)33. 
Unsurprisingly, the AU Peace and Security Council issued on its 98th meeting (November 2007), a 
document entitled “Contribution of the AU to the Report to be Submitted by the UN Secretary 
General in Pursuance of UN Security Council Presidential Statement on the Relationship Between 
the United Nations and Regional Organizations, in Particular the African Union, in the Maintenance 
of International Peace and Security”. There, AU’s PSC contends that in order to develop a stronger 
and more structured relationship between the UN and the AU in the maintenance of peace and 
security in Africa, there is a need to “support effectively the efforts made in the continent to 
operationalize the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), as provided for by the PSC 
Protocol, and strengthen the institutional, logistical and operational capacity of the various 
components of the APSA”.  
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
• UNGA Resolutions: A/RES/56/48 (7 Dec. 2001); A/RES/57/48 (21 Nov. 2002); 
A/RES/59/213 (20 Dec. 2004); A/RES/61/296 (17 Sept. 2007); and A/RES/61/296 (17 Sept. 
2007) on “Cooperation Between the United Nations and AU”; 
 
• Francis, David J. (2006). Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security Systems. Aldershot: Ashgate; 
 
• Murithi, Timothy (2005). The African Union: Pan-Africanism, Peacebuilding and Development. Aldershot: 
Ashgate; 
 
• Kent, Vanessa and Mark Malan (2003), “The African Standby Force, Progress and Prospects” in 
African Security Review Vol. 12 (3). 
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ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was created in 1967, in Jakarta, by Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, as a regional arrangement with the objective of 
fostering economic cooperation, social progress, cultural development, and regional peace. The 
ASEAN’s predecessor was the Association of Southeast Asia – an alliance of three countries (the 
Philippines, Thailand and Malaysia) created in 1961. In the 1980s and 1990s ASEAN grew both in 
mandate and membership, counting now 10 member states34. In order to fulfill its objectives, 
ASEAN is organized according to the following structure: 
 
• The Meeting of Heads of Government/States of member states – or ASEAN Summit, is the main 
decision-making body governing the organization. It is held every year. 
 
• The Annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) of foreign ministers is responsible for the overall 
coordination of the organization’s activities. 
 
• The ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) coordinates economic cooperation. Foreign and Economy 
ministers also meet regularly through the Joint Ministerial Meeting (JMM) before the ASEAN Summits. 
 
• Numerous other ministerial groups also meet regularly. ASEAN has developed over the years a 
high number of sectoral ministerial meetings (28 in total at present) focused on coordinating regional 
cooperation and more recently, the implementation of the Vientiane Action Programme 2004-201035 
and the Blueprints for ASEAN Community Building. 
 
• The Standing Committee, chaired by the foreign minister of the country holding the AMM, develops 
organizational policy and coordinates ASEAN’s activities. 
 
• The ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta provides advice, initiates actions, and implements cooperation 
activities. For the moment, the ASEAN Secretariat does not have any unit or department on peace 
and security. The mandate of the current Secretary General, Dr. Surin Pitsuwan (from Thailand), will 
last until 2012.  
                                                
34 ASEAN’s member states are: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.   
35 The Vientiane Action Program is a six-year plan (adopted on the 29th of November of 2004), put forward by the 
ASEAN leaders in order to establish the ASEAN Community, which is the end goal of the organization for 2015. 
“I hope that in the field of peace and security, too, we will see the beginnings of 
closer cooperation between ASEAN and the United Nations.” 
 KOFI ANNAN  
Jakarta Address SG/SM/7303 (2001) 
Founded in 1967 (Bangkok Declaration) 
Headquarters in Jakarta, Indonesia. 10 Member States 
www.aseansec.org 
 
Mandate in Peace and Security:  
. Bangkok Declaration (1967) 
. Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (1971) 
. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, articles 2.d and 13-17 (1976) 
. Declaration of ASEAN Concord I and II (1976 and 2003) 
. ASEAN Charter: Objectives and Chapter VII (signed in 2007, ratification pending) 
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• As for peace and security-related structures, ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) (see 
below) envisages the constitution of a High Council at ministerial level for peaceful settlement of 
regional disputes (Article 15 of the TAC). This is an ad-hoc mechanism for conflict prevention and 
peacemaking, but no mechanism exists pertaining to peacekeeping or enforcement; 
 
• The ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) is one of the above-mentioned ministerial 
meetings, which had its inaugural meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 9 May 2006. The ADMM was 
created by the Working Group on Security Cooperation of the Special Senior Officials’ Meeting (Special 
SOM) to complement regional efforts for the promotion of security dialogue and cooperation. 
 
In the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Charter (12 December 2005), 
ASEAN leaders recognized the importance of having ‘an appropriate institutional framework’ - to 
confer legal personality, determine the functions, and develop areas of competence of ASEAN’s key 
bodies. The ASEAN Charter was eventually signed on 20 November 2007, establishing the group as 
a legal entity. The Charter creates a permanent representation for its members (at its Secretariat in 
Jakarta), and commits Heads of Government/ State to meeting twice a year. The Charter will enter 
into force 30 days after ratification by the 10th member state. The ASEAN structures will be 
transformed and enlarged to include: 
 
• Coordination Council, composed of ASEAN Foreign Ministers and mandated to assist ASEAN 
leaders in the preparation of Summits, with support from the Secretary General of ASEAN and the 
ASEAN Secretariat. It meets twice a year. 
 
• Community Councils with relevant sectoral ministerial bodies (meeting twice a year), include the 
ASEAN Political and Security Council (APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community Council (AEC) 
and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Council (ASCC).  
 
• The Ministerial Meeting (AMM of Foreign Ministers) will be renamed as ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
Meeting and will be one of the four Sectoral Ministerial Bodies of the APSC Council. 
 
• A Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN will be established in Jakarta – comprised of one 
permanent representative from each ASEAN member state. Essentially the new Committee will take 
over many of the regional functions of the ASEAN Standing Committee (ASC), including external 
relations and supervising the ASEAN Secretariat.  
 
• An ASEAN Human Rights Body will be created as a new organ of ASEAN. The Terms of Reference 
are yet to be formulated. 
 
• The ASEAN Foundation, which is located in Jakarta, will be accountable to the Secretary-General 
of ASEAN. It used to be directly supervised by the Board of Trustees, consisting mainly of ASEAN 
Ambassadors to Indonesia in Jakarta. 
 
Conflict Prevention and Peaceful Settlement of Disputes 
In a region where the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention are of central importance, 
ASEAN has been successful in preventing intra-regional conflicts for the part forty years. Regarding 
its political objective of peace and stability, ASEAN’s Declaration speaks only of ‘respect for justice 
and the rule of law’ and ‘adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter’. But security 
concerns and political cooperation were never far from the ASEAN founders’ intentions. By 
fostering unity and solidarity through international cooperation, the member states attempt to 
prevent, contain, and solve any intra-regional conflict.  
 
The mandate of ASEAN in peace and security is stated in its founding Declaration (1967), where the 
maintenance peace and security is declared to be one of the objectives of the organization. 
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Furthermore, the Association has specified a set of norms to govern the conduct of relations among 
its members and has established procedures and institutions for conflict management and control in 
three major documents: the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality – ZOPFAN (1971), the Declaration of 
ASEAN Concord  (1976) and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) (1976).  
 
The ZOPFAN commits all ASEAN members to “exert efforts to secure the recognition of and 
respect for Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any manner of 
interference by outside powers”, and to “make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of 
cooperation”36.  
 
The Declaration of ASEAN Concord I (1976) determines the enlargement of ASEAN political 
cooperation. It also adopted principles for regional stability and a program of action for political 
cooperation which included settling regional disputes “by peaceful means as soon as possible” and 
strengthening political solidarity by promoting the harmonization of views, coordination of positions 
and, where possible and desirable, taking common action37.  
 
The Treaty of Amity (1976) provides guiding principles for cooperation, stating that political and 
security dialogue should “promote regional peace and stability by enhancing regional resilience” 
(articles 2.d and 13-17). For the resolution of disputes through regional processes, the TAC 
envisages the creation of a High Council, comprising a representative at ministerial level from each of 
the ASEAN members. The High Council is to recommend to the parties in dispute appropriate 
means of settlement such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation and may offer its good 
offices, or upon agreement of the parties in dispute, constitute itself into a committee of mediation, 
inquiry or conciliation. When deemed necessary, the High Council can recommend appropriate 
measures for the prevention of deterioration of the dispute or the situation38. To this day, TAC 
remains the only indigenous regional diplomatic instrument providing a mechanism and processes, 
and a code of conduct for the peaceful settlement of disputes. The practice of this mandate is made 
mainly through good offices.  
 
All decisions on peace and security issues are made at the intergovernmental level and on the basis of 
consensus, although this is not explicitly stated in the founding or following documents on peace 
and security issues. 
 
ASEAN’s role as a security forum increased in the 1990s. In 1992, member states issued the ASEAN 
Declaration on the South China Sea, which called for a peaceful resolution of disputes over the 
South China Sea territory claimed by several ASEAN members and by China. A 1995 Treaty 
(Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-free Zone or SEANWFZ) declared the region a nuclear free zone 
and banned the possession, use or testing of nuclear weapons.  
 
In more recent years, ASEAN has put forward new documents and forms of cooperation in this 
field: ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN or Bali Concord II (2003), the Action Plan for the ASEAN 
Community (2005) and the ASEAN Charter (2007).  
 
Currently, ASEAN is preparing the ASEAN Political-Security Blueprint and the ASEAN Socio-
Cultural Blueprint, which will be adopted by its Leaders at the 14th ASEAN Summit at the end of 
2008. The ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint has already been adopted by ASEAN Leaders 
at its 13th ASEAN Summit in Singapore.  
 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) 
The ARF was created in 1994 and presently comprises the ten ASEAN states, plus the ten ASEAN 
Dialogue Partners (Australia, Canada, China, EU, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia 
                                                
36 ASEAN, Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, 1971, available at http://www.aseansec.org/3629.htm 
37 ASEAN, Declaration of ASEAN Concord, 1976, available at http://www.aseansec.org/1216.htm 
38 ASEAN, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, 1976, Art. 14-15, available at http://www.aseansec.org/1217.htm 
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and the United States), one ASEAN Observer (Papua New Guinea) as well as North Korea, 
Mongolia, Pakistan, East Timor, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The ARF was created with a mandate to 
discuss political and security and is now the principal forum for security dialogue in Asia, 
complementing the various bilateral alliances and dialogues. The ARF is characterized by consensus 
decision-making and minimal institutionalization. The 1995 ARF Concept Paper set out a three-
stage, evolutionary approach to the ARF's development, moving from confidence-building to 
preventive diplomacy and, in the long term, towards a conflict resolution capability. 
 
Having a policy of minimal institutionalization, ARF’s only permanent body is the ARF Unit, which 
was established inside the ASEAN Secretariat (June 2004) with the objectives: (i) to support the 
enhanced role of the ARF Chair, including interaction with other regional and international 
organizations, defense officials dialogue and Track II organizations; (ii) to function as depository of 
ARF documents/papers; (iii) to manage database/registry; and (iv) to provide secretarial works and 
administrative support, including serving as ARF’s institutional memory.  
 
Since it was created, ARF has focused on confidence building measures and has had modest gains in 
building a sense of strategic community. Presently, the preventive diplomacy tools accepted by ARF 
members include mandating the ARF Chair to coordinate, during the period between Ministerial 
meetings, ARF’s response to situations affecting the security of its members. Another instrument is 
the ARF Register of Experts and Eminent Persons, which provides a pool of expertise on regional security 
issues that may be drawn upon by the ARF Chair or individual ARF members. In July 2001 ARF 
adopted principles of preventive diplomacy in a three-stage process: (i) promotional/confidence 
building measures; (ii) development of preventive diplomacy; and (iii) elaboration of approaches to 
conflicts. A definition of preventive diplomacy was also accorded39. A non-official ‘Track II’ process 
led by non-governmental institutes complements its work. 
 
The ARF preventive diplomacy role has been further enhanced by the establishment of the Friends 
of the ARF Chair mechanism at the 14th ARF in Manila in August 2007. The mechanism is an ad-
hoc group to support the ARF Chair in terms of its good offices role and in facilitating discussions 
on issues of critical significance for regional peace and security. 
 
The ARF remains the premier security forum in the region and its evolutionary process, which 
moves at “a pace comfortable to all”, considered too slow or passive by some authors but also as the 
reason for the increasing comfort level among its participants. Such enhanced comfort level has 
enabled the Forum’s participants to exchange views and discuss issues of common concern in a 
frank and open manner and thereby encouraging transparency and mutual understanding. 
 
ASEAN Concord II 
ASEAN Concord I was followed by ASEAN Concord II or Bali Concord II (signed in Bali in October 
2003). BCII reaffirms the basic principles and policies underlying ASEAN’s approach to issues of 
regional security: peaceful settlement of disputes; renunciation of the use or threat of force to 
resolving differences; respect for the sovereignty of nations; and non-interference in internal affairs. 
It also reaffirms the other principles embodied in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast 
Asia (TAC) and the Declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality: consensus-based 
decision-making; the comprehensive nature of security; a nuclear weapons-free Southeast Asia; the 
importance of the High Council of the TAC as a reflection of ASEAN’s commitment to the peaceful 
resolution of disputes. Finally, BCII reiterates the primacy of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as 
                                                
39 The accepted definition of preventive diplomacy was the following: “Consensual diplomatic and political action 
taken by sovereign states with the consent of all directly involved parties to help prevent disputes and conflicts from 
arising between states that could potentially pose a threat to regional peace and stability; to help prevent such 
disputes and conflicts from escalating into armed confrontation; and to help minimize the impact of such disputes 
and conflicts in the region”. It includes the following instruments: confidence building efforts; norms building; 
enhancing channels of communication; and the role of the ARF chair. 
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a venue for enhancing political and security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific; and the role of ASEAN 
as ARF’s primary driving force.  
 
Beyond the reaffirmation of these well-known ASEAN principles, policies and commitments, BCII 
charts the future direction of ASEAN security cooperation, namely the establishment of an ASEAN 
Community by 2015 - with the new motto of “One Vision, One Identity, One Community”. The 
ASEAN Community will comprise three integrated pillars – ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN 
Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. The ASEAN Security Community 
Plan of Action envisages the strengthening of regional cooperation in the fields of conflict prevention, 
conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding, including the establishment of an ASEAN 
Institute for Peace and Reconciliation, promoting technical cooperation with the UN and relevant 
regional organizations; and establishing a network among existing ASEAN member states’ 
peacekeeping centers to conduct joint planning, training, and sharing of experiences, with a view to 
establishing an ASEAN arrangement for the maintenance of peace and stability40. 
 
ASEAN Charter 
Finally, with the ASEAN Charter, peace and security are established together constituting  a primary 
objective. A mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes is envisaged in chapter VII 
(‘Settlement of Disputes’). However, the Charter does not recognize the need to establish conflict 
prevention and early warning mechanisms at the regional level.  
 
Military Cooperation and Peacekeeping 
Since ASEAN’s foundation, numerous suggestions have been put forward to provide the regional 
grouping with a military-security role. Such ideas have included formal/informal commitments by its 
member states to assist each other in the event of armed aggression; ASEAN-wide military exercises; 
regular meetings of ASEAN defense and interior ministers; standardization of weapons; and the 
creation of an ASEAN defense industry. The ASEAN members have not only rejected the idea of a 
military pact but have also opposed any form of military-security cooperation, agreeing that bilateral 
arrangements undertaken outside the ASEAN framework were the most desirable form of military-
security cooperation41. In this context, the organization also discussed an Indonesian proposal to 
create regional peacekeeping cooperation under its auspices. While some of its members suggest that 
this proposal is “too early”, individual ASEAN countries, including Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia 
and Singapore have all contributed contingents to either the UN-authorized or the UN-led peace 
operation in East Timor.  
RESOURCE CAPACITY 
The ASEAN Secretariat staff now consists of the Secretary General, two Deputies Secretary General 
(from Cambodia and Indonesia - Lao PDR and Myanmar are next in line to nominate theirs), 60 
openly-recruited staff from 9 member states (none from Brunei Darussalam), and about 200 support 
staff (almost all are Indonesians)42. There is no specific staff allocated to conflict prevention, 
peacebuilding or peace and security in general. The ARF’s Unit, its only permanent structure, is 
placed under the Office of the Secretary-General. 
 
For the financial year of 2007, the organizational core budget is USD $9 million. Currently, 
members’ contribution to the operating budget is equally distributed - about 0.005% of the total sum 
of members’ government revenues. In 2007 each member state contributed USD $905 thousand to 
the budget. In comparison, the EU budget is about 1 to 2% of total government revenues. 
                                                
40 ASEAN Security Community Action Plan, available at http://www.aseansec.org/16829.htm 
41 Acharya, Amitav (1992), “Regional Military-Security Cooperation in the Third World: a Conceptual Analysis of 
the Relevance and Limitations of ASEAN” in Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 29 (1), page 12. 
42 ASEAN Media Release, “Interesting Changes to the ASEAN Institutional Framework”, 20 November 2007, 
www.aseansec.org/21087.htm 
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According to the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS), the 
ASEAN budget should be increased. This could be done gradually to reach 0.025% of total 
government revenues43. Furthermore, some member states give ad-hoc contributions. In the 13th 
ASEAN Summit (20 November 2007), Singapore committed to contribute to the Secretariat to 
upgrade its information systems. 
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
ASEAN leaders have maintained their traditional respect for the principle of non-interference. 
Nevertheless, in practice, ASEAN adopts a more subtle approach that entails “actual interference” in 
each other’s affairs. For instance, ASEAN leaders adhere publicly to the vaunted “ASEAN way” of 
non-interference while privately - behind-the-scenes - quiet diplomacy take place to resolve issues 
causing tension between states. ASEAN’s activities in the field of peace and security have therefore 
been limited to good offices, official declarations and political statements on conflict situations, or 
confidence-building measures (such as the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality and the South-East 
Asian Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone) with very little publicity made to the Association’s endeavors in this 
field. 
 
Indeed, in its first 25 years of existence ASEAN concentrated primarily on economic issues, 
maintaining a strict ‘hands-off’ policy vis-à-vis its own ‘membership area’ (secessionist movements in 
Philippines and Indonesia) and left the mediation efforts over the Indonesian province of Aceh to a 
Finnish-based non-governmental organization and over the Mindanao secession in Philippines to the 
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The other major conflict issue, East-Timor, was left to 
the UN.  
 
In the post Cold War this policy went through significant, yet cautious, changes and ASEAN has 
gradually developed a regional security policy, tested in its policy towards Myanmar. Some examples 
are the diplomatic initiative for the political settlement of the Cambodian conflict; the observer 
Mission to the Cambodian elections; and a policy of cooperation in seeking the settlement of 
territorial and jurisdictional disputes in the South China Sea (Manila Declaration of 1992).  
 
One of the most important chapters in the history of ASEAN’s diplomacy took place in the 1980s 
and 1990s during the Cambodian conflict. ASEAN sponsored resolutions at the UN General 
Assembly with constant support from the international community and maintained a dialogue with 
all parties of the conflict. This eventually led to the Jakarta Informal Meetings at which the four 
Cambodian factions discussed peace and national reconciliation. The process extended to the early 
1990s culminating in the 19-nation Paris Conference on Cambodia (chaired by France and 
Indonesia), which produced the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodian Conflict, 
leading to the holding of elections supervised by the UN, to which the ASEAN sent an observation 
mission. 
 
ASEAN has consistently pursued a policy of cooperation in seeking peaceful settlement of disputes 
in the common territorial disputes faced by Southeast Asia member states. With reference to the 
South China Sea dispute, ASEAN recognized that the escalation of the conflict could directly affect 
peace and stability in the region, and therefore issued a declaration on this matter urging all parties to 
solve all disputes peacefully, without resort to force. The Manila Declaration of 1992 proposed a modus 
vivendi in the South China Sea, and ASEAN and China are currently working on a Code of Conduct 
to govern state behavior in the disputed territories. Furthermore, ASEAN has made an additional 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in the 8th ASEAN Summit (4 November 2002) 
reaffirming member states’ commitment to resolve their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by 
peaceful means. 44 
                                                
43 ASEAN-ISIS, The ASEAN Charter, Memorandum N.1/2006, Bali, Indonesia, 18 April 2006, Appendix 3, p. 15. 
Available at www.siiaonline.org/uploads/693/AI-Memo-18April-ASEAN_Charter.doc 
44 See www.aseansec.org/13163.htm  
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In the case of self-determination of East Timor, ASEAN made several official declarations and 
political statements supporting the implementation of the agreements between the United Nations 
and the Indonesian and Portuguese governments on modalities for the popular consultations of the 
East Timorese (held in August 1999). As violence shook the territory following the referendum, 
ASEAN leaders gathered to address the problem and some of them agreed to contribute to an 
International Force for East Timor. Other ASEAN members extended humanitarian and other 
forms of assistance. ASEAN has also called on the international community to help East Timor 
achieve peace, stability and prosperity during its transition to full independence, which would 
contribute to the stability of the region. 
 
ASEAN has also shown interest in its membership’s neighborhood, whose stability naturally 
influences its own. The participation of North Korea in the ARF for the first time in 2000 was an 
important step in this direction. ASEAN expressed support for the historic summit between North 
and South Korea leaders, held in Pyongyang on 13-15 June 2000. It also commended the North-
South Joint Declaration, the first agreement signed at the highest level since the division of the 
Korean Peninsula in 1945.   
 
Respect to the principle of non-interference seems to be the main explanation for the lack of overt 
intervention by the ASEAN in Myanmar (a member of ASEAN since 1997). ASEAN´s policy on 
Myanmar was first derived from the policy of “constructive engagement” initiated in 1991 by the 
Thai government and later regionalized as an ASEAN policy. However, talks on Myanmar’s possible 
expulsion of ASEAN have been common since the Junta’s detention of democracy activist Aung 
San Suu Kyi at the end of May 2003. The threat of expulsion from ASEAN is in any case unlikely, as 
the decision-making rule for the Association is based on consensus.  
 
During the 13th ASEAN Summit (2007), the ASEAN Chairman produced a Statement on 
Myanmar45 wherin member states accepted that this is an internal affair of Myanmar not to be dealt 
with by ASEAN but directly between Myanmar and the UN. ASEAN continues to urge the 
Myanmar Government to continue working with the UN (in its ‘good offices’ Mission led by Prof. 
Ibrahim Gambari) towards the peaceful transition to democracy. Furthermore, ASEAN emphasizes 
that this issue should not obstruct ASEAN’s integration efforts, especially the ASEAN Charter46 and 
the ASEAN Community.  
COOPERATION WITH THE UN 
ASEAN has a long-lasting relationship with the UN, namely through its Development Program 
(UNDP), which was designated ASEAN Dialogue Partner already in 1977. This cooperation is 
mainly in the economic field - UNDP has assisted ASEAN in its economic cooperation initiatives 
since the inception of the partnership. More recently it supported ASEAN’s goal of realizing the 
ASEAN Community. More specifically in the field of peace and security, ASEAN and the UN have 
held an annual conference on conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peacebuilding since 2001. 
This conference is jointly organized by UN-DPA, UNDP, the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and 
International Studies (ISIS), ASEAN Secretariat, and the host country of ASEAN. This conference 
continues to serve as a non-official venue for exchanging views, information, and experiences in 
anticipating and mediating conflicts. 
 
Furthermore, ASEAN has participated in the High-level Meetings Between the UN and Regional 
and Other Intergovernmental Organizations since 1996 and in the UN Security-Council meetings 
with the regional organizations since 2003. ASEAN has not been present in the past two HLMs 
                                                
45 ASEAN Chairman Statement on Myanmar, 20 November 2007, www.aseansec.org/21057.htm 
46 Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has indicated her country's Congress might not ratify the ASEAN 
Charter since the document had been watered down from the original draft so that Myanmar could accept it. See 
Bunn Nagara, “ASEAN Charter Reflect’s Grouping’s chequered History”, The Start Online, January 23, 2008. 
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(2005 and 2006) without giving particular justifications for its absence. At the same time ASEAN 
and the UN have been holding bilateral High-Level meetings – the first one held in Bangkok in 
February 2000 and the second one held in New York in September 2005. The last bilateral high-level 
meeting focused on issues of development and poverty eradication, health, disaster management, 
trade and investment as well as peace and security. One can speculate that this shift from the 
multilateral to the bilateral forum of dialogue might be due to ASEAN’s willingness to maintain a 
bilateral and general cooperation with the UN, without focusing too much on security issues. 
ASEAN has also signed a MoU with the UN (27 September 2007), encompassing the full range of 
cooperation (political, economic and social-cultural areas) between the two organizations, including 
in the implementation of programs for the maintenance of regional and international peace and 
security47. 
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Caribbean Community  
(CARICOM) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY  
In 1972, at the Seventh Heads of Government Conference of the Caribbean Free Trade Association 
(CARIFTA), Caribbean leaders decided to transform CARIFTA into a Common Market and 
establish the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), which is today composed of 15 member states48. 
CARICOM is primarily aimed at regional economic integration, following the European Union 
model, which dissuaded member states from developing structures tailored for peace and security. 
No article in its establishing treaty – the Treaty of Chaguaramas, provides any legal mandate to 
CARICOM to engage in the security dominion. Nevertheless, CARICOM has developed some 
functions in this field, mostly in less traditional areas of security (such as transnational crime), and 
has been involved in security crises that endangered the stability of its member states, such as in 
Haiti. 
 
CARICOM has organized itself into a state-like government structure composed of executive, 
legislative and judiciary bodies: 
 
• The Executive comprises a rotating Prime Ministerial Chairmanship, the CARICOM Secretary-General, 
and the CARICOM Headquarters Secretariat. The current Secretary General is Edwin Wilberforce 
Carrington (from Trinidad and Tobago), who was appointed in 1992, for a mandate of 5 years, and 
who has been continuously reappointed by the Conference of Heads of Government. There is also a 
quasi Cabinet of individual Heads of Government who are given responsibility over specific 
portfolios. The principal administrative organ is the Secretariat, directed by the Secretary General, 
(who acts as the administrator or the Chief Executive Officer of the Caribbean Community) – and 
including directorates of Foreign and Community Relations, Human and Social Development; 
Regional Trade and Economic Integration.  
 
• The legislative bodies are the Conference of Heads of Government, the highest authority, responsible for 
setting the Community policy, overseeing the CARICOM Supreme Court and also directing other 
organs, institutions and the Secretariat. The Common Market Council of Ministers, is the second highest 
authority, responsible for developing operational plans and setting priorities, mobilizing and 
allocating resources, and monitoring project implementation. These legislative structures are 
supported by a number of organs (the Council for Finance and Planning, the Council for Trade and 
Economic Development, the Council for Foreign and Community Relations, and the Council for 
Human and Social Development) and bodies (Legal Affairs Committee, Budget Committee, 
Committee of Central Bank Governors).  
                                                
48 The member states of CARICOM are: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, 
Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname and Trinidad & Tobago. 
              
               
      
Founded in 1973 (Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community,  
aka Treaty of Chaguaramas, revised in 2001).  
Headquarters in Georgetown, Guyana. 15 Member States 
www.caricom.org 
 
Mandate in Peace and Security:  
 
 
 
“The Caribbean Community, as a grouping of small states and an integral part of the 
international community, must continue to rely heavily on the United Nations (…) for 
the protection of its sovereignty, territorial integrity and the furtherance of its interests.”  
EDWIN CARRINGTON,  
Secretary General of CARICOM (2003) 
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• The Judiciary is the Caribbean Court of Justice, acting as the original jurisdiction for settlement of 
disputes on the functioning of the Caribbean (CARICOM) Single Market and Economy. It is based 
in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago.  
 
• The Regional Task Force on Crime and Security is the organ mostly associated to security issues. It is 
tasked to tackle non-traditional threats, including political, economic, social, health and 
environmental. It promotes multilateral activities for international security; capacity-building through 
institutional strengthening and shared surveillance; and other forms of cooperation both among 
member states, and between CARICOM, the wider Caribbean, and the international community. 
 
CARICOM is structured similarly to other regional organizations such as the African Union or the 
Organization of American States, and like them uses mediation as its main instrument for conflict 
prevention and settlement of disputes. The use of the Court of Justice – a step further to formalize 
mechanisms similar to the international legal processes for managing conflicts – is however used 
almost solely for trade issues. CARICOM’s mediators are invariably the organization’s senior 
officials or heads of Government of its member states, who have not received formal training in this 
function. Some authors put forward recommendations for the development of CARICOM’s 
mediation capacities, as this is, as mentioned, its main instrument to deal with member states’ 
instability and conflicts in the region. 
RESOURCE CAPACITY 
The staff of CARICOM is quite limited for the integrative nature of the organization, involving 
deeply integrative processes in the agricultural, economic and trade fields (Single Market and 
Economy, Common Passport, Visa and Single Domestic Space). It has approximately 180 staff 
members (only available numbers are from 2002). 
 
The yearly budget for the small Secretariat and programs is approved by the Community Council of 
Ministers and met from government contributions and external support from development banks 
and bilateral donors. The last available budget found is for the year of 2002 and is of approximately 
USD $10 million. As above-mentioned in relation to the staff of the organization, its budget is 
clearly very limited for the nature and competences of the Caribbean Community. There is no 
budget formally devoted to conflict prevention and resolution. 
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
In the area of peace and security, CARICOM actions have been ad-hoc and case-related, mostly 
through preventive diplomacy, fact-finding, confidence building, and good offices.  
 
Haiti was accepted as a CARICOM provisional member in 1998 (full membership in 2002). Since 
then, CARICOM has taken important efforts to help the country find a pacific settlement to its 
internal instability. In 2000, CARICOM sent fact-finding and electoral observation missions to the 
country, with funding from the Canadian International Development Agency. In 2001, CARICOM 
undertook a joint conciliation and negotiation mission with the OAS in order to further attempts at a 
resolution of the political instability. Subsequently the organization adopted a resolution in support 
of strengthening democracy in Haiti. In 2004, following reports of a deteriorating political situation 
in Haiti, a fact-finding mission was sent to the country, followed by a ministerial mission for 
mediation, negotiation and sustained dialogue between all parties. Later in 2006, CARICOM also 
sent an election observation mission. After the elections, CARICOM’s efforts were focused on 
reconstruction, peacebuilding and development efforts for the full integration of Haiti in 
CARICOM. 
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Furthermore, CARICOM was involved in Guyana’s explosive racial conflict (following the 
December 1997 general elections). It sent electoral observation, fact-finding, and several Chairman’s 
reconciliation missions to the country in 1998 followed by efforts for the support of constitutional 
reforms in Guyana. Since then, CARICOM has sent electoral observation missions to the country 
(2001 and 2006). 
 
Finally, in 2001, CARICOM played a mediation role, together with the OAS, in the territorial 
controversy between Venezuela and Guyana (Venezuela claimed parts of Guyana’s territory), 
encouraging dialogue between the two countries for a peaceful resolution of the controversy and 
supporting the Good Officer Process of the UN Secretary General for political reconciliation. 
 
Although not a security organization by nature, the authors Knight and Persaud consider that 
CARICOM’s involvement attests for the potential for a regional security structure, and in some 
circumstances, for regional multilateral intervention under the broader principles and institutional 
authority of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter49.  
 
Besides its missions to Haiti and Guyana, CARICOM undertook elections monitoring missions in 
Antigua and Barbuda (2004), Jamaica (2007), Saint Kitts and Nevis (2004), Saint Lucia (2006), Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines (2001 and 2005), Suriname (2005), Trinidad and Tobago (2001 and 
2007), and Turks and Caicos Islands (2003 and 2007). 
COOPERATION WITH THE UN 
The CARICOM was granted observer status in the UN General Assembly in 1991 (A/Res/46/8, 16 
October). The organization has also signed a general Cooperation Agreement with the UN 
Secretariat in 199750. This is a general cooperation agreement between the secretariats of the 
organizations, enhancing information sharing and consultations, as well as CARICOM’s invitations 
to UN meetings where observers are allowed. CARICOM has been cooperating closer with the UN 
on sustainable development, focused namely on the Caribbean Sea, but also in the fields of health 
(HIV-AIDS), disaster relief, and political and humanitarian affairs. 
In the field of security, there was some cooperation at the operational level in Haiti (the election 
observation, fact finding and reconciliation missions above mentioned were undertaken in 
cooperation with UN’s missions to Haiti), Guyana and Venezuela (as described above).  
CARICOM has been a participant in the High-Level Meetings since 1996, but has not been invited 
to the UN Security Council Meetings. Since 1991, the UN General Assembly adopts biannual 
resolutions for the strengthening of the cooperation between the two organizations.   
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Collective Security  
Treaty Organization (CSTO) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 
The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was created on the basis of the Collective 
Security Treaty (CST), signed within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) on the 15th May 1992. The Treaty, originally conceived as a military component of the CIS, 
came into force in 1994. After the dissolution of the USSR, the leaders of the Newly Independent 
States (NIS) had to solve the problem concerning the future of the Soviet nuclear and conventional 
arsenal, which was scattered around the former USSR territory. The intention of the Russian 
Federation was to put the former Soviet army under a joint CIS command, but the leaders of the 
NIS were interested in establishing their own armed forces. Moreover, by then the civil war in 
Tajikistan had begun and the situation was worsening. The leaders of the former Soviet Republics 
recognized the need to consolidate their positions and prevent spillover of the Tajik crisis into the 
region.  
 
In reaction to this development, the Collective Security Treaty was concluded. The signatories51 
confirmed their commitments to refrain from the threat or use of force in inter-state relations and 
agreed to settle all differences by peaceful means. The collective security orientation is stressed in 
Article 4 of the Treaty: “if an aggression is committed against one of the State Parties by any state or 
group of states, it will be considered as an aggression against all the State Parties to this Treaty.” The 
Treaty established the Council of Collective Security to coordinate the defense policies of its 
signatories. 
 
The CST, set-up to last for a 5-year period, was first signed by nine CIS member states on the 
assumption that all CIS countries would join. This ambition was not fulfilled – not all the CIS 
members signed the Treaty, and three of the initial signatories (Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan) 
actually withdrew from the Treaty in 1999 when the renewing protocol was signed by the presidents 
of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.52   
 
In 2002, the member states of the CST decided to transform the treaty into an international regional 
organization. In Chisinau, Moldova, they signed the Charter of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, 
granting legal status to the new entity, with effect in 18 October 2003. The organization was declared 
to be the response of the member states to the new threats to regional and international security in 
                                                
51 The member states of the CSTO are: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia, and 
Uzbekistan. 
52 In fact, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine formed GUAM in 1997 - a political, economic, and strategic 
alliance designed to strengthen the independence and sovereignty of these former Soviet Union Republics. The 
creation of the Organization is often seen as an attempt to form a counterweight to Russian influence in the region, 
although the member states refuse these claims. 
            
                         
Founded in 2002 (Charter of the CSTO).  
Headquarters in Moscow, Russia, 7 Member States. 
www.dkb.gov.ru 
 
Mandate in Peace and Security:  
. Collective Security Treaty, art. 2 (1992) 
. Charter of the CSTO, art. 3, 4 and 9 (2002) 
 
“We do not want to become a military-political alliance, but a universal 
international organization that would be able to react promptly and effectively 
to any threats and challenges.” 
NIKOLAI BORDYUZHA,  
CSTO Secretary-General 
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21st century, acting in strict accordance with their obligations under the UN Charter. The member 
states also reaffirmed their commitment to the principles and purposes of the CST. The stated aims 
of the organization are to ensure the collective defense of the territorial integrity, independence, and 
sovereignty of the member states, and to develop and intensify military and political cooperation. In 
this sense, CSTO member states committed themselves to provide immediate military assistance to 
one another in the event of an attack, but also to strengthen cooperation in their foreign policy, 
military, and technology fields. Furthermore, CSTO members pledged to cooperate on transnational 
security challenges , such as drug trafficking, trans-border criminality, terrorism and extremism.  
 
Since its creation CSTO profiles itself as an international regional organization whose objectives fall 
not only into the military-political sphere but also cover ‘soft security.’ The main ambition of the 
representatives of the organization is to create a system of collective security that protects its seven 
member states53 from external military aggression as well as any other threats and challenges. The 
internal structure of the CSTO is as follows: 
 
• The highest decision making body of the CSTO is the Collective Security Council, consisting of the 
Heads of the member states chaired by the Head of the State where the Council is taking place. The 
Council decides on the CSTO actions and ensures coordination and joint actions between member 
states.  
 
• Other decision making bodies of the CSTO are the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Council of 
Ministers of Defense and the Committee of Secretaries of the Security Council. The decisions of all CSTO 
bodies are taken by consensus.  
 
Besides its legislative bodies, the CSTO has three permanent executive bodies:  
 
• The Permanent Committee - takes decisions between the Council sessions, it is comprised of 
permanent representatives of member states. 
 
• The Joint Staff - responsible for operational command and monitoring of the Collective Forces of 
Rapid Deployment (CFRD) and for developing suggestions on strengthening the military 
components of cooperation. It is the working body of the Council of Ministers of Defense, with 55 
officers. 
 
• The Secretariat of the Organization (set up in 2003), headquartered in Moscow, is led by a Secretary 
General, who is appointed for a three year period (renewable). Its main task is to coordinate the 
cooperation of member states in the field of political and military relations and cooperation in 
countering the threats and challenges faced by the organization. The Secretariat undertakes 
organizational, information-sharing, and consultative assignments and is also responsible for budget 
coordination. Nikolai Bordyuzha (Russian) was appointed as the first Secretary-General of the CSTO 
in April 2003. 
 
In May 2001, the Council of Heads of States took the decision to create the so-called Forces of 
Rapid Response (FRR). These were to be deployed in the case of environmental or technological 
emergencies. After the formal creation of CSTO in 2002, the issue was discussed again. CSTO 
representatives, taking into account the existence of a similar mechanism operating within the CIS 
framework, adopted the decision to create a coordinative CSTO body dealing with these matters in 
order not to duplicate the work of CIS. 
 
In May 2000, the CSTO divided its territory into three distinct security regions: 1) European/Eastern 
European, 2) Caucasus, and 3) Central Asia; establishing three military groupings for these regions. 
The European military grouping comprises armed forces from Belarus and Russia, whereas the 
Caucasus grouping comprises armed forces from Russia and Armenia. For the Central Asia 
                                                
53 Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan 
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grouping, in August 2001, the Collective Security Council created the Collective Forces of Rapid 
Deployment (CFRD). 
 
Collective Forces of Rapid Deployment 
The Collective Forces of Rapid Deployment have been created to provide military security to the 
member states located in the Central Asia security region in cases of external aggression. These 
forces are also participating in joint anti-terrorist operations. Presently CFRD consists of 10 
battalions (troops from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) with a total military force of 
around 4,000 soldiers. All the battalions comprising the CFRD are stationed in the territory of their 
national states and under national command. The only exception is Russia’s elite 201st Motorized 
Rifle Division, stationed in Tajikistan. Additionally, the Russian air base situated in Kant, Kyrgyzstan 
has become part of the CFRD since April 2003, with around 150 military and civilian personnel, and 
planning to grow up to 500 permanently stationed personnel.  
 
In its June 2004 Summit, the Collective Security Council set the direction of the organization for the 
next six years by adopting a series of documents: the Plan for Construction of CSTO`s Military Coalition 
Forces until 2010, the Plan for CSTO Military Coalition Building and the Concept for Developing a Unified 
Military System. According to these documents, the next task for the Organization will be to integrate 
the military forces of the participating countries and to create permanent peacekeeping forces, ready 
to deploy at any moment. This is one step further from the creation of military groupings for each of 
CSTO’s security regions. The collective peacekeeping forces will be created in order to prevent and 
settle conflicts which may emerge anywhere within the territory of member states or beyond their 
borders. The leaders also agreed on the need to establish a joint air defense system, to improve 
communication, increased intelligence gathering capabilities and intelligence sharing.  
 
In the last summit meeting of the CSTO in Dushanbe (October 2007) member states decided to 
move forward with the creation of the organization’s peacekeeping forces and adopted the Agreement 
on Peacekeeping Operations and the Statute on the Collective Peacekeeping Forces – both to be implemented 
following ratification by all member states. According to the provisions of the Statute and other 
working documents, each member state should create permanent military, police, and other 
contingents in order to create the Collective Peacekeeping Forces (CPF)54. Every contingent shall be 
stationed at its member state territory and participate in collective programs and regular military 
drills. According to the CSTO’s Secretariat, the peacekeeping forces are special bodies tasked to 
counter drug-trafficking and illegal migration. Steps will also be taken to create coordinating high-
level mechanisms on countering terrorism and other contemporary threats. The Statute on the 
Collective Peacekeeping Forces does not provide any rigorous demarcation between peacekeeping 
and peace enforcement which might indicate that the CSTO is able to carry out both types of 
operation.  
 
The decision to whether deploy any CSTO peacekeeping operation will be adopted by the Council 
upon the request of a member state to carry out the peacekeeping operation in its territory. The UN 
Security Council will be informed immediately after the decision is adopted. All the contingents sent 
to create the CPF will, in the period of conducting the operation, serve under a united command, 
while every member state will be responsible for armament and other military equipment of its 
national contingent. The operations will be financed by the member states on the basis of shared 
financing according to national budget resources. In case of peacekeeping operations outside the 
CSTO’s borders, the operations will be conducted under the UN Security Council’s, or other 
empowered international body’s, mandate.  
                                                
54 All CSTO member states have created their national peacekeeping contingents.  
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RESOURCE CAPACITY  
According to Chapter IX of the CSTO Charter, the CSTO Secretariat shall be financed from the 
budget of the organization, through assessed contributions from member states approved by the 
Council. The direct expenses of the CSTO Secretariat, covering its day-to-day household 
expenditures and the staff wages were in 2007 around USD $3,5 million. The activities of the CSTO 
Joint Staff and major expenses for such operations as “Canal”, “Boundary” and others are covered 
separately by CSTO member states. 
 
Presently, 48 personnel are working for the CSTO Secretariat, of which 14 officials are employed in 
the units dealing with conflict prevention and peacekeeping. 
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
The CSTO has organized several military drills as well as different kinds of trainings and conferences 
for the military officers. The first drill was the South Anti-terror 2002 – a series of operational tactical 
exercises, taking place in Kyrgyzstan. Since 2001 military drills including the CRDF are taking part 
on different member states’ territories, under the name of Rubez (‘Boundary’). The last exercise took 
place in April 2007 in Tajikistan.  
 
In order to respond to the security situation in Afghanistan, particularly in areas bordering CSTO 
member states territories which are threatened by drug trafficking and misused by the extremist 
organizations, a Working Group was set up within the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs at the 
beginning of 2006. The main tasks of the Afghan Working Group are: i) to monitor the development 
of the situation in Afghanistan, ii) to ensure opinion exchange with the Afghan side and iii) to 
promote cooperation on a wide range of security issues, economic projects, and countering the 
threat posed by drugs trafficking. In order to prevent drugs trafficking, CSTO undertakes a yearly 
operation called Canal, since 2003, based on cooperation between member states’ law-enforcement 
agencies. In the field of countering illegal migration from third countries several operations have 
been conducted, the last one in June 2007 under the name Illegal CSTO-2007 which was carried out 
simultaneously in all member states.     
COOPERATION WITH THE UN 
The CSTO’s commitment to the UN Charter is stressed in the introduction of its founding Charter, 
according to which the Organization acts “in strict accordance with the obligations (of member 
states) under the Charter of the United Nations and the decisions of the United Nations Security 
Council.” The Organization was registered as a regional international organization according to the 
UN Charter on 19 September 2003 and gained observer status to UN General Assembly on 12 
December 2004.  
 
The CSTO has been a participant in the High-level Meetings between the UN Secretary-General and 
the Regional and Other Intergovernmental Organizations since 2003 and took part in the UN 
Security Council Meeting with the Regional Organizations in September 2006.  
 
One of the CSTO’s main stated goals for the near future is to promote cooperation with the UN 
structures, above all with its Counter-Terrorism Committee. Furthermore, in 2006, the Secretary 
General of the CSTO signed a Protocol on cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC), according to which the organizations will develop joint projects against drugs 
and crime and share information about their objectives.  
 
In October 2007 the CSTO signed a MoU with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which calls 
for cooperation in the areas of regional and international security and stability, counteraction against 
terrorism, fight against drug and arms trafficking and counteraction against transnational organized 
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crime. The MoU stresses the importance of consultation and information sharing between two 
organizations as well as their interest in the realization of joint programs and activities.  
 
The Secretary General of the CSTO participates regularly in the OSCE Ministerial Council. Lately, 
he expressed the interest of CSTO member states to cooperate with the OSCE in specific areas, such 
as fighting drug trafficking from Afghanistan, antiterrorist activities, or in the field of conflict 
prevention. 
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Founded in 1991 (Minsk Agreement or Agreement Establishing the 
Commonwealth of Independent States).  
Headquarters in Minsk, Belarus. 11 Member States 
www.cis.minsk.by 
 
Mandate for Peace and Security:  
. Agreement Establishing the CIS, art. 6 (1991) 
. Charter of CIS, art. 2 and 3 (1993) 
. Concept of Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts in the Territory of    
Member States of the CIS (1996) 
 
Commonwealth  
of Independent States (CIS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established in 1991, when the leaders of 
Belarus, Russia and Ukraine signed the Agreement Establishing the CIS (aka Minsk Agreement), which 
assured cooperation between its member states after the dissolution of the USSR. Soon after, on 21 
December 1991 eleven55 former Soviet Republics signed the Alma-Ata Declaration, which confirmed 
the formation of CIS and the formal dissolution of the USSR. These two documents lay down the 
basic principles and stipulate the areas of cooperation of the CIS. The Commonwealth has 11 
member states.56  
 
The CIS Charter (adopted by the Council of Heads of State on 22 January 1993), expounds the main 
objectives of the Organization: “cooperation between member states in political, economic, 
environmental, humanitarian, cultural and other spheres; cooperation in assuring human rights and 
fundamental liberties; maintenance of international peace and security and peaceful resolution of 
disputes between the member states of the Commonwealth” (art. 2). The relations between the 
member states are based on the principles of “respect for the sovereignty of member states, 
territorial integrity, inviolability of state borders, and resolution of disputes by peaceful means in 
such a way that international peace, security and fairness are not threatened” (art. 3).  
 
Section III of the Charter (‘Collective Security and Military-political Cooperation’), determines as 
CIS priorities the prevention, localization, and settlement of conflicts arising in the territory of the 
organization. Further on, the Charter stipulates that in the eventuality of a threat to the security, 
sovereignty or territorial integrity of a member state; or in the eventuality of a threat to international 
peace and security, the organization immediately initiates a mechanism of joint consultation to 
coordinate positions and further action (art. 12). Section IV (‘Prevention and Resolution of 
Conflicts’), calls on member states to “undertake all possible measures for the prevention of 
conflicts, and to try to achieve a fair and peaceful resolution to disputes through negotiations, or 
reach agreement on an appropriate alternative solution” (art. 16-17). 
 
The CIS has two different groups of operational bodies: the so-called constitutional bodies (created 
according to the provisions of the Charter) and the bodies of cooperation (created according to the 
developing fields of cooperation).  
                                                
55 The three Baltic States have not signed the Declaration.  
56 Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan  
“We need to make our cooperation even more effective, to concentrate 
on major issues rather than get bogged down in small ones: economic 
cooperation, migration, security cooperation and social issues”  
SERGEY N. LEBEDEV  
CIS Secretary General (2007) 
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Constitutional Bodies: 
• The supreme body of the CIS is the Council of Heads of State. The Council discusses and decides 
fundamental questions connected with the activities of member states in the sphere of their common 
interests. It is the highest decision-making body concerning usage of military force and the issues of 
collective security, military, and political cooperation of member states. It can also offer assistance in 
terms of conflict resolution to conflicting parties. The Council decides on the basis of consensus. 
The meetings take place twice a year. 
 
• The Council of Heads of Government meets four times a year, and coordinates the economic and social 
cooperation of member states.   
 
• The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is the executive body that ensures cooperation in the 
foreign policy field. In-between meetings of the highest bodies, (Council of Heads of State and 
Council of Heads of Government) it is the highest decision-making body. The Council is responsible 
for foreign policy cooperation, peaceful settlement of disputes among member states and peace and 
security in the territory of the CIS. It pays special attention to the CIS’s peacekeeping activities.  
 
• The Council of Ministers of Defense57 was established in February 1992. The meetings of the Council 
are held at least every four months and whenever else it is considered necessary. The main task of 
the Council is to coordinate military cooperation (including legal harmonization in the field of 
development of armed forces and conflict prevention). The Council has several executive bodies 
working on a permanent or temporary basis.  
 
• The other institutional bodies include the Council of Commanders-in-chief of Border Troops, the Economic 
Court, the Commission on Human Rights, and the Inter-parliamentary Assembly.  
 
Bodies of Sectoral Cooperation: 
• Approximately 70 bodies of sectoral cooperation have been established within the Commonwealth 
framework. Their main goal is to further promote multilateral cooperation between the member 
states (in the fields of economy, science, humanitarian affairs and development of armed forces), and 
to coordinate the rules and principles of this cooperation. These ‘intergovernmental councils’, as they 
are called within the CIS framework, coordinate cooperation in the field of economy, science, 
ecology, transport, industry, agriculture, education, energy, trade and finances.58 
 
• The Executive Committee is the executive, administrative, and coordinating body of the CIS – it is its 
only permanent structure. Jointly with the member states and the other bodies of the 
Commonwealth, the Executive Committee develops proposals and draft documents aimed at 
broadening cooperation in the political, economic, social and other spheres. The Chairman of the 
Committee is the Executive Secretary of the CIS elected for three years. Sergey N. Lebedev (from 
Russia) is the CIS Chairman since 5 October 2007.   
 
Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping Mechanisms 
The conflict prevention mechanism of the CIS is governed by Section IV of the Charter and by the 
Concept of Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts in the Territory of Member States of the CIS (adopted on 19 
                                                
57 Representatives of three CIS member states, namely Moldova, Ukraine and Turkmenistan are participating at 
Council sessions only as observers. In January 2006 Georgia announced withdrawal of its participation in CIS 
sessions. (source: CIS official web page in Russian)  
58 Some of the bodies of sectoral cooperation include: Joint Staff of Military Policy Coordination; Secretariat of the 
Council of Ministers of Defense; Intergovernmental Statistical Committee; Anti-terrorism Center; Office for the 
Coordination of the Fight Against organized crime and other dangerous types of crime in CIS Member States’ 
territory; Temporary Operational Working Group to resolve the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia; CIS Commission for 
the peaceful usage of atomic energy. 
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January, 1996). The Concept provides the framework for conflict prevention and resolution, but also 
for post-conflict peacebuilding and the interaction with the UN and the OSCE in these fields. 
 
According to the Concept, the preferable means for resolving disputes and preventing conflicts is 
the use of preventive political and diplomatic efforts. In this sense, the Concept names preventive 
diplomacy measures (good offices, mediation, negotiations between parties) and confidence-building 
measures (agreement on non-use of force or threat of force, the exchange of information on issues 
of concern, mediation missions or observers from either neutral parties or the conflicting parties 
themselves), which may be applied. In certain cases the Concept envisages the possibility of 
preventive deployment of police, civilian, and military personnel in the region of possible 
confrontation.  
 
Settlement of conflicts is interpreted as a set of methods of political, social, legal, economic or 
military nature used with the aim to resolve conflicts. The basic task is to keep the peace after the 
conflicting parties have reached a cease-fire agreement through the establishment of a peacekeeping 
operation (the features of a peacekeeping operation are listed at the end of this section). The 
Concept envisages the possibility to carry out enforcement actions, but only with a mandate from 
the UN Security Council. However, none of the adopted documents provide any legal or political 
criteria to differentiate between peacekeeping operations and enforcement action (similarly to the 
CSTO).  
 
Similarly to UN doctrine, CIS approaches post-conflict peacebuilding as a methodology that 
encompasses measures of political, social, economic and legal nature, which are taken after the 
settlement of a military conflict (e.g. restoration of the state authority institutions, return of refugees 
and displaced persons, humanitarian assistance).  
 
The peacekeeping mechanism of the CIS is based on the following documents, adopted by the 
Council of Heads of State in the early 1990s:  
 
• Agreement on Groups of Military Observers and Collective Peacekeeping forces of the CIS 
member states (aka Kyiv Agreement) (20 March 1992); 
• Protocol on the Temporary Procedure for the Formation and Use of Collective Peacekeeping 
Forces in Zones of Conflict between or within member-states of the CIS (16 August 1992); 
 
According to the above-mentioned documents, the CIS’ peacekeeping operations conducted by 
peacekeeping groups composed of Groups of Military Observers and Collective Peacekeeping 
Forces are to be deployed through the following steps:  
 
i) The decision to deploy the peacekeeping operation is made by the Council of Heads of State by 
consensus. This decision is preceded by the appropriate request of the parties to the conflict for the 
deployment of peacekeeping forces and by a cease-fire agreement reached between the conflicting 
parties. Furthermore, the conflicting parties have to commit to respecting the international status, 
neutrality, privileges and immunities of the peacekeeping personnel; 
ii) The Council of Heads of State immediately informs the UN Security Council and the Secretary 
General of the OSCE about the decision to deploy a peacekeeping operation; 
iii) CIS Peacekeeping Forces are created by member states, except for conflicting parties, on a 
voluntary basis as temporary coalitional formations established for the period of conducting the 
peacekeeping operation. The Groups are entrusted to carry out the following tasks: separation of 
conflicting parties; monitoring of cease-fire and armistice agreements; and supervision of agreements 
on disarmament and humanitarian assistance. The Peacekeeping Forces cannot be used to participate 
in military actions. All the forces participating on a peacekeeping operation shall be subordinate to 
the United Headquarters; 
iv) In accordance with the decision of the UN the activity of the CIS Peacekeeping Forces may go 
beyond the CIS area.  
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RESOURCE CAPACITY 
The CIS activities are financed through member state’s contributions (Russia is the highest 
contributor). The general budget of the organization is adopted by the Council of Heads of State of 
the CIS. The latest available information on the CIS’s budget is from 2001, according to which the 
budget was approximately USD $8.54 million.59  
 
The Executive Committee has a staff of about 220 employees. This includes approximately 120 
people attached to the Executive Committee in Minsk, and roughly 100 staff working at an affiliated 
branch of the Executive Committee, located in Moscow.  
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Peacekeeping operations 
Since its creation the CIS has carried out four peacekeeping operations in the territories of the 
former USSR. All operations were deployed after the conflicting parties had signed a cease-fire 
agreement. All the conflicts have the character of inter-group power-struggles in the newly 
independent states. Some of the conflicts were worsened by the intervention of the former Soviet 
army troops that were still deployed in the territories of these states, which found themselves 
without any national command. In fact only one of these operations (Tajikistan) was completed 
successfully, leading to the stabilization of the internal situation. The following description of the 
operations shows some discrepancies between the above-mentioned mechanism for peacekeeping 
operations and their practical realization.   
   
• Moldova (since 1992) The deployment of this peacekeeping operation was preceded by the 
signature of the Yeltsin-Snegur Agreement (21 July 1992), according to which a cease-fire was 
achieved (between the Moldavian national armed forces and the Transdnisteria separatist group, 
which was supported by the former Soviet 14th Army ) and security zones have been created on both 
sides of the Nistru (Dniester) river. The joint Russian, Moldavian and Dniesterian peacekeeping 
force was deployed under a Joint Control Commission command in August 1992. The Peacekeeping 
Forces are still deployed, composed of Moldavian, Russian, Ukrainian and Trans-Dniesterian 
soldiers, and comprises 1199 troops.  
 
• Georgia, Abkhazia (since 1994) The CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia were deployed under 
the provisions of the so-called Moscow Agreement, or Agreement on a Cease-fire and Separation of 
Forces between Georgian and Abkhaz sides signed on 14 May 1994. The main agreed tasks for CIS 
peacekeepers were maintaining the cease-fire, implementing the conditions of the Agreement, 
supervising the withdrawal of heavy weapons, and promoting safe conditions for the returning of 
displaced persons. Under the Agreement, a coordinating commission has been established in order 
to discuss requirements from both sides. CIS Peacekeeping Forces are still present in Georgian 
territory, and some clashes between peacekeepers and Georgian authorities have been reported. The 
main problem is linked to the fact that the Peacekeeping Forces are composed purely of Russian 
troops, presently 2000 soldiers. The CIS peacekeepers are under the supervision of the UN 
Observation Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), which was deployed in August 1993 and its mandate 
has recently been extended until 15 April 2008.  The UN and CIS missions act independently but 
keep close contact.  
 
• Tajikistan (1993-2000) this operation has been the largest operation carried out by CIS in the 
former Soviet space.60 The Peacekeeping Forces were deployed according to a decision of the 
                                                
59 Even if the CIS’s official website (in Russian) mentions the decision-making process involved in the adoption of 
the annual budget, the updated budget figure is not provided. The latest figure is from 2001 (237,901,000 Rubles). 
The CIS officials contacted by UNU-CRIS were not able to provide the most up to date figures. 
60According to the CIS commander-in-chief there were 25,000 peacekeepers from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Uzbekistan. Former Prime Minister Abdullojonov estimated that 30,000 people died in the climax of civil war. 
See John Mackinlay and Peter Cross (2003). Regional Peacekeepers: The Paradox of Russian Peacekeeping. Tokyo and New 
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Council of Heads of State adopted in September 1993. CIS leaders regarded the civil war between 
political factions of Tajikistan (the fight started in May 1992) as a serious threat to the stability of the 
entire CIS. The forces included the Russian 201st Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) and Uzbek, 
Kazakh and Kyrgyz battalions, which were operationally subordinated to the Collective 
Peacekeeping Force (CPF).61 In fact, the Russian ground troops’ commander was directly in 
command of the 201st MRD, while subunits from the other CIS states were under the command of 
their respective Ministries of Defense. In February 1994 the CIS’ role was formally extended when 
nine CIS defense ministers (excluding Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova) signed a document 
committing each to send peacekeeping troops to Tajikistan. In March 1994 a Standing Consultative 
Commission on Peacekeeping Activity was established under the CIS Council of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs. 
 
The UN decided to deploy its own peacekeeping mission in the country - UN Mission in Tajikistan, 
UNMOT (adopted by UNSC Resolution 963) on 16 December 1994. UNMOT, which completed its 
mandate on 15 May 2000, collaborated with the CIS Peacekeeping Forces. After the end of the Tajik 
civil war and the disbanding of peacekeeping forces, Russia and Tajikistan agreed on transforming 
the 201st Motorized Rifle Division, stationed in the country, into a military base. Although the 
agreement was not implemented, the Division is still stationed in Tajik territory and has become part 
of the Collective Forces of Rapid Deployment, which operates within the framework of the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).  
 
Peacemaking 
Concerning the civil war in Tajikistan, the CIS and its member states were involved in political and 
diplomatic mediation with the aim to settle the conflict in a peaceful way. In 1995-1997 the Councils’ 
(of Heads of State, Heads of Government, Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense) representatives 
and the CIS Special Representative on conflict resolution in Tajikistan, participated in the negotiation 
between the Tajik government and United Tajik Opposition which resulted in the Tajik Peace 
Agreement in 1997. This CIS non-military operation was carried out in coordination with the UN 
and OSCE missions. 
 
Election Observation Missions  
Since the Convention on Standards of Democratic Elections, Electoral Rights and Freedoms in the Member States 
of the CIS was adopted in October 2002, the CIS started deploying Election Observer missions in 
almost every election undertaken in the CIS member states: Armenia (presidential election 2008), 
Azerbaijan (parliamentary election 2005), Belarus (presidential election 2006), Chechnya (presidential 
election 2003), Georgia (presidential election 2008), Kyrgyzstan (presidential election 2005 and 
parliamentary election 2007), Moldova (parliamentary election 2005), Russia (parliamentary election 
2007), Serbia (parliamentary election 2007), Tajikistan (parliamentary election 2005), Ukraine 
(presidential election 2004, parliamentary election 2006 and 2007), and Uzbekistan (parliamentary 
election 2005 and presidential election 2007). 
COOPERATION WITH THE UN 
The intentions of the CIS to cooperate with the UN are stressed in the Charter of the CIS, which 
refers to the UN Charter several times. The other important document adopted by CIS which deals 
with the relation with the UN and the OSCE is the Concept on Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts in the 
Territory of Member States of CIS. Chapter 4 of the Concept states: “When working to settle conflicts in 
accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Commonwealth of 
Independent States shall interact closely with other international organizations and particularly with 
                                                                                                                                                  
York: United Nations University Press, pp. 156. 
61 “Peacekeeping in the Soviet Successor States”. Online at www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai18e.html#chap3 
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the United Nations and OSCE.”62 The concept further sets up the forms of cooperation: 
consultation among representatives on various levels; assistance in peacekeeping efforts; submission 
of information to the UN Security Council or the UN Secretary General. The other form of 
cooperation is the Exchange of Letters with the UN Secretariat.  
 
On 24 March 1994 the UN General Assembly adopted resolution A/RES/48/237 which granted 
observer status to the CIS. In August 1994 the CIS participated at the 1st High Level Meeting. On 11 
October 2004 the Memorandum of Mutual Understanding and Partnership was signed between the 
Executive Committee of the CIS and the UN Secretariat. Furthermore, the Executive Committee of 
the CIS created a department on interaction with international organizations, which is responsible 
for international cooperation, namely with the UN.  
 
The CIS also developed close cooperation with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and in 
January 2005 hosted the special meeting of the CTC with international, regional and sub-regional 
organizations in Almaty, Kazakhstan.  
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Commonwealth  
Secretariat (COMSEC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 
The Commonwealth of Nations (or Commonwealth) is a voluntary association of independent 
sovereign states - successor to the British Commonwealth of Nations. Queen Elizabeth II is the 
symbol of the free association of members and  the Head of the Commonwealth.63 She is also Head 
of State, separately, for sixteen of the Commonwealth countries, called Commonwealth Realms. As 
each Realm is an independent kingdom, Elizabeth as monarch holds a separate title for each. Beyond 
the Realms, the majority of member states64 are republics or indigenous monarchies that have their 
own Heads of State. The key organs of COMSEC are: 
 
• The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) provides a forum for consultation at the 
highest level of government. They are held every other year. Meetings of associated committees 
usually take place in the weeks preceding CHOGM. These include: 
 
• The Committee of the Whole, which consists of senior officials and considers Commonwealth 
functional cooperation. 
 
• The Commonwealth Ministers’ Action Group on the Harare Declaration deals with serious or persistent 
violations of the Harare Declaration (see below). The Group is convened by the Secretary-General 
and is composed of the Foreign Ministers of eight Commonwealth member countries 
 
• The Ministerial Group on Small States is also comprised of senior officials and addresses the 
challenges faced by small states.  
 
                                                
63 The Commonwealth should not be confused with the Commonwealth of Independent States or the 
Commonwealth of Australia and eight other states with that title, i.e. Bahamas, Jamaica, Dominica, Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, Northern Marianas, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico and Virginia. The United Kingdom, Canada, 
Australia, Newfoundland, New Zealand and South Africa were the Commonwealth’s six original members. Their 
‘position and mutual relation’ was defined in 1926 as autonomous, equal in status, owing common allegiance to the 
crown, and freely associated. This formula was incorporated in the preamble to the Statute of Westminster of 1931 
which also declared that the crown was the symbol of their free association. The modern Commonwealth took 
shape from the 1949 Declaration of London which facilitated India’s membership as a republic. 
64 The member states of COMSEC are: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, The Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, 
Belize, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Canada, Cyprus, Dominica, Fiji, The Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, 
Guyana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Nauru, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri Lanka, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Kingdom, Vanuatu, and Zambia. 
 
“The Commonwealth is the oldest living political association of states, 
yet in many ways the most adaptable to modern realities and thus the 
most responsive to the changing needs of its membership”  
 
 OWEN ARTHUR, former Prime Minister of Barbados 
“The Co monwealt  i  the oldest living political association of states, yet in 
many ways the ost adaptable to modern realities and thus the most 
responsive to the changing needs of its membership”  
OWEN ARTHUR 
Prime Minister of Barbados 
            
                                     
Founded in 1965 (Agreed Memorandum on the Commonwealth Secretariat)  
Headquarters in London, United Kingdom. 53 Member States 
www.thecommonwealth.org  
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Parallel special events involving people, business, and youth forums now coincide with each 
CHOGM. Action plans are developed at these events to complement official Commonwealth 
statements. The last CHOGM was held in Kampala (Uganda) from 23 to 25 November 2007. 
 
Though the Commonwealth has no constitution or charter it does have a coordinating arm, the 
Secretariat, based in London and established since 1965. This is headed by a Secretary-General, 
currently Donald McKinnon, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs of New Zealand (until April 
2008). The Commonwealth Secretariat is the main intergovernmental agency of the Commonwealth, 
facilitating consultation and cooperation. It is responsible to member governments collectively. 
 
Following the CHOGM 2002 in Coolum (Australia), the Secretariat has a Board of Governors and 
an Executive Committee. All member governments are represented on the Board of Governors, and a 
17-member Executive Committee was constituted by the Board in June 2002. The Executive Committee 
meets every three months, makes policy recommendations to the Board and oversees budgets and 
audit functions. The Committee includes the eight largest contributors to the Secretariat’s total 
resources: Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, Nigeria, Singapore, South Africa and the United 
Kingdom. Other member countries are elected to the Executive Committee on a regional basis, to 
serve two-year terms.65 
 
All of the member states, except for Mozambique, have experienced direct or indirect British rule, or 
have been linked administratively to another Commonwealth country. At the 2007 CHOGM in 
Kampala Heads of Government reviewed the recommendations of the Committee on 
Commonwealth membership and agreed on the following criteria for membership: (i) an applicant 
country should, as a general rule, have had an historic constitutional association with an existing 
Commonwealth member, save in exceptional circumstances. (ii) In exceptional circumstances, 
applicants should be considered on a case-by-case basis. (iii) Applicants should accept and comply 
with Commonwealth fundamental values, principles and priorities as set out in the 1971 
Commonwealth Declaration of Principles and Subsequent Declarations. (iv) An applicant must demonstrate 
commitment to democracy and democratic processes, including free and fair elections and 
representative legislatures; the rule of law and independence of the judiciary; good governance, 
including a well-trained public service and transparent public accounts; and, protection of human 
rights, freedom of expression and equality of opportunity. (v) An applicant should accept 
Commonwealth norms and conventions such as use of the English language as the medium of inter-
Commonwealth relations and acknowledge Queen Elizabeth II as Head of the Commonwealth. (vi) 
New member should be encourage to join the Commonwealth Fund, and to promote vigorous civil 
society and business organizations within their country and to foster participatory democracy 
through regular civil society consultations. 
 
Since the Commonwealth has no constitution it is guided by a series of agreements on its principles 
and aims, generally known as Declarations or Statements, issued by Commonwealth Heads of 
Government at various summits. Together, they constitute a foundation of Commonwealth values 
and a history of concern in global affairs. The first, fundamental statement of core beliefs is the 
Declaration of Commonwealth Principles which was issued at the 1971 summit in Singapore. The 
Declaration defines the voluntary character and consensual working methods of the Commonwealth, 
specifying the goals and objectives of the association. The Harare Commonwealth Declaration of 1991 
sets out the Commonwealth's commitment to democracy, rule of law and good governance. In 1995 
Commonwealth Heads of Government adopted an action program to fulfill more effectively their 
commitment to the Harare Principles with the Millbrook Commonwealth Action Program on the Harare 
Declaration. In earlier decades the Commonwealth focused much of its attention on apartheid in 
South Africa.66 Its modern agenda derives from the 1991 Commonwealth Harare Declaration.  
                                                
65 The current regional representatives on the Committee are: Botswana, Mozambique, Cyprus, Sri Lanka, Antigua 
and Barbuda, Trinidad and Tobago, Fiji, Papua New Guinea 
66 Until the beginning of the 1990s apartheid in South Africa was of primary attention of the Commonwealth. 
During many CHOGM meetings this item was high on the agenda. At the 1985 CHOGM in Nassau (the Bahamas) 
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The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) was established to deal with serious or persistent 
violations of the Commonwealth’s fundamental political values. The CMAG was established by the 
Commonwealth Heads of Government in November 1995 to deal with serious or persistent 
violations of the Harare Declaration. The Group is convened by the Secretary-General and is 
composed of the Foreign Ministers of nine Commonwealth member countries, supplemented as 
appropriate by one or two additional ministerial representatives from the region concerned; it 
currently includes the Foreign Ministers of Canada, Lesotho, Malaysia (vice-chair), Malta (chair), 
Papua New Guinea, St. Lucia, Sri Lanka, Tanzania and United Kingdom. Their task is to assess the 
nature of the infringement and recommend measures for collective Commonwealth action aimed at 
the speedy restoration of democracy and constitutional rule. 
RESOURCE CAPACITY 
The Commonwealth Secretariat currently has a staff of approximately 250. The Secretariat and its 
activities are supported by an assessed budget and two specialized funds. The assessed budget, to 
which all full members are obliged to contribute, covers the Secretariat's core functions. 
Governments contribute to the funding of the Secretariat's assessed budget according to an agreed 
scale based on Gross National Product and population size. Each year a proposed budget for the 
Secretariat is agreed by a Finance Committee composed of Commonwealth High Commissioners in 
London and a representative of the UK Government. Governments make voluntary contributions 
to the two specialized funds, the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC) and the 
Commonwealth Youth Program (CYP). For 2007/08, the Secretariat’s budget is UK£13.9 million (USD 
$27,1 million), the CFTC’s UK£27.4 million (USD $53,6 million) and the CYP’s UK£0.8 million 
(USD $1,6 million). The largest financial contributors are the UK, Canada, and Australia. 
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
The Commonwealth Secretariat has significant experience in the field of conflict prevention and 
peacemaking. In 1969-1970 the Secretariat provided a Secretary (in the person of Chief Anyaoku) 
and administrative support to a Commission that was set up to propose terms of settlement in a 
dispute between Anguilla and St Kitts and Nevis. Every Secretary-General since then was involved 
in mediation and good offices efforts. Apart from the ones below, one can refer to the Falkland war, 
Zimbabwe, the Nigerian civil war or the long-standing conflict between India and Pakistan. 
 
The good offices role of the Secretary-General is the Commonwealth’s primary mechanism for 
addressing political problems and conflicts where they arise. In 2007, the report of the Commonwealth 
Commission on Respect and Understanding: ‘Civil Paths to Peace’, under the chairmanship of Amartya Sen 
was presented. The Commission suggests in its report to extend the good offices work of the 
Secretary-General to address grievance internationally. More particularly, the Commission urges the 
Commonwealth to use its experience to advocate greater use of multilateral approaches in 
international disputes and confrontations, working with the United Nations and other international 
organizations. At the 2002 Meeting in Coolum, Heads of Government approved the conclusions of 
the Commonwealth High Level Review Group (HLRG) which included a call for more proactive use 
of the good offices role. In line with the Group’s recommendations, a Good Offices Section was 
subsequently established within the Secretariat's Political Affairs Division (PAD) in 2003. The 
Secretariat’s Good Offices Section provides an early warning mechanism, proposes measures for 
preventive action, and is responsible for coordinating integrated approaches to conflict and political 
tensions within member states. Since its establishment there has been a significant increase in the 
                                                                                                                                                  
a joint statement was issued i.e. calling on the South African Government to end apartheid, release Nelson Mandela 
and to begin a ‘dialogue across lines of color, politics and religion with a view to establishing a non-racial and 
representative government’. To support this process, the Eminent Persons’ Group was established, drawn from 
seven countries. The Commonwealth Secretariat gave extensive support to this Group. The Group visited South 
Africa and in its report Mission to South Africa proposed among others the abolishment of apartheid. 
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scope and depth of the Secretary-General’s good offices role. The Commonwealth Secretary-General 
has used his good offices to successfully defuse crises or tensions in a number of Commonwealth 
countries in recent years. He is assisted by several Special Envoys. A historical precedent for this 
practice was the initiative taken by Secretary-General Arnold Smith to mediate in the dispute over 
the independence claim of Biafra (Nigeria) in 1967. In 1975 a Commonwealth Committee on 
Cyprus was established to assist the UN. This initiative was accompanied by good offices from the 
Commonwealth Secretary-General. The Secretary-General was in 1983 involved in finding solutions 
for the conflict in Grenada. During the last decade, good offices were used to promote dialogue 
between the United Kingdom and Mauritius over the Chagos Islands (2004). On the Solomon 
Islands Hon. Major-General Sitiveni Rabuka was instrumental in 1999-2000 in resolving tensions 
which eventually led to the mobilization of a Commonwealth Multinational Police Peace Monitoring 
Group (see below). On the Fiji Islands, Special Envoy Justice Pius Langa facilitated dialogue 
between key stakeholders to encourage the formation of a government in accordance with the 
Constitution (2000). In 1999 the Commonwealth Secretariat tried to broker and implement a peace 
agreement that led to the Honiara Peace Accord. In Lesotho facilitation efforts occurred after 1998 
elections between the government and opposition. In Swaziland, Special Envoy Ketumile Masire 
facilitated the adoption of a new constitution in 2005. In Zanzibar, the Commonwealth facilitated 
the implementation of the Muafaka peace agreement (2001). In Cameroon, Special Envoy Joe Clark 
is assisting with the implementation of a wide range of reforms (since 2002). In the Gambia, Special 
Envoy Abdulsalami Akubakar is promoting dialogue between political parties (since 2005). In 
Guyana Special Envoy Paul Reeves is promoting dialogue between political parties (since 2002). In 
Kenya, Special Envoy Adebayo Adedeji is facilitating dialogue between political parties (since 2004). 
In the Maldives, Special Envoy Tun Musa Hitam is supporting the implementation of constitutional 
and electoral reform (since 2005). In Tonga, Special Envoy Douglas Graham has been working to 
strengthen the authority and capacity of the Legislative Assembly and the constitutional reform 
process (since 2002). 
 
The Commonwealth has undertaken peacekeeping missions involving police and armed forces with 
a ‘soft mandate’ but has not undertaken, and is not designed to undertake, any enforcement action 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  
 
• Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (1979-1980) In 1979 a Commonwealth Monitoring Force (around 
1,300 troops) was set up to address the intrastate conflict in Southern Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. The 
role of the multi-national force was to keep peace between independence groups and the Rhodesian 
forces during the cease-fire in the run-up to the 1980 elections in independent Zimbabwe.  
 
• Solomon Islands (2000) A Commonwealth Multinational Police Assistance Group addressed intrastate 
conflict in the Solomon Islands in 2000. The previous year, the Commonwealth Multinational Police 
Peace Monitoring Group addressed the same conflict. The latter was composed of ten Fiji and ten 
Vanuatu policemen. New Zealand provided transport assistance for this Group. 
 
The Commonwealth Secretariat is quite experienced in election observation. Numerous election 
monitoring missions are held in this framework, beginning with observing a referendum in Gibraltar 
in 1967, followed by Uganda (1980). During the last decade Commonwealth missions were present 
in: Antigua and Barbuda (1999, 2004), Autonomous Bougainville Government (2005), Cameroon 
(2004), Fiji Islands (2006 and 2001), Gambia (2006, 2001), Guyana (2006 and 2001), Kenya (2002), 
Lesotho (2007, 2005, 2002, 1998), Maldives (2005), Malawi (2004), Mozambique (2004, 2003), 
Nigeria (2007, 2003 and 1999), Pakistan (2005, 2002, 1997), Papua New Guinea (1997), Seychelles 
(2006, 1998), Sierra Leone (2002, 2004, 2007), Solomon Islands (2006, 2001), South Africa (1999), 
Sri Lanka (2004 and 2005), St-Kitts and Nevis (2004), Swaziland (2003), Trinidad and Tobago 
(2000), Uganda (2006), Zambia (2006), Zanzibar (2005; 2003 and 2000), Zimbabwe (2002, 2000).  
These Commonwealth Observer Groups (COGs) are constituted at the request of a member state. In 
addition a Commonwealth Expert Team (CET) can be sent to promote democracy and strengthen the 
democratic processes and institutions. In recent years CETs were sent to Tanzania, Sierra Leone, 
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Solomon Islands and Malawi (2004), to Cameroon, Gambia, Fiji Islands (2003) and to Maldives 
(2007). 
COOPERATION WITH THE UN 
All Commonwealth members also belong to the UN and the Secretariat has observer status at the 
UN General Assembly (A/RES/31/3). The association strongly supports the work of the UN – 
which is listed as one of the Harare Principles. The Commonwealth funds and administers since 
1983 a “Joint Office for Commonwealth Permanent Missions to the United Nations” for eleven 
small Commonwealth member states.67 The Commonwealth has a formalized agreement – a MoU 
with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (1 December 1998, no. 1219) and with 
UNDP. On 6 February 2007 at the meeting between the Commonwealth Secretary-General and his 
counterpart at the United Nations, they discussed potential collaboration between the UN and the 
Commonwealth in Sierra Leone and other countries in support of the UN Peacebuilding 
Commission. 
 
The Commonwealth has participated in every High-Level Meeting between the UN Secretary-
General and the Heads of Regional and Other Intergovernmental Organizations since their inception 
(1994) but has not been invited to the Security Council Meetings. 
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67 The eleven small states are Dominica, Gambia, Grenada, Maldives, Nauru, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Samoa, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. 
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Community of Portuguese  
Speaking Countries (CPLP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 
CPLP was created in 1996 by the seven official Portuguese-speaking countries68 (East Timor joined 
in 2002 after gaining independence)69. Although CPLP participates in the High Level Meetings 
between the UN and Regional Organizations and has engaged in conflict prevention and 
peacemaking, it has never adopted any legal document that would accord it a legal mandate and 
operational guidance in the fields of peace and security. According to the CPLP Statutes, the goals of 
the organization are political-diplomatic coordination amongst its members (namely in international 
fora), cooperation in economic, social, cultural, legal, and technical-scientific areas, also promotion 
and diffusion of the Portuguese language. From the outset, CPLP has been reticent about entering 
the peace and security area. To fulfill its goals CPLP is structured around four central organs: 
 
• Conference of Heads of State and Government, which determines and supervises the policies and 
strategies of the organization and meets ordinarily every two years; 
 
• Council of Ministers, composed of the Foreign Ministers of the member states. It coordinates CPLP’s 
activities, approves the budget, and adopts action plans;  
 
• Permanent Coordination Committee (CCP in Portuguese), comprised of one representative of each 
member state. It monitors whether the Executive Secretariat has implemented the decisions and 
recommendations laid out by the Conference of Heads of State and Government. The CCP, as an 
organ specifically designed to facilitate political and diplomatic cooperation, has the capacity to (i) 
collect and analyze all information related to potential conflict situations, and (ii) plan conflict 
prevention strategies; 
 
• Executive Secretariat, the main executive body of the organization. The current Executive Secretary is 
Mr. Domingos Simões Pereira of Guinea-Bissau. He was nominated in 2008.  
 
At the 12th meeting of the Council of Ministers, held in Lisbon on 31 October 2007, it was decided 
to formalize the establishment of a Parliamentary Assembly with a mandate to supervise the orientation 
and the political strategy of CPLP. It will also set up working groups that could be deployed on 
election observation missions. The Assembly, it is believed, will inject new political oxygen to the 
organization and increase its political weight. 
 
Even though CPLP has no legal mandate in peace and security, defense issues have been discussed 
since its inception in 1996. For instance the Ministers of Defense regularly attend summit to discuss 
new avenues of cooperation and coordination of their national defense plans. In 2005, the Ministers 
of Defense adopted a Protocol of Cooperation in the Area of Defense. Within this framework CPLP has 
                                                
68 CPLP members are: Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, and Sao Tomé and 
Principe. 
69 In July 2006, during the Bissau summit, Equatorial Guinea and Mauritius were admitted as Associate Observers. 
                            
                                                         
Founded in 1996 (Statutes of CPLP) 
Headquarters in Lisbon, Portugal.  8 Member States 
www.cplp.org 
 
 
Mandate in Peace and Security: 
___ 
[CPLP is driven by the principle of] “primacy of Peace, 
Democracy, Rule of Law, Human Rights and Social Justice” 
Statutes of CPLP (art.5-e) 
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also established the think-tank Center for Strategic Analysis on Defense Issues, with headquarters in 
Maputo, in which the role of the CPLP in the prevention of conflicts and management of regional 
crisis has been debated. In a document elaborated by the Center and discussed at the 7th Meeting of 
Ministers of Defense (2004), the creation of an early warning mechanism was suggested. The proposal 
has not yet materialized. Yet, CPLP has a temporary Mission in Guinea-Bissau, which although it is 
not exclusively geared towards early warning, it can operate as such. The Secretariat follows the 
situation in Guinea-Bissau through its resident representative. 
 
In 2006, at the 6th CPLP Summit of Heads of State, member states approved the ‘Bissau Declaration’ 
where it is underscored that the CPLP should regularly monitor the situation in the member states in 
order to identify problems and reinforce the capacity of CPLP in the prevention of conflicts, 
humanitarian aid, and the support to democratic institutions. So far, this has been carried out to a 
very limited extent. 
 
In June 2007, CPLP members that take part in the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone 70decided 
to engage in diplomatic talks with counter-parts to revitalize the dormant zone of peace, established 
in 1986. At the end of a CPLP Ministerial Meeting, the Defense Minister of Cape Verde declared 
that, “CPLP needed to be more ambitious in order to actively create new solutions for security and 
defense in light of new non-conventional threats, such as traffic of people, arms, drugs, and 
organized criminality”. Thus far, CPLP diplomatic efforts have not reached any breakthrough.  
 
CPLP’s regulations do not endow the Organization with peace enforcement authority. Nonetheless, 
at the Meeting of CPLP’s Defense Ministers in 2000  a light military force was created. Battalion-like, 
whose joint military exercises (aka ‘Felino’) have reached its eighth edition. Felino exercises started in 
2000 with the aim of improving the response capacity of a CPLP light military force in the 
eventuality of a conflict situation in one of CPLP member states. According to CPLP deliberations, a 
possible intervention will have to be requested by the UN. The 2008 ‘Felino’ exercise will be carried 
out in Mozambique.  
 
CPLP’s involvement in peacemaking efforts is decided by member states or when other interested 
states call upon CPLP to act in that regard. Either way, the aim is always to reestablish dialogue, 
knowing that, inter alia, this is one of the essential initial steps. Funding has been CPLP’s main 
constraint in peacemaking efforts, along with the lack of coordination with actions undertaken by 
other organizations. 
 
In June 2007, CPLP organized an international conference on “International Security Challenges and 
Cooperation within CPLP”.  The conference was high-profile and counted on the presence of senior 
representatives from the EU, NATO, and ECOWAS to discuss the role of regional organizations – 
and specifically CPLP – in the “prevention and resolution of conflicts in Africa”. However, the 
conference seems to have been led by an aspiration to showcase CPLP as a security organization, 
rather than the outcome of a serious internal effort to accord to the organization capacity in the 
security sphere.  
RESOURCE CAPACITY 
CPLP staff is limited. The Executive Secretary’s Office is composed of Executive Secretary, Deputy 
Executive Secretary, Chief of Staff and three assistants; whereas the Advisors’ Office includes ten 
advisors. In total, CPLP has approximately 20 staff members. 
 
According to the CPLP Statutes, the budget is generated by contributions from the member states. 
The Secretariat’s 2006 Budget was EUR €1,167,169 (USD $1,7 million). 
 
                                                
70 Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, and Säo Tomé and Principe.  
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CPLP is also provided with a Special Fund, composed of volunteer, public and private financial 
contributions, exclusively dedicated to support specific activities within the frame of CPLP’s goals. 
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Even though CPLP does not possess any specific mechanism purposely for dispute settlement, its 
intervention in dispute situations happens through mediation efforts and/or the promotion of 
dialogue among all the parties involved. CPLP’s functioning, in partnership with other organizations, 
made possible the reestablishment of peace in Guinea-Bissau in 199871, and the reinstatement of 
constitutional order in both São Tomé and Príncipe and Guinea-Bissau, in 2002 and 2004, 
respectively. 
 
Pertaining to peacebuilding, the organization does have some experience in the areas of (a) truth, 
justice and reconciliation, (b) rule of law, (c) human rights and (d) good governance, public 
administration and electoral assistance. Some examples include CPLP’s involvement in 
Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. 
 
In 1999 CPLP deployed its first election observation mission to the self-determination referendum 
in Timor Leste, which was followed, in 2001, by the observation of the elections which led to the 
formation of the Constitutive Assembly of the same country. Later CPLP observed electoral 
processes in East Timor (2002 and 2007), Guinea Bissau (2004 and 2006), Mozambique (2003 and 
2004), and Sao Tomé and Principe (2002 and 2006).  
COOPERATION WITH THE UN 
The UN granted observer status to CPLP on 26 October 1999. In addition, General Assembly 
Resolution 59/21 of 8 November 2004, encourages the UN Secretary General to undertake 
consultations with the Executive Secretary of CPLP and requests the specialized agencies of the UN 
system to cooperate to this end with the Secretary-General and the Executive Secretary. 
 
On 20 December 2006, the General Plenary of the UN General Assembly discussed the cooperation 
between the UN and CPLP. The resolution that was approved, (i) welcomed the signature of the 
Agreement between the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and CPLP in November 2006, 
regarding consultation, exchange of information and technical cooperation on their respective 
activities in the field of human rights; (ii) invited the UN Secretary-General to continue to undertake 
consultations with CPLP Executive Secretary, with a view to promoting cooperation between the 
Secretariats of the two bodies, in particular by encouraging meetings that enable their representatives 
to consult one another on projects, measures and procedures that will facilitate and expand their 
mutual cooperation and coordination.  
 
CPLP first joined the High Level Meetings between the UN and Regional Organizations in 2003 (5th 
HLM). For an organization with a very limited security profile and low organizational capacity, the 
participation seems to be sparked more by the will to be in high profile gatherings where similar 
organizations already participate - such as the Commonwealth and Francophonie – rather than by 
political and operational legitimacy. According to the Secretariat, even though CPLP has only 
recently been involved in the High-Level meetings, it believes that it is possible to improve 
coordination between the UN and CPLP, particularly through CPLP’s increased attendance of 
consultation gatherings and improved access to timely information on related events. CPLP has not 
been invited to the Security Council Meetings. 
 
                                                
71 ECOWAS and CPLP arranged for a meeting, which took place in Praia, Cape Verde in August 1998, where 
representatives of the disputing parties, President Vieira and General Mané, signed a ceasefire agreement and 
pledged to reopen the national airport and allow the deployment of international observers. 
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In 2006, the 6th CPLP Conference of Heads of State and Government, held with the theme ‘The 
Millennium Development Goals: Challenges and Contribution of CPLP’, adopted a specific 
declaration on the issue. The CPLP Heads of State and Government considered that in order to 
reach the goals set in the Declaration, member states should pursue efforts to strengthen ties among 
them. Furthermore, it was decided to concentrate resources - human and material - in the eradication 
of hunger and extreme poverty in the member states.  
 
The former Presidency of CPLP, held by Guinea-Bissau (2005-2006), decided to hold a Forum 
dedicated to the MDG in the CPLP space, to make an assessment of its fulfillment and try to 
mobilize additional resources. The current Presidency, held by Angola (2007-2008) still has to follow 
up on this. 
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
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Council of Europe (CoE) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 
The CoE formed on 5 May 1949, when ten countries signed the treaty constituting the Statute of the 
Council of Europe. The Council of Europe seeks to develop throughout Europe common and 
democratic principles based on the European Convention on Human Rights and other reference 
texts concerning the protection of individuals. The CoE has a genuine pan-European dimension, 
which can be read from its membership72. There are five observers to the CoE, namely the Holy See, 
the United States, Canada, Japan, Mexico. The CoE’s main aims are (i) to protect human rights, 
pluralist democracy and the rule of law; (ii) to promote awareness and encourage the development of 
Europe's cultural identity and diversity; (iii) to find common solutions to the challenges facing 
European society: such as discrimination against minorities, xenophobia, intolerance, bioethics and 
cloning, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, organized crime and corruption, cyber-crime, 
violence against children; and (iv) to consolidate democratic stability in Europe by backing political, 
legislative and constitutional reform.  
 
The CoE’s concept of peace and security is based on democratic security (as opposed to security 
through the use of force) and was defined at the first CoE Summit in 1993. The concept 
encapsulates pluralist parliamentary democracy, the indivisibility and universality of human rights, 
the rule of law and a common cultural heritage enriched by its diversity. The 1993 Vienna 
Declaration also identifies the protection of national minorities as an essential element of stability 
and democratic security. The concept of “human rights” within the CoE refers to the aggregate of 
fundamental rights and freedoms set out in a range of CoE instruments, as developed by their 
respective supervisory mechanisms, which again find their sources in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. The concept is therefore not different from that of the UN, in accordance with the 
principle of universality. However, the methods of protection may differ. Minority rights are 
considered to be an integral part of human rights. 
 
The main component parts of the Council of Europe are:  
 
• The Committee of Ministers is the Council of Europe’s decision-making body. It comprises the 
Foreign Affairs Ministers of all the member states, or their Permanent Representatives in Strasbourg. 
The Committee meets at ministerial level once a year, and on Permanent Representatives level once 
a week. It is both a governmental body, where national approaches to problems facing European 
                                                
72 The member states of CoE are: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian 
Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and United 
Kingdom. 
Founded in 1949 (Statute of the Council of Europe). 
Headquarters in Strasbourg, France. 47 Member States. 
www.coe.int 
 
Mandate in Peace and Security: 
. Statute of the Council of Europe, Preamble (1949) 
. European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (1957)    
“The United Nations seeks to promote th[e] same values throughout 
the world, which is why our two great organizations [CoE and UN] 
work closely together.” 
KOFI ANNAN   
  Former UN Secretary-General (2005) 
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society can be discussed on an equal footing, and a collective forum, where Europe-wide responses 
to such challenges are formulated. In collaboration with the Parliamentary Assembly, it is the 
guardian of the Council's fundamental values, and monitors member states' compliance with their 
undertakings;  
 
• The Parliamentary Assembly, is a grouping of 636 members (318 representatives and 318 substitutes) 
from the 47 national parliaments. Its powers extend only to the ability to investigate, recommend 
and advise. Even so, its recommendations on issues such as human rights have significant weight in 
the European political context. One important function of the Parliamentary Assembly is the 
election of judges to the European Court of Human Rights. The sessions of the Parliamentary 
Assembly are divided into four part-sessions, each lasting for about a week; 
  
• The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities is a political assembly composed of representatives 
holding an electoral mandate as members of a local or regional authority appointed each by a specific 
procedure. Its 315 full members and 315 substitute members, representing over 200 000 European 
municipalities and regions, are grouped by national delegation and by political group. The Congress 
offers a forum for dialogue where representatives of local and regional authorities discuss common 
problems, compare notes about their experiences and then put their points of view to the national 
governments; 
 
• The European Court of Human Rights was created as an instrument to enforce the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by ruling over complaints against human 
rights violations committed by States Parties. Complaints can be brought to the Court either by 
other States Parties or by individuals subject to national jurisdiction. The Court consists of a number 
of judges equal to the number of States Parties. Each judge is elected in respect of a State Party; 
 
• The Commissioner for Human Rights is elected by the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE. His/her 
mandate is to foster the effective observance of human rights, and to assist member states in the 
implementation of CoE human rights standards. The Commissioner promotes education in and 
awareness of human rights and identifies possible shortcomings in the law and practice concerning 
human rights. He/she facilitates the activities of national ombudsperson institutions and other 
human rights structures and provides advice and information regarding the protection of human 
rights across the region. The current Commissioner is Thomas Hammarberg (Sweden), who took up 
his position on 1 April 2006.  
 
• The CoE-Secretariat is recruited from member states. It is headed by a Secretary General, elected by 
the Parliamentary Assembly. The current SG is Terry Davis (UK), who was elected in 2004 for a 
period of 5 years; and the present Deputy Secretary General is Maud de Boer-Buquicchio 
(Netherlands), elected in 2002. 
RESOURCE CAPACITY 
The ordinary budget amounts to EUR €197,2 million (USD $288 million). The main part of the 
additional resources is applied to the European Court of Human Rights, to face its increasing needs. 
The follow-up to the May 2005 Warsaw Summit Plan of Action will be financed by the 
redeployment of internal resources. Together with the Partial Agreements and other budgets, the 
CoE total budget amounts to EUR €270,1 million (USD $395 million). In 2007, the CoE has 
approximately 2,140 staff employed either on posts or fixed term positions. 
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
The whole statutory and political concept of the CoE is based on the concept of conflict prevention, 
not least indirectly through the promotion of democracy, the rule of law and human rights. Three 
Conventions were adopted to that end: the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), the 
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European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (1957), and the European 
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(1987). 
 
The pursuance of conflict prevention by the CoE is undertaken mainly through political channels 
and can be categorized as “operational experience” only to a limited extend and in a few instances. 
Examples for concrete activities on the ground are: 
  
 • Assistance and cooperation programs for the development of democratic stability in order 
 to help member states (in particular those of Central and Eastern Europe) to build up and 
 consolidate their democratic systems; 
 
 • The work of the “Committee of Experts on Issues Relating to the Protection of National 
 Minorities”, offering guidance on the implementation of the Framework Convention for the 
 Protection of National Minorities; 
  
 • The program for “Assistance and Technical Cooperation in the Media Field”, set up in 
 order to promote the functioning of professional, independent and pluralistic media in 
 current and potential member states. It covers a wide range of issues such as the rights and 
 responsibilities of journalists, access to information, the regulation of the press, radio and 
 television sectors; 
  
 • The various programs of the Human Rights Cooperation and Awareness Division 
 (HRCAD), such as the human rights training for legal professionals and law enforcement 
 officials, support to Ombudspersons and independent national human rights institutions, 
 and the ‘Police and Human Rights’ program; 
  
 • The Technical Cooperation and Consultancy Program, which provides technical, legal or 
 institutional support to member states in solving complex sustainable development 
 problems linked to the protection, conservation, promotion, management, use and re-use of 
 the architectural and archaeological heritage, the protection and development of sites and 
 landscapes, together with resulting urban planning problems; 
   
 • The Intercultural Dialogue and Conflict Prevention Project, established to help policy-
 makers  (at local, regional and national levels), civil society and all who play a part in culture 
 to devise a policy of dialogue which respects every aspect of cultural diversity, to analyze the 
 sources of conflict between cultural and religious communities and the mechanisms which 
 stir such conflict, to define cultural activities with a preventive aim and to identify actions to 
 promote reconciliation. 
 
Under the CoE Statute the Organization does not deal with military or defense issues. It is therefore 
not involved in peacemaking, peace enforcement and peacekeeping. 
 
However, the CoE can and does contribute to peacebuilding. It has helped building up post-
conflict and post-totalitarian countries, starting with Germany in 1950, then Spain and Portugal in 
the 1970s, and since 1989 the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The CoE has considerable 
experience in standard-setting, monitoring and supervision of compliance on human rights and good 
governance issues. It also runs assistance activities (providing expertise on the compatibility of draft 
laws with European human rights standards, training, and awareness-raising activities). More 
specifically regarding peacebuilding, the CoE has made significant efforts in South-Eastern-
European countries. Agreements were concluded recently in Kosovo between UNMIK and the 
CoE on two important CoE mechanisms covering the prevention of torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment on the one hand, and the protection of national minorities on the other. 
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COOPERATION WITH THE UN 
Cooperation between the United Nations and the Council of Europe has long existed. It has 
continued to develop over the years, in particular since the signing of an Agreement between both 
Organizations on 15 December 1951 and the Arrangement on Cooperation and Liaison between the 
Secretariats of the UN and the CoE of 19 November 1971. The Council of Europe was granted 
observer status at the United Nations in 1989, enabling it to take an active part in the fields of 
activity which they have in common. This applies in the first instance to the defense and promotion 
of human rights, but also to the unremitting search for peace and international security. A new stage 
in the partnership between both organizations was initiated with the initial adoption of a Resolution 
by the UN General Assembly on Cooperation between the United Nations and the Council of 
Europe in October 2000 (A/RES/55/3). 
 
Close cooperation and a good relationship between the Organizations have developed particularly in 
the issue areas of human rights, humanitarian affairs, refugee matters, culture and education. An 
intense exchange of views and frequent meetings take place both on highest political levels but also 
on working level of officials from UN and CoE Secretariats. Some UN-bodies and autonomous 
agencies concluded formal agreements with the CoE, creating an independent framework for 
cooperation with the CoE. These are FAO, ILO, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNICEF, and WHO. 
Fruitful cooperation has also developed between the CoE and the International Law Commission of 
the UN. 
 
The CoE has been a constant participant to the High-Level Meetings between the UN and Regional 
and Other Intergovernmental Organizations since 1998 and has been invited to join the Security 
Council in the past two meetings with Regional Organizations (2005 and 2006).   
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Economic Community of  
Central African States (ECCAS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 
ECCAS’ role in peace and security has been hindered by the internal animosity involving some 
members of the Organization73. ECCAS began functioning in 1985, but it was inactive for several 
years because of financial difficulties (non-payment of membership fees) and the conflict in the 
Great Lakes region. The war in the Democratic Republic of Congo was particularly divisive, as 
Rwanda and Angola fought on opposing sides. ECCAS efficiency has also been hampered by the 
fact that some member countries have given more value to their membership to other regional 
organizations74. Rwanda withdrew its membership from ECCAS in June 2007 while it had already 
briefly suspended ties to the organization during 2001-2002. Despite these obstacles, in September 
1994, Central African states adopted a pact of non-aggression at the end of the 5th meeting of the 
UN Consultative Committee on Security in Central Africa held in Yaoundé, Cameroon. 
 
In late 1990s ECCAS received new political oxygen. At the Malabo Heads of State and Government 
Conference (1999), four priority fields for the organization were identified: (i) to develop capacities 
to maintain peace, security and stability, which are essential prerequisites for economic and social 
development; (ii) to develop physical, economic and monetary integration; (iii) to develop a culture 
of human integration; and (iv) to establish an autonomous financing mechanism for ECCAS. The 
institutions of ECCAS are as follows: 
 
• Conference of Heads of State and Government, which defines the general policy and major guidelines of 
the Community. The Conference meets once a year in regular session 
 
• Council of Ministers composed of Ministers responsible for economic development matters or any 
other Minister appointed for the purpose by each member state. The Council is responsible for the 
functioning and development of ECCAS. It meets twice a year.  
 
• Court of Justice, which ensures the legality of the decisions, directives and regulations of ECCAS, the 
Court is yet to be operational.  
 
• General Secretariat comprised of the Secretary General, three Deputy Secretaries General, a Financial 
Controller, an Accountant and other staff required for the functioning of the organization. The 
                                                
73 The member states of ECCAS are: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo 
(Brazzaville), Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, São Tomé and Príncìpe. 
74 Angola and the DRC are also members of COMESA and SADC; Burundi is a member of COMESA and the 
East African Community (EAC); Chad is member of CEN-SAD. 
                          
Founded in 1983 (Treaty Establishing ECCAS).  
Headquarters in Libreville, Gabon. 10 Member States. 
www.ceeac-eccas.org 
 
Mandate in Peace and Security: 
. Treaty Establishing ECCAS, art. 3, 4, and 83 (1983) 
. Mutual Assistance Pact Between Member States of ECCAS (2000) 
. Protocol Relating to the Establishment of a Mutual Security Pact in Central 
Africa (COPAX) (2000) 
 
 
 
 
“It shall be in the aim of the Community to promote and strengthen 
harmonious cooperation and balanced and self-sustained development 
in all fields of economic and social activity (…) in order to (…) foster 
closer and peaceful relations between Member States and contribute to 
the progress and development of the African continent” 
Treaty Establishing ECCAS, Art. 4 
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Secretary General, since 1998, Louis Sylvain Goma (from the Republic of the Congo), is the chief 
executive of ECCAS. The post of Secretary General is appointed for a four-year mandate75. The 
three Deputy Secretaries General are each in charge of one department: (i) Human Integration, 
Peace, Security and Stability (IHPSS); (ii) Physical, Economic and Monetary Integration (IPEM); (iii) 
Program, Budget, Administration and Human Resources 
 
• Consultative Commission responsible for studying or investigating questions and projects submitted to 
it by the other Community institutions. 
 
At a summit conference of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions 
in Central Africa, which took place in Yaoundé on 25-26 February 1999, member states decided to 
create a mechanism for the promotion, maintenance and consolidation of peace and security in 
Central Africa, which would be called the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX). The 
COPAX Protocol, approved one year later, has now entered into force and is headed by the Deputy 
Secretary General in charge of Peace and Security. The objectives of COPAX are: (i) to prevent, 
manage and settle conflicts; (ii) to reduce the sources of tensions and prevent the eruption of armed 
conflicts; (iii) to develop confidence-building measures between member states; (iv) to promote 
peaceful dispute resolution measures; and (v) to facilitate mediation efforts in cases of crises and 
conflicts between member states and with third parties. The technical organs of the council are: 
  
• The Defense and Security Commission (CDS), which is the meeting of Chiefs of Staff of national armies 
and Commanders-in-Chief of police and gendarmerie forces from the different member states. Its 
role is to plan, organize and provide advice to the decision-making bodies of the community in order 
to initiate military operations if needed. 
 
• The Central African Early-Warning System (MARAC), which collects and analyses data for the early 
detection and prevention of crises. On 17 June 2002, ECCAS’ Heads of State and Government 
adopted the ‘Standing Orders of the Central African Early Warning Mechanism (MARAC)’. 
According to these standing orders, “the Central African Early Warning Mechanism (MARAC) is a 
mechanism for the observation, monitoring and prevention of crises and conflicts, which shall work 
within the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)” and that “shall be responsible 
for data collection and analysis in order to prevent crises and conflicts”. 
 
Currently MARAC suffers from a number of staffing, financial, logistic and other problems and the 
system is, for all practical purposes, not yet operational although it has its own office and limited 
infrastructure. When fully operational MARAC is expected to have a staff of 24, with inter-
disciplinary experts covering thematic areas (the position of Director was recently announced and 
filled). In the short term (until the end of 2008), MARAC will establish a Situation Room and 
develop operating standards and procedures – drawing lessons from IGAD and ECOWAS’ similar 
mechanisms. ECCAS has evolved a plan for the further development of MARAC (until 2010). The 
Mechanism is supported by the European Union. The EU also funded a training session for 
MARAC’s staff held in Kinshasa in December 2007. 
 
• The Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC), which is a non-permanent force consisting of 
military contingents from member states, whose purpose is to accomplish missions of peace, security 
and humanitarian relief. In 2004, ECCAS members have agreed on an Action Plan for the 
establishment of an ECCAS Standby Brigade and a Planning Element. FOMAC standby force will 
be composed of army, naval and air force units, police, gendarmerie contingents and civilian 
modules from the 11 member states.  
 
                                                
75 According to the ECCAS Treaty the mandate is only renewable once. But Louis Sylvain Goma’s mandate was 
renewed again in 2007. This is currently his third mandate. 
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In January 2000, Gabon hosted a regional peacekeeping exercise “Gabon 2000” with the objective of 
increasing the capacity of ECCAS states in the field of peacekeeping and conflict prevention and 
management. Similar exercises were undertaken in Gabon in 2003 and in Cameroon in 2006. These 
exercises represented a direct application of the French reinforcement of African peacekeeping 
capacities (Recamp) concept. However, this training exercise was not limited to the ECCAS member 
states and other countries also took part in it. 
 
A Meeting of Defense Chiefs of Staff was held in Brazzaville in October 2003. The meeting decided 
to create a brigade-size peacekeeping force for intervention in zones of instability in Central Africa, 
in line with the African Union’s plans to establish an African Standby Force. It recommended that 
military planners from each of the ECCAS states form a group to work out the details for the force. 
They also suggested the establishment of a joint peacekeeping training centre and military exercises 
every two years, the first of which, known as “Biyongho-2003”, took place in Gabon in 2003. A 
second military exercise, “Bahr El-Gazel”, was held in Chad in November 2007 despite being initially 
scheduled for 2005. The “Bahr El-Gazel” exercise was the first one to be held independently from 
the RECAMP framework. 
 
In 2006, as a follow-up to the recommendations made by the working groups, the Defense and 
Security Commission decided to create a Regional Chief of Staff to overview the establishment and 
management of FOMAC. The headquarters have temporarily been located in Libreville in Gabon. 
The Regional Chief of Staff was appointed during the year 2007 and is composed of one Chief of 
Staff assisted by four Joint Chiefs of Staff and one assistant for information gathering and public 
relations. Each of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is in charge of a particular domain: Operations, Training 
and Doctrine; Regional Logistics; Budget, Finances and Administrative matters and Regional System 
for Communication and Information.  
 
ECCAS remains, nevertheless, a weak organization marred by technical and infrastructural problems 
and punctuated by the pursuit of narrow national interests. The general lack of political will and the 
security environment in the region has made it difficult for ECCAS to emerge as a robust 
organization in the field of peace and security. 
RESOURCE CAPACITY 
Budget revenues originate from the annual contributions of member states. In October 2007, at the 
13th Summit meeting in Angola, five countries agreed to each assume 13 percent of the 
organization’s budget (Angola, Gabon, Republic of the Congo, Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea), 
making up 65 percent of the total general budget, which is around USD $17-18 million. In terms of  
staff, no source has been able to supply the exact figure, it could be estimated to be approximately 50 
people. 
 
Moreover, ECCAS has also established a Development Fund whose goal is to provide financial and 
technical assistance to promote the economic and social development of member states. 
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Recently, ECCAS has started deploying election observation missions in its member states. 
ECCAS sent electoral observers to supervise the electoral process in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (2006), Gabon (2005), and the Republic of the Congo (2007). To date ECCAS does not have 
a single document on which it can base its governance assessment. 
 
In 2003, in Sao Tome and Principe, ECCAS was involved in the mediation team between Major 
Fernando Pereira who attempted a coup and President Fradique de Menezes. The initial mediation 
efforts were first led by CPLP, under the leadership of Angolan Deputy Foreign Relations Minister 
Francisco Romão. Later, the leadership of the mediation team was given to Rodolphe Adada, the 
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Foreign Minister of the Republic of the Congo, the country that held the presidency of ECCAS. The 
large mediation team was able to secure an initial agenda with the ‘Junta’, which included provisions 
for the return to constitutional normality. Later on the Special Representative of ECCAS would also 
head the international monitoring commission after the crisis settled down. The commission also 
included one representative each from CPLP and the AU.  
 
In July 2008, the peacekeeping Multinational Force Central African Republic (FOMUC)76 of the 
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) was renamed to Mission of the 
Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (MICOPAX 1) and put under the authority of 
ECCAS. This mission, in addition to the combat troops, will incorporate a civilian branch, which is 
intended to help with the revival of political dialogue in the Central African Republic. The relation 
between FOMAC and MICOPAX 1 is not clear, however.  
 
COOPERATION WITH THE UN 
The United Nations and ECCAS have been engaged for over a decade in a constructive partnership 
in the critical areas of peace and security, human rights and institution-building. In July 2003, 
ECCAS, with the assistance of France and of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on 
Security Questions in Central Africa, organized a multinational military maneuver called “Biyongho 
2003” in Gabon. 
 
The United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa is the 
main framework at the ministerial level for discussions of sub-regional peace and security issues in 
Central Africa, in particular on arms limitation, disarmament and confidence-building measures. The 
Department for Disarmament Affairs serves as the Secretariat of the Committee and works closely 
with member states of the sub-region and with the ECCAS secretariat in Libreville. Moreover, the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) contributed to the drafting of the joint 
ECCAS and ECOWAS Plan of Action against Trafficking in Persons, which was adopted in Nigeria 
in July 2006. 
 
The ECCAS Secretariat and the Yaounde-based United Nations Sub-regional Centre for Human 
Rights and Democracy in Central Africa have continued their cooperation on a number of issues of 
common concern, including early warning and conflict prevention, and the role of civil society 
organizations in the consolidation of democracy and human rights in Central Africa. In this context, 
ECCAS has participated in several workshops organized by the Centre. The workshops focused on 
military justice, human rights and democracy, relations between civilians and the military, and the 
role of civil society in conflict prevention and peacebuilding in Central Africa. 
 
ECCAS has been a participant in the last three High-level Meetings between the UN and Regional 
Organizations (2003, 2005 and 2006) but has not been invited for the Security Council Meetings. 
                                                
76 Originally, FOMUC was mooted and designed with the intention of protecting President Ange-Felix Patasse, 
former head of state of the Central African Republic, who, at the time was facing a rebellion in his country. After he 
was overthrown by General Francois Bozize in March 15,2003, the mandate of the mission was transformed into a 
security mission that was also tasked with reforming and helping the Central African Armed Forces (FACA) in its 
fight against highway bandits and armed gangs operating in the northern part of the country. 
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 68 
Founded in 1975 (Treaty of ECOWAS).  
Headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria. 15 Member states. 
www.ecowas.int 
 
Mandate in Peace and Security: 
. Treaty of ECOWAS, art. 58 (1993) 
. Declaration of Political Principles (1991) 
. Protocol on the Community Court of Justice (1991) 
. Moratorium on Import, Export and Manufacturing of Light Weapons (1998) 
. Protocol for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping 
  and Security (1999) 
. Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the 
  Protocol for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping 
  and Security (2001) 
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of West African States (ECOWAS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 
In the African context, the sub-regional organization, which has arguably the most robust security 
mechanism is ECOWAS. Founded by treaty in May 1975, ECOWAS was conceived as a means 
towards economic integration and development intended to lead to the eventual establishment of an 
economic union in West Africa, fostering economic stability and enhancing relations between its 
member states77. However, soon after its establishment, ECOWAS entered the security domain with 
the adoption of a non-aggression pact. A recent UN mission to ECOWAS has reiterated that, “in the 
past 15 years ECOWAS has developed the political will, accorded itself the legal authority, 
established the instrumental mechanisms and begun to build the organizational capacity to maintain 
regional peace and security”78. In 1999, the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, adopted at the ECOWAS summit in Lomé, reinforced ECOWAS’ 
role as a security organization. The Mechanism expanded two previous sub-regional security 
initiatives: the Protocol on Non-Aggression signed in 1978, and a Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on 
Defense in 1981.  It is comprised of the following bodies:  
 
• The Authority of Heads of State and Governmennt, is the supreme institution of the Community and is 
composed of Heads of State and/or Government of member states; 
 
• Council of Ministers, it comprises the Minister in charge of ECOWAS Affairs and any other Minister 
of each member state. It is responsible for the functioning and development of the Community; 
 
• Commission, which in January 2007 replaced the Executive Secretariat. It supervises the activities of 
the various bodies of the ‘Mechanism’ and it is constituted by a President, a Vice-President and 
seven Commissioners. The current President Mohamed Ibn Chambas (from Ghana) was re-elected 
in 2007 for a 4-year term. The Office of the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security 
contributes to achieving the goals of ECOWAS through the Implementation of the ‘Mechanism’. It 
supervises the Political Affairs Department, the Peacekeeping and Regional Security Department, 
                                                
77 ECOWAS member states are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. 
78 “Joint UN Inter-Agency Mission to ECOWAS on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding”, 31 March 2006 
(UNDP, UNDPA, UNU-CRIS). 
                                                                                                           
                    
           
(…) “ECOWAS is the most advanced regional organization in 
Africa in the field of peace and security” 
EU-UN Assessment Mission to ECOWAS (2004) 
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and the Observation and Monitoring Center79 (the headquarters body of the early warning system - 
ECOWARN); 
 
• Mediation and Security Council, composed of 10 members80, it decides and implements all policies for 
conflict prevention, management and resolution, peacekeeping and security, the Council is also 
responsible for authorizing military interventions. It oversees the activities of the following organs: 
 
• Defense and Security Commission, comprises Chiefs of Defense Staff of ECOWAS. It examines all 
technical and administrative issues and evaluates the prerequisites for peacekeeping operations;  
 
• Council of Elders, a group of eminent persons (15) mandated to use their good offices in the 
prevention of violent conflict81;  
 
• ECOMOG/ECOWAS Standby Force, a body that consists of standby military forces; 
 
• Court of Justice, composed of seven Judges and is based in Abuja, it was set up to ensure the legality 
of the interpretation and application of the Treaty, a provisional amendment to the Protocol in 2005 
allowed individuals to seize the Court and extended the jurisdiction of the Court to include violation 
of Human Rights in all member states. 
 
• ECOWARN, which collects and transmits data on imminent conflicts. 
 
The organizational capacity of ECOWAS in the sphere of peace and security is primarily focused on 
conflict prevention/early warning and peacekeeping and enforcement: 
 
Conflict Prevention 
ECOWARN, which collects and transmits data on imminent conflicts, comprises a situation room at 
ECOWAS headquarters, field stations in all member states and four zonal bureaus of early warning 
(in Banjul, Ouagadougou, Monrovia, and Cotonou) mandated to assess political (human rights, 
democracy), economic (food shortages), social (unemployment), security (arms flows, civil-military 
relations), and environment (drought, flooding) indicators on a daily basis.82 ECOWAS work in the 
                                                
79  The OMC is responsible for data collection and analysis, and the drafting of up-to-date reports on behalf of the 
Deputy Executive Secretary for the Executive Secretary that identify/outline possible emerging crises, monitor on-
going crises and post-crisis transitions. Currently, the ECOWAS team is tasked with producing three types of 
reports: Situation Reports, Incident Reports and Country Profiles but it only produces daily Situation Reports and 
occasionally, Incident Reports. The Country Profiles are meant to provide the situational context and background 
for analysis, thereby presenting the structural mapping of potential causes of conflict. At the ECOWAS Secretariat, 
the Director of the Centre compiles the Situation Reports and Incident Reports. The OMC also has responsibilities 
regarding establishing and maintaining collaboration with the member states, the African Union, the UN, research 
centers, major NGOs active in the sub-region, and all relevant international and regional organizations (see Jakkie 
Cilliers, Towards a Continental Early Warning System for Africa, ISS Occasional Paper 102, 2005). 
80 The current ten members are the Foreign Ministers of the following states: Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, 
Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.  
81 The first Council of Elders was inaugurated in July 2001 in Niamey, Niger and count election monitoring in The 
Gambia, Sierra Leone, Togo as well as Zimbabwe among their achievements. This Council was constituted as a 32-
member organ drawn from the ten members of the Mediation and Security Council. At the Dakar Summit in 
January 2003, the Council of Elders was recomposed as a 15-member body, one from each member state of 
ECOWAS. On 23 April 2003, a new Council of Elders was inaugurated in Accra, Ghana. At their first meeting the 
new Council recommended that exploratory or preliminary missions in certain conflict situations be carried by the 
Elders before the intervention of the Heads of State. The current members for 2005 are: General Abdulsalami 
Abubakar, former president of Nigeria; Gactan Nitchama, former minister of Guinea Bissau; Bitokotipou 
Yagnimim, former minister of Togo; Elizabeth Alpha-Lavalie, vice speaker of Sierra Leonean parliament; Bernadine 
Do-Rego, Benin; Debra Ebenezer Moses, Ghana; Dieudonne Essienne, Côte d'Ivoire; Abdourahmane Sow, 
Guinea; Mbaye Mbengue, Senegal; Bahou Ousmane Jobe, Gambia; Leopold Andre Ouedrago, Burkina Faso; 
Emmanuel Gbalaze, Liberia; Sira Diop, Mali; Amirou Garba, Niger. 
82 The ECOWAS early warning system, similarly to IGAD’s and AU’s native systems, is being developed by Virtual 
Research Associates, Inc., USA. 
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area of early warning is carried out in close partnership with civil society, and is being coordinated 
mainly through two West African civil society networks: the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding 
(WANEP) and the West African Civil Society Forum (WACSOF). The Zonal Bureaus are, however, 
not yet functional. There is still a lack of technical and qualified staff to convert raw data into useful 
and predictive information. Nevertheless, ECOWARN is making some steady progress towards 
achieving a fully integrated early warning system by 2010.  
 
Peacekeeping and Enforcement 
The ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) consists of 6,500 troops pledged by contributing nations. The 
troops are sub-divided between an ECOWAS Task Force composed of 1,500 troops that could be 
deployed within 30 days and an ECOWAS Main Brigade of 5,000 troops that could be deployed 
within 90 days. The ESF is to be coordinated through a Mission Planning and Management Cell 
(MPMC). The MPMC has a working group of 5 people nominated by member states. This working 
group is responsible for planning for the operation of ESF. The Taskforce should be made of 15 
staff members (so far 8 positions have been filled).  
 
Three training centers have been designated to offer ECOWAS troops training in peacekeeping 
operations. The National War College in Nigeria is aimed at the strategic level, a training center in 
Mali operates at the tactical level, and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in 
Ghana is focused on the operational level. As a recent Capacity Needs Assessment Report83 pointed 
out, apart from funding for selected courses, these institutions particularly need substantial support 
in respect of their respective Work Production Facilities/centers, which constitute the workhouse of 
the institutions. Additionally, two ECOWAS military exercises have been held. In 2004 an exercise 
under the Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix (RECAMP) framework was 
organized for ECOWAS member states in Benin. In December 2007, some 1,600 troops from West 
Africa and France participated in Exercise DEGGO XXVII, a command post and field training 
exercise starting at Thies, Senegal. The exercise would strengthen the capacity of the Task Force 
component of the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) towards making it functional by 2008. 
 
An interesting aspect of the Protocol is that it calls for intervention not only in inter-state conflicts, 
but also in internal disputes that “threaten to trigger a humanitarian disaster” or that pose “a serious 
threat to peace and security in the sub-region.” Intervention is also authorized in situations of 
“serious and massive violations of human rights and the rule of law”, or “in the event of an 
overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government” (art. 25). 
 
The organic and operational record of ECOWAS is, however, not faultless. The organization has 
only demonstrated a modest interest from the military/security side in drawing out the linkages 
between their work and development programs for conflict prevention. Indeed, the defense and 
security staff still regard peace and security as a mainly military responsibility involving the 
ECOWAS Standby Force and other techniques involving military forces supported by formal 
structures. ECOWAS should therefore enhance the conceptual basis for peace and security in 
general, and conflict prevention in particular, so that a distinction between operational prevention 
and structural prevention becomes visible, and should increase understanding of conflict prevention 
related opportunities, tools and resources at technical and political levels. Indeed, ECOWAS has 
mostly focused on identifying operational and strategic partners that could collaborate in actualizing 
the 1999 Protocol rather than on creating synergies to develop a strategic vision or a sense of 
prioritization that is informed by the current needs of the region.84  
                                                
83 “Long Term Capacity Needs Assessment of the AU and RECs in Their Promotion and Maintenance of Peace 
and Security”, January 2007. Report commissioned by the European Union.  
84 Analogously, the Report of the Joint EU-UN Assessment Mission to ECOWAS has pointed out that “Despite its 
broad mandate, ECOWAS has yet to articulate a strategic policy framework for sustainable peacebuilding and 
conflict prevention”. Also a report supervised by the UN Office for West Africa, recommended ECOWAS to 
“develop and publish an ECOWAS peace support operations, vision, concept and doctrine (see Report of the 
ECOWAS Workshop, Lessons from ECOWAS Peacekeeping Operations: 1990-2004; Accra, February 2005).  
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Nevertheless, ECOWAS is currently in the process of developing a Strategic Framework aimed at 
mainstreaming conflict prevention into ECOWAS policies and programs, enhancing the conceptual 
basis for conflict prevention, and bolstering ECOWAS’ anticipation and planning capabilities in 
relation to regional tensions. 
RESOURCE CAPACITY 
Several assessments carried out by independent consultants have indicated that the ECOWAS 
Secretariat is in need of training and equipment to operationalize the framework set up by the 
Protocol. The recent UN assessment mission to ECOWAS has concluded that ECOWAS still lacks 
the “resource capacity (both human and financial) to complete the organization’s institutional 
capability to maintain regional stability over the long-term.”85 ECOWAS staff dealing with peace and 
security need to enhance their capacity in program/project identification, formulation, practical and 
financial management86. Additionally, ECOWAS still needs to balance peace/security with 
development activities87. 
 
Financial administration remains weak and needs to be strengthened. Only five countries are up to 
date in the payment of their contributions, some member countries like Liberia, Mauritania, Sierra 
Leone and the Gambia have accumulated arrears over more than 10 years. The ECOWAS 
Secretariat’s move from Lagos to Abuja in 1998 was delayed by seven years due to lack of funds, and 
its staff have sometimes been irregularly paid. Dependence on external funding is growing as an 
increased number of donors show interest in fostering the capacity of the Secretariat. Such funding is 
either channeled through the ECOWAS internal budget or allocated directly to the department 
concerned. The Joint EU-UN Assessment Mission to ECOWAS has concluded, however, that no 
central source appeared to be aware of the entire range of assistance being provided to ECOWAS. 
And it added that the assistance is more based on the availability of funds and budgetary deadlines 
from donors rather than on systematically assessed needs. 
 
Additionally, human resource management is still often driven by political appointments and 
promotions, hindering the progressive professionalization of ECOWAS staff.  
 
Finally, in what financial resources are concerned, ECOWAS announced, in November 2005, the 
launch of the Peace and Development Project whose overall aim is to contribute to promoting peace in 
the region through the Peace Fund. This project has three key components, namely (i) capacity 
building, (ii) support to the Peace and Development Program, and (iii) project management. The 
Project is under implementation. 
 
Although there is no reliable source that could indicate the exact figure of ECOWAS staff, it is 
estimated to be approximately 300 people. In 2006, it approved a budget of USD $121 million for 
the operations of the Secretariat and institutions of the Community.  
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
ECOWAS experience in issues of peace and security has mostly been attained in peacekeeping and 
enforcement, conflict prevention and peacemaking, and peacebuilding (election observation). 
 
                                                
85 “Joint UN Inter-Agency Mission to ECOWAS on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding”, 31 March 2006 
(UNDP, UNDPA, UNU-CRIS). 
86 See for example ‘ECOWAS Training Needs Assessment for the ECOWAS Dept. of Political Affairs, Defense 
and Security” carried out by the Training Program on Peacebuilding and Good Governance for African Civilian 
Personnel based at LECIA, University of Ghana (February 2004).  
87 See debriefing of ‘ECOWAS/Development Partners Annual Coordination Meeting and Launch of the Peace and 
Development Project’ (Abuja, 21-22 November, 2005).  
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Peacekeeping and Enforcement 
Arguably, ECOWAS is the African regional organization with the most experience in military 
deployment. Nevertheless, a critical analysis will demonstrate that specific weaknesses of ECOWAS 
missions included: the lack of unified command and control, since troop contributing countries kept 
close national control on their forces; major differences in training and capabilities of contingents; 
the absence of a central logistic system, leading to a lack of coherence and predictability in logistic 
support; and lack of capacity to transition from peacekeeping to peacebuilding88. ECOWAS has 
deployed military missions in the following countries: 
 
• Liberia I (1990-1997). Following the outbreak of civil war that pitted Charles Taylor (NPFL) 
against governmental forces (led by President Samuel Doe), ECOWAS deployed a mission with the 
mandate “to conduct military operations for the purpose of monitoring the ceasefire” and restore 
“law and order to create the necessary conditions for free and fair elections.” ECOMOG, however, 
soon found its mandate complicated by the violent capacity of the warring factions. Not long after 
its deployment, ECOMOG shifted from being a peacekeeper to performing peace enforcement 
tasks. 
 
• Liberia II (2003). After President Taylor resigned office and departed into exile in Nigeria, 
conditions were created for the deployment by ECOWAS, in August 2003, of what became a 3,600-
strong peacekeeping mission in Liberia (ECOMIL). The UN took over security in Liberia in October 
2003, subsuming ECOMIL into the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), a force that grew 
to its present size of nearly 15,000. 
 
• Sierra Leone I (1997-1999). It was established after Nigerian leader, General Sani Abacha, 
diverted peacekeepers from the successful Liberia mission to Sierra Leone in an attempt to crush a 
military coup by the Sierra Leonean army in May 1997. Nigerian troops reversed the coup in 
February 1998 and restored President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah to power. 
 
• Guinea Bissau (1998-1999). The goal was to end civil conflict between President João Vieira 
(backed by Senegalese and Guinean military forces), and his former army chief, Ansumane Mané. 
Given the continuous degradation of the conflict and its poor capacity to cope with it, ECOWAS 
withdrew its forces before the conflict was resolved. 
 
• Côte d’Ivoire (2003-2004). Deployed in order to facilitate the implementation of the Linas-
Marcoussis Agreement that put an end to the civil war that had broken out in September 2002. On 
27 February 2004, the UN Security Council passed a Resolution authorizing a full peacekeeping 
operation for Côte d’Ivoire, and mandating nearly 7,000 UN troops to monitor and help implement 
the peace agreement. The ECOWAS forces have been, as a result, subsumed within the UN 
mandated operation. 
 
Conflict Prevention and Peacemaking 
As a joint EU-UN assessment mission to ECOWAS observed, the West African organization has 
been more effective in crisis management through the deployment of peacekeepers than in conflict 
prevention89. Nonetheless ECOWAS has field experience in conflict prevention and peacemaking. 
In Guinea Bissau (1998), mediation efforts (in collaboration with CPLP) led to a ceasefire 
agreement between President Vieira and dissident General Mané. In Sierra Leone (2000), it was 
directly involved in securing the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement, and a subsequent meeting in Abuja in 
May 2001, which committed the RUF and government to start disarming. In Côte d’Ivoire (2002), 
ECOWAS dispatched a high-level ministerial delegation to Abidjan to begin efforts to restore peace 
between the government of President Laurent Gbagbo and rebel soldiers. ECOWAS also became a 
                                                
88 See IPA Meeting Note “The United Nations Contribution to African Capacity-Building for Peacekeeping” (April, 
2006). 
89 Report of the Joint EU-UN Assessment Mission to ECOWAS (March, 2004). 
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member of the Follow-Up Committee established to monitor the implementation of the agreement 
reached between the government and rebel groups. In Liberia (2003), ECOWAS facilitated peace 
talks among the Government of Liberia, civil society, and the LURD and MODEL rebel groups. In 
Togo (2005) special envoys were sent in order to mediate disputes and to prevent the outbreak of 
armed violence. In 2005, ECOWAS was also instrumental in appeasing tensions between Senegal 
and The Gambia that were sparked by the conflict in Casamance. A report supervised by the 
United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA) has clarified that “ECOWAS mediation has led 
to the signing of nearly two dozen peace agreements to end destructive wars in West Africa”90. 
Despite this, ECOWAS has not yet fully capitalized on the potential of its Council of Elders as many 
of the Council members lack training and knowledge in conflict prevention, resolution and 
management. 
 
Peacebuilding 
Finally, ECOWAS has deployed election observation missions, such as those in Benin (2006), Cape 
Verde (2006), Mali (2007), Nigeria (2007), Senegal (2007), Sierra Leone (2002 and 2007) and Togo 
(2005). ECOWAS has recently requested the support of the donor community to establish an 
Electoral Assistance Unit, and a Democratization and Good Governance Unit. So far, ECOWAS 
still does not have a single methodology to assess elections. Moreover, the elections observations 
undertaken by ECOWAS are generally limited to election day and not the entire electoral process. 
COOPERATION WITH THE UN 
The UN Department of Political Affairs oversees UNOWA, created in 2002 to bring a regional and 
integrated dimension to the wide-ranging UN peace efforts in the area. Headed by Ahmedou Ould-
Abdallah, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for West Africa, UNOWA is the first such 
regional conflict prevention and peacebuilding office of the United Nations. The Office works 
closely with ECOWAS to develop programs that address a wide range of issues affecting peace and 
security in and between countries in the region. The UNOWA mandate is to enhance ‘the 
contribution of the United Nations towards the achievement of peace and security priorities in West 
Africa’. 
 
Furthermore, ECOWAS and UN senior staff meet regularly to exchange views on how to encourage 
cooperation between both organizations. In the case of Sierra Leone, a coordination mechanism 
between UN agencies and ECOWAS was implemented in 2000 to harmonize the UN and 
ECOWAS strategies. Also, the UN has cooperated with ECOWAS in efforts to compile the list of 
persons to be appointed to the Council of Elders for mediation purposes. 
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European Union (EU) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 
With the founding of the European Union (EU) in 1992, an EU Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) was created. The CFSP incorporates all activities and policies of the EU in the 
international arena, and therefore provides the central EU framework for foreign and security affairs. 
The CFSP has five key objectives: (i) to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, 
independence and integrity of its member states91 in conformity with the principles of the UN 
Charter; (ii) to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; (iii) to preserve peace and strengthen 
international security; (iv) to promote international cooperation; and (v) to develop and consolidate 
democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
 
Part of the CFSP is the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), which deals with questions 
of peace and security. In the second half of the 1990s life was breathed into the ESDP in a gradual, 
but rapid process: in 1997, crisis management tasks (known as the “Petersberg tasks”) were 
incorporated into the ESDP (Amsterdam Treaty). These crisis management tasks include 
humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, 
including peacemaking. In 1999, it was decided that the EU should develop the capacity for 
autonomous action, backed by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the 
readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises. In the years thereafter, an EU Military 
Rapid Response Concept was developed and implemented. In June 2003, the first autonomous EU 
military crisis management operation took place. And a European Security Strategy was adopted for 
the first time in December 2003. 
 
Regarding the civilian aspects of crisis management, the EU aims to be capable of carrying out any 
police operation, from advisory, assistance and training tasks to substituting local police forces. Since 
2003, EU member states have undertaken to provide up to 5,000 police officers, of which up to 
1,400 can be deployed in under 30 days. As regards civil protection, three different assets can be 
provided by the EU: 2 or 3 assessment and/or coordination teams, consisting of 10 experts, can be 
dispatched within 3 to 7 hours; intervention teams of up to 2,000 persons for deployment at short 
notice can be provided; additional or more specialized means can be dispatched within 2 to 7 days, 
depending on the particular needs of a crisis. In addition, the EU has Civilian Response Teams 
(CRTs) with almost 100 pre-identified and trained experts. The rule of law can be strengthened 
within crisis-management operations by nearly 300 officers with backgrounds in the judicial and 
                                                
91 The member states of the EU are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and United Kingdom. 
 
             
“(…) the United Nations and the European Union are engaged in a 
vital, tremendously complementary partnership (…), encompass(ing) 
peace and security, human rights, humanitarian assistance and 
development.” 
      
   ASHA-ROSE MIGIRO     
UN Deputy Secretary-General (2007) 
 
Founded in 1992 (predecessor founded in 1957).  
Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium and Strasbourg, France.  
27 Member States.      
http://europa.eu  
 
Mandate in Peace and Security: 
. Treaty on European Union, Article 17, including Protocol No 1; 
. European Security Strategy (2003). 
. Lisbon Treaty (2007, ratification pending) 
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penitentiary system (prosecutors, judges, prison officers). Additional experts on civil administration 
can be deployed at very short notice. 
 
The current formulation and implementation of ESDP policies is undertaken by a number of 
different actors within the institutional framework of the EU. Four different hierarchical layers can 
be distinguished: 
 
• The first layer is constituted of the European Council, composed of the Heads of State and 
 Government of the EU member states and the President of the European Commission. 
 This body lays down the principles and general guidelines for the ESDP. The current 
 President of the European Commission is José Manuel Barroso (from Portugal), who was 
 elected in 2004 for a 5-year term. 
  
• The second layer is the General Affairs and External Relations Council with Foreign and 
 Defense Ministers of the 27 EU member states and the External Relations Commissioner of 
 the European Commission. The Council adopts joint actions and common positions, and can 
 present  recommendations for common strategies. The Presidency of the Council, rotating 
 every six months, is the driving force in the legislative and political decision-making process. 
 Within the second layer, a High Representative (HR) for CFSP acts as a central contact 
 person for third parties and gives the Union a continuous face in global politics. The HR 
 assists the Council and  especially the EU Presidency within CFSP and ESDP matters by 
 ‘contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of policy decisions’ and by 
 acting on behalf of the Council ‘ through conducting political dialogue with third parties’.  
 
•  At senior officials level (third hierarchical layer) one body is of particular relevance in ESDP 
matters: Ambassadors of the EU member states meet in the Political and Security 
Committee (PSC – commonly referred to by the French acronym COPS). The PSC is the 
linchpin of the CFSP and the ESDP and deals with management and policy-making on 
political and security issues on a daily basis, including the handling of crises. The PSC also 
supports the General Affairs and External Relations Council in its decision-making. 
Furthermore, Special Representatives pursue CFSP and  ESDP policies in clearly designated 
matters, such as the Middle East or the Kosovo. 
 
•  Less senior experts on the fourth layer discuss CFSP issues in different constellations, most 
 importantly within the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) (composed of the 
 Chiefs of Defense of the member states, often represented by their permanent military 
 representatives), the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) (military and civilian personnel), 
 the Politico-Military Group (PMG) and the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
 Management (CIVCOM). 
 
Also the European Commission and the Secretariat of the Council of the EU play a role in EU 
policy-making concerning peace and security. While the European Commission is involved 
predominantly in the social, economical, diplomatic and environmental dimension of security, the 
Council and its officials focus on diplomatic and military aspects. 
 
Outside the policy-making structures stand three institutions providing scientific and technical input: 
 
• The EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) conducts security-related research and analysis, 
 feeding into the policy-making processes; 
•  The European Defense Agency (EDA) is involved in developing defense capabilities, in   
 promoting defense research and technology, as well as in armaments cooperation; 
•  The European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) supports decision-making within the ESDP 
 by providing analysis of satellite imagery and collateral data. 
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The ESDP functions within the same regulatory framework as the CFSP as outlined in Articles 11-
28 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). However, two notable exceptions exist: 
 
• Invariably, decisions on ESDP have to be taken unanimously (Article 23 [2] TEU); 
• Operating expenditures for ESDP are covered by the EU member states and not charged to 
 the general budget (Article 28 [3] TEU). 
 
In December 2007, Heads of State or Government of the EU member states signed the Lisbon Treaty 
(ratification pending), which will have implications for policy-making in the field of peace and 
security. Particularly important for the ESDP are four of the Treaty’s proposals: 1) giving legal 
personality to the Union; 2) the establishment of the position of a High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy (‘EU foreign minister’) by amalgamating the positions of the HR and the 
Commissioner for External Affairs; 3) the creation of an EU External Action Service; and 4) the 
implementation of new regulations on defense policy, allowing the EU member states to become 
more active outside the Union for peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening of 
international security. 
RESOURCE CAPACITY 
The EU does not have its own army. Instead, it has to fall back on the troops and military 
capabilities of the EU member states, which again decide autonomously on the participation in a 
mission. 
 
Nevertheless, two key instruments are at the Union’s disposal, with which it can act in fulfillment of 
the Petersberg tasks: the EU Battle Groups and the European Union Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). 
While the former are intended to be deployable more rapidly and for shorter periods in crisis 
situations, the ERRF are to be used in longer-term missions. 
 
In January 2007 the EU Battlegroup Concept reached full operational capability. Up to fifteen 
battlegroups, composed of 1,500 combat soldiers each plus support, are to be formed. Currently, the 
EU has the capacity to undertake two concurrent single battlegroup-sized rapid response operations, 
including the ability to launch both such operations nearly simultaneously. Forces should be on the 
ground no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation. The battlegroups are 
sustainable for 30 days in initial operations, extendable to 120 days, if re-supplied appropriately.  
 
The ERRF is still in the process of creation, even though its first utilization took place already in 
2003 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Once fully operational, the ERRF will 
comprise 50,000-60,000 troops plus support, grouped in units of some 1,500 soldiers. These troops 
are deployable within sixty days for at least one year, fulfilling the whole range of Petersberg tasks. 
 
A total of around 500 people work in the three above-mentioned ESDP-related EU institutes and 
agencies (EUISS, EDA, EUSC). The EU Council Secretariat has about 2,500 personnel, of which a 
couple of hundred civil servants work on security issues. About 22,000 people work within the 
European Commission, a majority of which on issues with a soft security dimension. The EU budget 
for 2008 is EUR €129.1 billion (USD $188.5 billion). The biggest resources, however, exist in the 
form of military and political personnel, as well as military equipment and financial resources, in the 
EU member states, on which the EU can fall back on.  
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Conflict Prevention 
 
 Conflict prevention is undertaken by the EU through seven main channels: 
 • Development cooperation and external assistance; 
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 • Trade policy instruments; 
 • Humanitarian aid; 
 • Social and environmental policies; 
 • Diplomatic instruments and political dialogue; 
 • Cooperation with international partners and NGOs; 
 • New crisis management instruments. 
 
The operational experience in those channels certainly goes beyond the four sub-complexes of 
conflict prevention identified above (i.e. preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment, preventive 
disarmament and structural prevention). 
 
The EU has been – or still is – involved in preventive diplomacy in various theatres. Particularly 
important in that regard is the work of the High Representative for the EU’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, Javier Solana, virtually on the whole range of political and security crises occurring 
worldwide. The EU also acts through its Special Representatives. Currently ten such senior 
diplomats focus on different regions, such as the Middle East, the Great Lakes and the South 
Caucasus. Preventive Diplomacy is also undertaken within specifically designed policy-frameworks, 
such as the European Neighborhood Policy. 
 
The EU has little experience in preventive deployment. The only operation to be mentioned in this 
context is the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (since 2005). Within this 
mission the EU helps to prevent smuggling, trafficking, and customs fraud, by providing advice and 
training to improve the capacity of the Moldovan and Ukrainian border and customs services. 
 
The EU is pro-actively involved in preventive disarmament all over the world. Concerning small arms 
and light weapons such initiatives have been undertaken in Africa, Latin America and Central and 
Eastern Asia, and the Balkans. Examples of such involvement are projects in Tanzania, ECOWAS 
countries, Ukraine and Albania. In the nuclear and chemical disarmament field, the EU was 
associated with and involved in the bilateral US-Russia disarmament process. 
 
Structural prevention is a key facet of EU external action. About half the money spent to help poor 
countries worldwide comes from the EU or its individual member states, making the EU the world’s 
biggest aid donor, paying out more than €30 billion a year in official aid. EU priorities are to attack 
the sources of the countries’ vulnerability: ensuring better food and clean water; improving access to 
education, healthcare, employment, land and social services; providing better infrastructure and a 
better environment. The EU also helps developing countries build institutional capacities and apply 
principles of good governance. 
 
Peacemaking 
The EU has experience in peacemaking in a number of conflicts. It has used diplomatic means to 
ease hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (since 1992), Kosovo (from 1998) and Macedonia 
(2001). The same is true for Cyprus (since 1974), Democratic Republic of the Congo (since 
2003), Sudan (Darfur) (since 2003), and in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (since 1980). 
 
Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement 
The EU has conducted or still conducts three peacekeeping missions in its own right (Chad/Central 
African Republic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia), and was party to a joint mission in 
Indonesia: 
 
• EU Military Operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Concordia) (2003). 
Contributed further to a stable secure environment and to allow the implementation of the 
Ohrid Framework Agreement. The operation played a role in achieving a more peaceful, democratic 
and prosperous country. 
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• EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea) (since 2004). Military 
deployment to oversee the military implementation of the Dayton Agreement; does have police 
duties against organized crime. 
 
• EU Military Operation in Chad/Central African Republic (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA) (since 
2008). The goal is to contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and displaced 
persons; to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian 
personnel; and to contribute to protecting UN personnel, installations and equipment and to 
ensuring the security and freedom of movement of its staff and UN and associated personnel. 
 
• Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) (2005-2006). The EU participated in AMM monitoring the 
implementation of various aspects of the peace agreement set out in the MoU signed by the 
Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). 
  
Peacebuilding 
So far, the EU has gained its most comprehensive operational experience in the field of 
peacebuilding. Since 2003, the EU completed five peacebuilding missions, and is still involved in 
nine such missions. 
 
• EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (EUPM) (since 2003). It aims to help in 
establishing a sustainable, professional and multi-ethnic police force. EUPM assists the local police, 
fights large-scale organized crime and helps with police reform.  
 
• EU Border Assistance Mission at Rafah Crossing Point in the Palestinian Territories (EU 
BAM Rafah) (since 2005). It monitors the operations of this crossing point on the Palestinian-
Egyptian border. 
 
• EU Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq (Eujust Lex) (since 2005). It has integrated 
training in the fields of management and criminal investigation, for a representative group of senior 
officials and executive staff from the judiciary, the police and the penitentiary. 
 
• EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC) (EUPOL Kinshasa) (since 2005). It monitors, mentors, 
and advises the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) to be operational under a Congolese chain of 
command. 
 
•  EU Security Sector Reform Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC 
DR Congo) (since 2005). It provides advice and assistance to the Congolese authorities in charge of 
security while ensuring the promotion of policies that are compatible with human rights and 
international humanitarian law, democratic standards, principles of good public management, 
transparency and observance of the rule of law. 
 
• EU Support to AMIS II (since 2005). It provides civilian-military supporting action to the African 
Union (AU) Mission in the Darfur region of Sudan; It was also established to ensure effective and 
timely EU assistance to back the AMIS II enhancement and supporting action; support the AU and 
its political, military and police efforts to address the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan. 
 
• EU Planning Team in Kosovo (since 2006). It has initiated planning to ensure a smooth 
transition between selected tasks of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) and a possible EU crisis management operation in the field of rule of law and other areas. 
 
• EU Police Mission in the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) (since 2006). It 
contributes to the establishment of sustainable and effective policing arrangements under Palestinian 
ownership.  
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• EU Police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN) (since 2007). It aims at 
contributing to the establishment of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements under 
Afghan ownership and in accordance with international standards.  
 
• EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (since 2008): the goal is to monitor and analyze the situation 
pertaining to the stabilization process, centered on full compliance of the six-point Agreement. 
 
• EU Rule of Law Mission  in Kosovo (since 2008): The mission includes 2,000 police and judicial 
personnel. 
 
• EU SSR Guinea Bissau (since 2008): The mission will provide advice and assistance on reform of 
the security sector in Guinea Bissau.  
 
The completed missions are: 
 
• EU Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Proxima) (2003-2005). 
It monitored, mentored and advised the country's police thus helping to fight organized crime as 
well as promoting European policing standards. 
 
• EU Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Artemis) (2003). It contributed 
to the stabilization of the security conditions and improvement of the humanitarian situation in 
Bunia. 
 
• EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia (Eujust Themis) (2004-2005). It supported, mentored and 
advised Ministers, senior officials and appropriate bodies at the level of the central government in 
addressing urgent challenges in the criminal justice system and in developing a coordinated overall 
approach to the reform process. 
 
• EU Police Advisory Team in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPAT) (2005-
2006). It supported the development of an efficient and professional police service based on 
European standards of policing. 
 
• EUFOR RD Congo (2006): military operation in support of the United Nations Organization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election process. 
 
 
COOPERATION WITH THE UN 
There has been a sea change in the relationship between the EU and the UN in recent years. What 
had been a benevolent co-existence for decades has turned into a promising partnership in most of 
the issues the UN is involved in, resulting in a steady increase of interaction and cooperation 
between both organizations at all levels. 
EU member states provide 38 per cent of the UN’s regular budget, at least 40 per cent of funding 
for peacekeeping operations and about 50 per cent of contributions to voluntarily funded UN 
agencies, funds and programs. In addition, significant contributions to the UN-system (UN agencies, 
funds and programs) are provided by the European Community (around EUR €874 million in 2004 
alone). 
Strategic partnerships have been concluded in the field of development and humanitarian aid with 
several UN agencies, funds and programs (UNDP, WHO, FAO, ILO, UNHCR) with the aim of 
further developing policy dialogue and cooperation. Other agreements /exchanges of letters (ILO, 
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WHO, UNODC, UNEP, UNHCR) have been signed and facilitate regular policy dialogue and 
cooperation. Discussions are ongoing about enhanced cooperation between the Commission and the 
UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA). 
Intensified EU-UN cooperation extends also to conflict prevention and crisis management. 
Examples are the EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which took over from the UN task 
force, as well as the MONUC take-over from the EU military operation Artemis in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. Further momentum was gained by the signing of the “Joint Declaration on EU-
UN Cooperation in Crisis Management” in 2003, focusing on practical cooperation in the field of 
crisis management and related issues such as planning, training, communication and best practices. 
An overall increase in cooperation extends to exchange of information, coordination of activities and 
priorities as well as an increase of contacts at all levels, including implementation of conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding support, desk-to-desk dialogue on conflict prevention and field level 
cooperation. 
The EU has been attending the High-Level Meetings between the UN and Regional and other 
Intergovernmental Organizations since their inception in 1994, being the only organization (in its sui 
generis nature) that holds more that one seat. In fact, the EU is represented at the HLMs by the 
European Commission, the Council of the EU and the Presidency of the Council of the EU. The 
EU has also been attending the UNSC meetings with the regional organizations since 2003, 
represented by the member state holding its Presidency. 
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Intergovernmental Authority  
on Development (IGAD) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 
IGAD is the successor organization to the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and 
Development (IGADD), created in 1986 by six drought-stricken East African countries to 
coordinate development in the Horn of Africa. IGAD headquarters are in Djibouti. In April 1996, at 
the recommendation of the Heads of State and Government, the IGAD Council of Ministers 
identified three priority areas of cooperation: conflict prevention, management and resolution, and 
humanitarian affairs; infrastructure development (transport and communications); and food security 
and environment protection. In its foundation treaty, IGAD has clearly accorded itself a role in 
peace and security. Article 18a determines that “Member States shall act collectively to preserve 
peace, security and stability, which are essential prerequisites for economic development and social 
progress”. To reach this goal, IGAD members92 shall take effective collective measures to eliminate 
threats to regional cooperation, peace and stability; establish an effective mechanism of consultation 
and cooperation for the pacific settlement of disputes; and accept to deal with disputes between 
member states within this sub-regional mechanism before they are referred to other regional or 
international organizations. 
 
The efficiency of IGAD has been hampered by several factors. In the words of IGAD’s Executive 
Secretary, H.B. Attalla, the region is idiosyncratic in the sense that “first, it often suffers from natural 
calamities (floods, famine, water shortages, droughts), second, IGAD countries are devastated by 
civil wars and political instability, third, they are the most poor countries in the world, finally, the 
illiteracy rate reaches 80%”. In addition to this problematic scenario, the conflict between Ethiopia 
and Eritrea from 1998 to 2000 and the still volatile tensions between the two Member States also 
affected the work of the organization. In April 2007, Eritrea decided to suspend its membership 
from IGAD ‘due to the fact that a number of repeated and irresponsible resolutions that undermine 
regional peace and security have been adopted in the guise of IGAD’ 93. The internal structure of 
IGAD is as follows: 
 
• The Assembly of Heads of State and Government is the supreme policy-making organ of the Authority. It 
determines the objectives, guidelines and programs for IGAD and meets once a year. A Chairman is 
elected from among the Member States in rotation. 
                                                
92 The member states of IGAD are: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda.  
93 Eritrea suspended its membership when the IGAD Council of Ministers, which met in Nairobi in April 2007, 
issued a communiqué highlighting the accomplishments Ethiopia had made in Somalia in its support of the 
Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG). The communiqué was approved by consensus, but Eritrea, 
later, claimed that the communiqué was a demonstration that IGAD was no longer a neutral organization. 
According to Eritrea, IGAD has been used by the US and by Ethiopia to advance their interests. 
                          
Founded in 1996 (Agreement Establishing IGAD).  
Headquarters in Djibouti City, Djibouti. 7 Member States  
www.igad.org 
 
Mandate in Peace and Security: 
. Agreement Establishing IGAD, art. 7-g and 18A (1996) 
. Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and Response 
Mechanism (CEWARN) (2002) 
 
The Member States solemnly reaffirm their commitment to (…) the 
peaceful settlement of inter- and intra-State conflicts through 
dialogue. 
Treaty Establishing IGAD (Art. 6A-c) 
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• The Secretariat is headed by an Executive Secretary appointed by the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government for a term of four years renewable once. The Secretariat assists member states in 
formulating regional projects in the priority areas, facilitates the coordination and harmonization of 
development policies, mobilizes resources to implement regional projects and programs approved by 
the Council, and reinforces national infrastructures necessary for implementing regional projects and 
policies. The current Executive Secretary is Dr. Hamad Bashir Attalla of Sudan (since 8 April 2000). 
On 22 March 2004, he was elected for his second and final term and it was agreed that the next 
Executive Secretary would come from Kenya. 
 
Within the Secretariat the Peace and Security Division is mandated to deal with issues related to peace 
and security and humanitarian affairs. The division has three main program components, namely: (i) 
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (CPMR), (ii) Political Affairs, and (iii) 
Humanitarian Affairs. 
 
•  The Council of Ministers is composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and one other Minister 
designated by each member state. The Council formulates policy and approves the work program 
and annual budget of the Secretariat during its biannual sessions. Moreover, one of its functions is to 
promote peace and security in the sub-region and to make recommendations to the Assembly; 
 
• The Committee of Ambassadors is composed of IGAD member states’ Ambassadors or 
Plenipotentiaries accredited to the country of IGAD Headquarters. It convenes to advise and guide 
the Executive Secretary, as often as the need arises. 
 
IGAD’s organizational capacity in security issues is primarily centered around early-warning/conflict 
prevention, peacekeeping and enforcement, and counter-terrorism 
 
Early-Warning/Conflict Prevention 
In 1998, IGAD Heads of State mandated the Secretariat in Djibouti to establish a Conflict Early 
Warning and Response Mechanism. Four years later, at the 9th Summit in Khartoum, IGAD Heads of 
State and Government signed the ‘Protocol on the Establishment of a Conflict Early Warning and 
Response Mechanism (CEWARN)’. Following a consultative process, the subsequent central hub of 
the CEWARN Unit, located in Addis Ababa, was set up in June 2003 with funding from Germany 
(GTZ) and the United States (USAid). The Unit now has approximately 20 professional staff and a 
resource centre. It is intended to act as the hub and clearing-house for early warning in East Africa. 
Apart from secretarial duties, it creates and manages the conflict databases, provides shared internet 
communication for the national units, develops guidelines for users, sets standards and harmonizes 
information policies and systems, provides training, and recommends mechanisms for regional 
responses to cross-border and trans-border conflicts. 
 
The CEWARN Unit in Addis Ababa is responsible for the actual exchange of information, encoding 
of information and support of the national units, known as CEWERUs (Conflict Early Warning and 
Response Units)94. Once fully mature, each IGAD member state will have a CEWERU and an 
optional operational steering committee that could include a wide range of stakeholders95.  
  
                                                
94 CEWARN uses a sophisticated methodology and reporting tool originally developed by Virtual Research 
Associates Inc (VRA). With funding from Germany and the United States, and assistance of the Swiss Peace 
Foundation who had been using much of this since 1998, the technology was embedded and customized at the 
CEWARN Unit in Addis Ababa. 
95 Unlike AU’s Situation Room, CEWARN’s uses primary sources. Data is usually generated by ‘field monitors’ 
(currently there are roughly 30 field monitors). They submit different types of reports, namely Situation Report (once 
a week) and Incident Reports (only when an event occurs). As CEWARN is on a pilot phase, the reporting areas do 
not cover all pastoral areas, but Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Somalia are each a reporting area. Civil Society 
organizations quality-control the data. They are in contact with the field monitors.  
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Part II of the Annex to the Protocol stipulates that, “CEWARN shall rely for its operations on 
information that is collected from the public domain, particularly in the following areas: livestock 
rustling; conflicts over grazing and water points; smuggling and illegal trade; nomadic movements; 
refugees; landmines; banditry” (52 variables in total). The focus on these variables sets aside the fact 
that the major causes of inter-state and intra-state conflicts in the IGAD region are centered on 
governance and political power within the member states, issues the Mechanism does not yet 
address. As pointed out by Daniel Yifru, Director of IGAD’s Peace and Security Division, 
“monitoring pastoral conflicts was the easiest entry point into the field of conflict prevention in East 
Africa. As most countries in the region are in tension with one another, embracing hardcore inter-
state or intra-state armed conflicts was considered a premature and impudent step”. Nevertheless, 
IGAD is planning to adopt a new strategic concept for CEWARN that would allow monitoring 
hardcore security issues from 2012 onwards (end of pilot phase).  
  
Yet, early warning presupposes early action and IGAD is not logistically fully prepared to respond to 
pastoral conflicts. The decision to intervene (or not) in conflicts is taken by the Assembly, which 
generally takes a long time to reach a decision due to divergent state interests, and it meets only once 
a year. IGAD officials seem to be aware of this problem. To address this issue, the organization is 
considering a responsive capacity through the implementation of tribal mediation projects. This idea 
is under consideration, and it has not yet been implemented.  
 
Another shortcoming of early warning practices in East Africa is that although CEWARN is a 
complex and authoritative system it still requires the establishment of a single, integrated and 
comprehensive conflict prevention, management and reconstruction framework. Although IGAD 
launched the IGAD Strategy on Peace and Security in October 2005, it has not yet been properly 
formulated and implemented. The aim of the Strategy will be to enable IGAD member states, the 
IGAD Secretariat, and the citizens of IGAD countries actively to contribute to developing and 
maintaining a robust peace and security order throughout the sub-region. IGAD officials recognize 
that the organization’s involvements in Somalia and Sudan were spontaneous and did not follow any 
doctrine. In July 2007, IGAD organized a workshop on lessons learnt for future IGAD mediation 
efforts. The goal of the Strategy on Peace and Security is to formulate how and when to intervene.  
 
Peacekeeping and Enforcement 
The organizational capacity of IGAD is not solely concentrated on early warning but also on 
peacekeeping and enforcement. In 2003, IGAD was requested by the African Union to spearhead 
the conceptualization and formation of the Eastern Brigade of the African Standby Force (ASF). In 
February 2004, IGAD convened a meeting of Experts on the establishment of the Eastern Africa 
Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) and in the same month the Eastern African Chiefs of Defense Staff 
(EACDS) drafted a Policy Framework and a Legal Framework to operationalize EASBRIG. In April 
2005, during the first EASBRIG Assembly of Heads of State and Government (held in Addis 
Ababa), the Policy Framework, Memorandum of Understanding, and Budget for the establishment 
of EASBRIG were adopted. The EASBRIG has three components: the Brigade headquarters located 
in Addis Ababa, the Planning Element based in Nairobi, and the Logistics Base located with the 
Brigade headquarters in Addis Ababa96. EASBRIG uses the Karen training centre in Nairobi to train 
the troops for peace support operation. In May 2007, as previously determined, IGAD handed over 
the responsibility of operationalizing EASBRIG to an independent organ, EASBRICOM, which is 
administratively attached to the Planning Cell in Nairobi97 and has been formed in full consensus 
with AU and IGAD’s decision-making bodies. The reason why IGAD is not taking up the 
responsibility is centered on the fact that some members of the Eastern Africa sub-region are not 
                                                
96 In 2005, a budget of USD $2,564 million for EASBRIG was agreed. It included the functioning budget for the 
EASBRIG headquarters (USD $873,813), the Logistics Base (USD $391,775), the Planning Element (USD 
$860,684) and Program and Coordination activities (USD $400,000).96 EASBRIG is expected to comprise 5,500 
members composed of military personnel and civilians. 
97 EASBRICOM Secretariat has a staff of 5 people. 
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part of IGAD: Rwanda, Seychelles, Madagascar, Comoros, Malawi, and Mozambique (Tanzania and 
Mauritius have decided to contribute to SADC rather than EASBRIG). 
 
In the absence of a legal framework EASBRICOM is governed by a MoU that provides for an 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government, a Council of Ministers of Defense and Security, a 
Committee of Chiefs of Defense Staff, a Standby Brigade and Logistics Base located in Addis Ababa 
and a Planning Element based in Nairobi. Member states supporting EASBRIG have contributed 
sufficient troops to make up the Brigade as required by the ASF framework. The Planning Cell is 
adequately staffed from a military point of view. The only handicap is the lack of civil/police and 
other civilian elements.  
  
Counter-Terrorism 
Finally, IGAD is also involved in counter-terrorism through the IGAD Capacity-Building Program 
Against Terrorism (ICPAT, created in 2002). There are four aspects to the program: legal area 
(adoption by member states of an adequate legislative network to prevent terrorism), system of 
interdepartmental cooperation (enhancement of national cooperation between the Ministries of 
Defense, Justice and External Relations, central banks, tourism agencies and chambers of 
commerce), border control (governance enhancement, electronic surveillance, and training of border 
police), and institutional linkages with other agencies to avoid duplication (namely extra-regional 
agents such as the UN). The Institute of Security Studies is the implementation agency of the 
Program and, in this sense, it provides technical administration. The Program is being funded by 
external donors (e.g. Canada, Holland, Sweden), whereas the Commonwealth provides training.  
RESOURCE CAPACITY 
The finances of the Authority are derived from contributions of member states as well as assistance 
from other sources. The IGAD Partner Forum (IPF) is the mean through which contacts between 
IGAD and potential funding external actors are organized. The UN, the World Bank, the EU and 
various governments take part in the IPF meeting. It is subdivided into working groups focused on 
specific issues through which IGAD can gather external support and resources for its programs and 
operations. The regular yearly budget of IGAD is approximately USD $3 million, which is invested 
in running the Secretariat in Djibouti. CEWARN and ICPAT are externally funded by donors 
(primarily GTZ, USAid and EU). Also IGAD’s peace initiatives for Somalia and Sudan are donor 
dependent. Out of IGAD’s seven members, three regularly do not pay their levies: Uganda, Eritrea 
and Somalia, which create serious difficulties to the organization.  
 
The Secretariat, based in Djibouti City, has a staff of 46, including 23 professionals and 23 support 
staff. In addition there are 7 technical advisors and other project staff. As far as peace and security 
issues are concerned, there are 2 people working on this portfolio in the headquarters, 20 people 
working at CEWARN, and 5 at ICPAT (both located in Addis Ababa). 
 
Even though the physical and administrative conditions of the Secretariat are poor and the 
organization is under-resourced financially, the staff is entrepreneurial and diligent in capitalizing on 
the scarce resources available. Despite all limitations, the relation between IGAD and donors seems 
to be based more on pragmatic partnerships than on hierarchical financial directives.  
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
As stated in the ‘Agreement Establishing IGAD’, one of the objectives is to “promote peace and 
stability in the sub-region and create mechanisms within the sub-region for the prevention, 
management and resolution of inter and intra-State conflicts through dialogue” (Art.7-g). In March 
2005, IGAD proposed a Peace Support Mission to Somalia involving 10,000 troops, at a cost of 
USD $500 million for the first year. However, the plan never materialized and in 2006 it was decided 
that the deployment would be undertaken by the AU rather than IGAD. IGAD’s availability, unlike 
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AU’s, was not followed by international commitment to support logistically and financially the 
intervention98.  
 
In the field of peacemaking IGAD has a better record. Since 1993, it has been involved in 
negotiating a peace settlement in Sudan. In 1999, a Secretariat was created in Nairobi to ensure 
continued engagement with the parties to the conflict. The process, however, has been stalled over 
the question of the separation of state and religion and the right to self-determination of the South. 
In 2002, the Machakos Protocol agreed by the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A under the 
auspice of IGAD opened the way for the signing of a peace agreement in 2005.  
 
Besides Sudan, IGAD is also involved in Somalia. In 1998, in cooperation with the IGAD Forum 
Partners Liaison Group, IGAD members created a Standing Committee on the Somali peace 
process, chaired by Ethiopia. This committee was mandated to organize a peace process in Somalia 
by providing a consultative forum for negotiations aimed at reconciliation and restoration of a 
government in Somalia. The current Transitional Federal Government is a result of Ethiopia’s effort 
in finding a solution for Somalia, and it received the approval of IGAD. 
COOPERATION WITH THE UN 
In the case of Sudan, the United Nations has closely followed and supported the regional peace 
initiative carried out by IGAD. The Secretary-General's Special Adviser, Mr. Mohamed Sahnoun, 
and other senior officials represented the UN at summit meetings of the IGAD countries, and 
carried out consultations with regional governments and organizations in support of the peace 
process. They also took part in meetings of the IGAD-Partners Forum, composed of donor 
countries and organizations supporting the IGAD peace process and assisting the regional 
organization to enhance its capacity in several areas. The UN Advanced Mission in Sudan 
(UNAMIS) was set up in order to prepare for a fully fledged UN peace support mission to be 
deployed during the interim period following the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army 
(SPLM/A) as the result of the IGAD-led negotiations. UNAMIS was transformed into the UN 
Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in March 2005, after the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1590, 
which tasked UNMIS with supporting the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A in the 
implementation of the CPA. 
 
The UN also offered its backing on the settlement of the Somalia situation. The Secretary-General's 
Special Adviser, Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun, accompanied by his Representative for Somalia, 
Winston Tubman, collaborated actively with IGAD leaders in efforts to re-energize the stalled 
reconciliation process during 2003-2004. 
 
In 2005 the UN Security Council had approved the deployment of IGAD and AU troops in the 
Darfur region of Sudan. Similarly, in 2006 the UNSC approved a partial lifting of the arms embargo 
on Somalia to allow a deployment of IGAD troops under Chapter VIII of the Charter. However this 
deployment never occurred and was replaced by a deployment of AU troops. 
 
The UN has also been collaborating with IGAD on various issues. In general, the relationship 
between IGAD and the UN has focused on specific issues with ad hoc UN agencies, such as for 
health (WHO), desertification (UNCCD), livestock and agriculture (FAO).  
 
                                                
98 IGAD officials believe that the lack of international support was a result of the US’ deliberate intention not to 
have any country or organization intervening in Somalia. However, when Islamists took power in Somalia, in 2006, 
the US put the country on the map of the global war on terrorism and withdrew its reservations over an 
intervention. 
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IGAD has not been a participant in the High-level Meetings between the UN and the Regional 
Organizations (although it was invited to attend the past two meetings). IGAD has also not been 
invited to participate in the UN Security Council meetings with the regional organizations. 
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ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 
The Francophonie organization was first initiated through the establishment of the Agence de 
Coopération Culturelle et Technique in 1970 between French-speaking countries, in order to 
promote cooperation among themselves. The first Summit of Head of States only occurred in 1986 
and the organization truly became an intergovernmental institution following the Cotonou Summit 
in 2001, where it was renamed as the Agency of the the Francophonie and its General Secretariat 
was established. Following the tenth Summit of the Francophonie, the Heads of State decided to 
empower the organization further and assign to it new tasks. The decision prompted the adoption of 
the Charter of the Francophonie at the Antananarivo Summit in 2005. The new Charter specifically 
assigns functions linked to democracy, sustainable development, conflict prevention and human 
security. The Francophonie organization now includes 55 member and 13 observer states100. The 
following organs were instituted after the adoption of the 2005 Charter: 
 
• The Summit, comprising Heads of State and Government, convenes every two years. It is the 
supreme organ of the Francophonie and it decides, on the basis of unanimity, on the strategic plan 
of the organization.  
 
• The Ministerial Conference of the Francophonie, which brings together the member states’ Foreign 
Ministers or the Ministers in charge of the Francophonie. The Ministerial Conference aims at 
ensuring the political continuity and sustainability of the decision adopted at the Summit. The 
Ministerial Conferences can focus on a specific theme, such as Information Society (Rabat, 2003), or 
Conflict Prevention and Human Security (Manitoba, 2006). The Organization also has two 
permanent Ministerial Conferences: the Conference of Ministers of Education of French-speaking 
Countries (Confémen) and the Conference of Ministers of Youth and Sports of French-speaking 
Countries (Conféjes). 
                                                
99 “Si la Francophonie, ces dernières années s’est développée, renforcée, rénovée, réorganisée avec votre appui 
clairvoyant, n’est-ce pas avant tout pour répondre à ce besoin criant de paix, d’égalité, de liberté?” (Statement in the 
original French version). 
100 The members are: Albania, Andorra, Belgium, French-speaking Community of Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Canada – Province of Nouveau-Brunswick, Canada – 
Province of Quebec, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Republic of the Congo, Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, France, Gabon, Greece, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Haiti, Laos, Lebanon, Luxemburg, Madagascar, Mali, 
Mauritius, Mauritania, Moldavia, Monaco, Morocco, Niger, Romania, Rwanda, Saint-Lucia, Sao Tomé and Principe, 
Senegal, Seychelles, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, Vanuatu, Vietnam. The observer states are: Armenia, Austria, 
Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Georgia, Ghana, Hungary, Lithuania, Mozambique, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia and Ukraine. 
            
                           
Founded in 1970 as Agence de Coopération Culturelle et Technique. 
(institutionalized as the Agence de la Francophonie in 1995) 
Headquarters in Paris, France. 55 Member-States and 13 observer states. 
www.lafrancophonie.org 
 
Mandate in Peace and Security:  
. Bamako Declaration on Democracy, Rights and Freedoms (2000)  
. The Francophonie Charter, art. 7 (2005) 
. Saint Boniface Declaration on Conflict Prevention and Human Security (2006) 
 
 
       
“If, in the last years the Francophonie has evolved, reinforced, renovated, 
reorganized itself […], isn’t it first of all to answer the pressing needs for 
peace, for equality, for freedom?” 
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• The Permanent Council of the Francophonie, presided over by the Secretary General, brings together the 
representatives of all the different member states. The Permanent Council is the Francophonie’s 
executive organ, ensuring the proper implementation of decisions adopted at the Summits and at the 
Ministerial Conferences. The Permanent Council is also responsible for approving, awarding and 
evaluating projects in the political and economic domain as well as cooperation. It has three different 
commissions working respectively on political issues, economic issues and cooperation. 
  
• The General Secretariat is the executive body of the organization, also in charge of representing and 
promoting the organization. Similarly, it is in charge of coordinating multilateral cooperation. The 
General Secretariat is headed by the Secretary General who is the official representative of the 
Francophonie. The current Secretary General, Abdou Diouf, was elected during the 2002 Summit 
and re-elected again in 2006 for a second four-year mandate.  
 
• The Parliamentary Assembly of the Francophonie acts as the consultative institution of the organization. 
It is composed of parliamentarians coming from 74 different states and inter-parliamentarian 
organizations. The Parliamentary Assembly is in charge of promoting and defending democracy, the 
rule of law, and respect for human rights and cultural diversity.  
 
Following the adoption of the Bamako Declaration at the tenth Summit of the Francophonie in 
2000, new institutions were created to deal directly with the issues of peace, human rights and 
democracy. The newly established Delegation for Peace, Democracy and Human Rights falls under the 
direct authority of the Secretary General. It is composed of: 
• The Democracy, Human Rights and State of Rights Division, which is further divided into sections 
dealing respectively with Justice and Rights, Elections, Human Rights and Democratic 
Culture. 
• The Conflict Prevention, Conflict Management and Peace Consolidation Division, which includes a 
bureau for Prevention and Conflict Management, and one for Peace Consolidation and 
Transition. 
• An Observatory in charge of reporting to the Secretary General the advancement of 
democracy, rights and freedoms in the francophone area. 
 
The Francophonie also expects to establish a conflict early alert mechanism working in a similar way 
to the observatory on democracy. However, this mechanism is yet to be implemented. 
 
In 2006 as a follow up to the adoption of the new Charter in Antananarivo, and in order to 
strengthen the capacity of the Francophonie in the field of conflict prevention and security, the 
member states adopted during the Ministerial Conference the Saint Boniface Declaration on Conflict 
Prevention and Human Security. The Saint Boniface Declaration emphasizes the role of the Francophonie in 
regard to election observation, mediation and conflict prevention and at the same time calls for a 
greater involvement of francophone countries in peacekeeping operations. 
 
Both the Ouagadougou Declaration, adopted during the tenth Summit, and the Saint Boniface 
Declaration on Conflict Prevention and Human Security, recognize the ‘responsibility to protect’ human 
security and the responsibility of the international community to act, with a UN mandate, in case of 
gross violations of human rights. 
 
The Secretary General, who is the key actor in the peace and security strategy of the organization, 
also has the possibility to use other means in order to mediate a conflict or find an agreement in a 
crisis situation. The Secretary General can thus nominate a facilitator, who will be responsible for 
finding a suitable solution for all parties.  
 
In regard to election monitoring, the Francophonie adopted in Marrakech in December 1996 its 
Defining Principles Guiding Election Observation. The Observation missions are dispatched after a request is 
formulated by the state holding the elections. The sending of these missions is the responsibility of 
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the Permanent Council of the Francophonie. The report of the election observation missions is in 
the end transmitted to the Permanent Council and the Secretary General. 
RESOURCE CAPACITY 
The budget of the International Organization of the Francophonie is composed of the contributions 
of the member states. The size of each member state’s contribution is agreed during the Ministerial 
Conferences. The preparation of the budget is the responsibility of the Permanent Council who is 
also in charge of drafting the financial reports. 
 
In 2007, the Francophonie’s overall budget was USD $101,3 million. A bit more than half of the 
budget comes from the statutory contribution of France (54,5%), Canada and Québec (25,6%), the 
French Community of Belgium (8,6%), Switzerland (6,6%) while the other members together only 
account for 4,4% of the budget. 
 
The Francophonie is also provided with a Multilateral Fund, composed of volunteer public financial 
contributions, exclusively dedicated to support specific activities within the framework of the 
Organization’s goals, especially in the domain of development and technical cooperation. 
 
Out of the overall budget of USD $101,3 million, 36,8% (approximately USD $37,2 million) was 
used for the running of the organization while the rest was used to finance the various projects 
undertaken by the Francophonie. However, the Organization decided in 2007 to recalibrate the 
budget in order to allocate 75% of the money to the projects and only 25% to the administrative 
costs of the organization. The Francophonie is also expected to review in 2008 the size of the 
member states’ contributions as well as finding a solution to recover payment arrears, which reached 
10 million euros in 2007. 
 
In its strategic plan for 2007-2009, the Francophonie has decided to allocate USD $18,29 million to 
its programs in peace, democracy and human rights. This includes USD $8,56 million for the various 
projects that are part of the Strategic Goal to Consolidate Democracy, Human Rights and the Rule 
of Law, and USD $9,72 million for the Strategic Goal for Conflict Prevention, Post-Conflict 
rebuilding, Democratic Transition and Peace Consolidation. 
 
As of June 2006, the staff working with the International Organization of the Francophonie totaled 
327 employees. 
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Peacemaking and Conflict Prevention 
Since the adoption of the Bamako Declaration in 2000, the Francophonie has tried to become more 
operational in the consolidation of democracy and the protection of human rights. The 
Francophonie’s action in this regard can be divided in two parts. On the one hand the Observatory has 
so far published two reports on the state of democracy and human rights in the francophone world. 
On the other hand, the organization (mainly through the Secretary-General) has tried to find 
solutions to political crises or in cases where the democratic order was disturbed. These included: 
 
• In Côte d’Ivoire, the Francophonie participated as an observer, in the talks between the 
government and the rebel forces which ended with the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement 
in January 2003. The Organization was represented by its delegate for human rights and democracy 
and by Lansana Kouyaté, its special representative for Côte d’Ivoire. A working group was also 
instituted to monitor the follow up of the agreement. The Secretary General also met on numerous 
occasions with Ivorian government officials in order to find a solution to the crisis. 
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• In the Comoros, The Francophonie involved itself in the talks between the conflicting parties. In 
collaboration with other international actors it helped in reaching an agreement signed by all the 
parties in December 2003. The Francophonie was also a member of the committee monitoring the 
implementation of the provisions made in the Agreement. The Organization is also involved in the 
reconstruction of the Comorian state institutions including its Court and its Parliament. 
 
• The Secretary General of The Francophonie delegated a fact-finding mission in 2004-2005 to the 
Central African Republic following the political unrest in the country. The Francophonie became 
involved in the capacity-building effort for the National Dialogue, a conference aiming at resolving 
the political tension in the country. Later on, the Francophonie was elected a member of the follow-
up committee on the implementation of the National dialogue provisions. A more or less similar 
pattern was used with regard to Burundi (2005) and to Chad (2005-2006). 
 
• With regard to the political situation in Haiti, the Secretary General convened in 2004 an ad-hoc 
committee to monitor the evolution of the political situation in the country and to investigate the 
cases of human rights violations. A special High Level Mission was also delegated to Haïti in order 
to identify the areas where the Francophonie could play a positive role. Thus, the Organization 
became involved in projects aiming at consolidation the State’s institutions and ensuring good 
governance. 
 
Peacebuilding 
• The Democratic Republic of the Congo also benefited from the Francophonie’s support in its 
transition process. The Francophonie organized an International Seminar on the management of the 
transitional institutions in Kinshasa in 2004, which paralleled its capacity building effort towards the 
Congolese institutions. 
 
• Following the coup in Mauritania in 2005, the Permanent Council decided, after convening an 
extra-ordinary meeting, to suspend part of the projects the Francophonie was carrying out in 
Mauritania. Nevertheless, the Francophonie expressed its readiness to resume these projects and 
provide support to the democratic transition after the military junta announced its intention to hold 
democratic elections. A fact-finding mission was thus delegated to Mauritania and was to be 
followed by full support from the Francophonie for the transition process. The support included an 
effort to increase the capacity of various institutions, including the Mauritanian Constitutional 
Council, and promoting good governance. A similar framework was also used for Togo in 2005 
including the suspension of its membership to the International Organization of the Francophonie. 
  
Considering election observation, the Francophonie has extensive experience and has sent 
explorative and election observation missions to Albania (2001, 2005), Benin (1995, 1996, 1999, 
2001, 2003, 2006), Burkina Faso (1992, 1997, 1998, 2002, 2005), Burundi (1993, 2005), Cambodia 
(1998, 2003), Cameroon (1997, 2002, 2004), Central African Republic (1993, 1998, 1999, 2003, 2004, 
2005), Chad (1996, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2006), Comoros (1993, 1996, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2006), Congo 
(2002), Côte d’Ivoire (1995, 2003, 2004, 2005), Democratic Republic of Congo (2003, 2005, 2006), 
Djibouti (1992, 1997, 1999, 2003, 2005), Equatorial Guinea (1999, 2000, 2002), Gabon (1993, 1995, 
1998, 2001, 2005), Guinea (1995, 1998), Guinea Bissau (2000, 2004, 2005), Haiti (2000, 2004, 2006), 
Lebanon (2005), Macedonia (2004, 2006), Madagascar (1993, 1996, 2002, 2006), Mali (1997, 2002), 
Mauritania (2005), Mauritius (2005), Moldova (2005), Niger (1993, 1995, 1996, 1999, 2004), Nigeria 
(1999), Romania (1992), Rwanda (2003), Sao Tome & Principe (1998), Senegal (1993, 2000, 2001), 
Seychelles (1992, 1993, 1998, 2001, 2002), Togo (1993, 1994, 1998, 2003, 2005). 
 
Peacekeeping 
Despite not having the capacity to deploy forces under the francophone banner, the Francophonie 
has called through the Saint Boniface Declaration in 2006 for  the organization to be involved in various 
projects aiming at building the capacity of peacekeepers. The Francophonie could thus provide 
capacity-building in the areas of human rights and institution rebuilding by taking part in the 
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RECAMP (Renforcement des Capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix) and PAIM (Program 
d’Aide à l’Instruction Militaire) programs.  
COOPERATION WITH THE UN 
The Francophonie is an observer at the UN General Assembly and has a permanent office in New 
York. The Francophonie has also participated in the High-Level Meetings between the UN and 
regional organizations since 1998. The Francophonie has also taken part in the Standing Committee 
(set up to act as a link between high-level plenary meetings). While the IOF has become a constant 
participant in the HLMs, it has not been invited to participate in the UNSC meetings with the 
regional organizations. 
 
Meetings between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the missions of the 
francophone countries were held in March 2006 to initiate a dialogue between DPKO and IOF in 
order to increase the participation of the Francophonie member states and observers in 
peacekeeping operations. The IOF is also pushing for a greater usage of the French language in UN 
peacekeeping operations. A group of francophone experts was dispatched in May-June 2006 to 
participate in DPKO’s pilot project for the training and recruitment of police officers for United 
Nations peacekeeping operations in Dakar and Yaoundé. 
  
IOF collaborated with the UN on various electoral timetables in French-speaking areas. Thus, the 
Francophonie collaborated extensively with the UN offices and missions in Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and the Central African Republic. It was also involved in the review 
of a draft text on harmonizing the electoral observation rules and practices of international 
organizations adopted by the UN on 27 October 2005. 
 
The Francophonie and the High Commissioner for Human Rights signed an agreement in 1997 
which makes provision for a commission bringing together officials from both institutions. The 
Commission is in charge of ensuring the realization of the joint projects undertaken by the High 
Commissioner and the Francophonie. Furthermore, the two institutions have agreed in 2007 on a 
common program focusing on conflict prevention, conflict resolution, elimination of discrimination 
and the promotion of diversity. The program, running from the end of 2007 till 2009, will be jointly 
financed and benefit from extensive exchanges between the High Commissioner and the 
Francophonie. 
 
Additionally, the Francophonie is involved in a vast array of projects and development programs in 
which the organization also collaborates with UN organs. For example, The Francophonie has been 
participating in the UNDP Millennium Development Goals. 
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League of Arab States (LAS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 
The League of Arab States (LAS) was established when the Charter of the League of Arab States was 
signed by Egypt, Iraq, Transjordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen in Cairo, Egypt, on 22 
March 1945. The creation of the League of Arab States results from the October 1944 Alexandria 
Protocol, an agreement reached between five of the League’s founding members. The League was 
established in order to bring the member states closer and coordinate their political activities with the 
aim of realizing a close collaboration between them101. The League also aims to foster cooperation in 
economic, cultural, and financial issues; infrastructure; and matters concerned with nationality, social 
welfare and health.  
 
Article 5 of the Charter ensures that member states should not resort to force in the settlement of 
disputes among them but should refer the dispute to the League to act as mediator and arbitrator. 
The member states also signed a Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Between the States of the 
Arab League on 17 June 1950. The Treaty provides a framework for collective security between the 
member states and calls for increased cooperation in the security and military fields. 
 
In March 2000 during the 113th session of the League’s Council at the Foreign Ministerial level, the 
member states agreed on the League of Arab States Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution Between the Arab States. The Mechanism opened the way for the adoption of the Statutes of the 
Arab Peace and Security Council during the 18th ordinary session of the Council of the League at Summit 
level held in Khartoum in March 2006. The Statutes entered into force in June 2007 after one third 
of the member states ratified it. The League is an intergovernmental organization, its main bodies 
are: 
 
• The Council of the League, which convokes the representatives of the member states. The Council can 
meet at the Summit level, when it brings together the Heads of State and Government, or at 
Ministerial level. The Council holds ordinary sessions twice a year (in March and in October) at the 
League’s headquarters in Cairo. The function of the Council is to realize the purposes of the League 
and supervise the execution of the agreements concluded between the member states. During the 
meetings, decisions are adopted by a simple majority vote (in which case the decision is only binding 
to the states who voted in favor) or unanimously (in which case the decision is binding for all 
member states). Each state only has one vote. Chairmanship of the Council follows a rotation among 
member states. 
                                                
101 The current member states are: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. 
            
                      
 
 
           
Founded in 1945. Headquarters in Cairo, Egypt. 22 Member States 
www.arableagueonline.org 
 
Mandate in Peace and Security: 
. Charter of the League of Arab States, art. 5-6 (1945) 
. Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Between the States of 
the Arab League (1950) 
. Resolution 5962 establishing the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution between the Arab States (2000) 
. Statutes of the Arab Peace and Security Council (2007) 
 
 
 
“Cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations 
in the maintenance of international peace and security cannot occur 
without the restructuring and reform of the United Nations and its 
institutions”. 
YAHYA MAHMASSANI 
Permanent Observer for the League of Arab States  (2006) 
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• The Special Committees is responsible for establishing the basis and scope of cooperation by drafting 
agreements that will subsequently be submitted to the Council. The Charter of the League of Arab 
States provides for the establishment of Special Committees on a series of matters to be dealt with 
by the League. These include the Political Committee, the Social Committee, the Permanent 
Committee for Administrative and Financial Affairs, and the Legal Committee. Non-member Arab 
countries may also participate in the Special Committees upon decision by the Council. Some of the 
Special Committees have evolved so as to become Ministerial Councils bringing together Ministers 
from the member states. Twelve such councils have been established working on issues such as 
internal affairs, justice, health, transport, information and environment. 
 
• The General Secretariat is composed of a Secretary General and Assistant Secretaries. The Secretariat 
is the administrative body of the League. It provides support for the Councils (Summit and 
Ministerial level) and for the Special Committees. The General Secretariat is subdivided into the 
Conference Secretariat, responsible for protocol affairs related to the Councils meeting, and seven 
other departments. These departments cover respectively: Finances and Administration, Political 
affairs, Economic and Communication affairs, Social and Health affairs, Legal matters, Information 
and Publication, Cultural affairs. The Secretary General is appointed by the Council upon the vote of 
two-thirds of the member states for a five-year renewable term. The current Secretary General is the 
Egyptian diplomat Amr Moussa who was elected to the post in 2001. 
 
The Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation between the States of the Arab League signed in 1950 
also establishes special bodies which include: 
 
• A Permanent Military Commission composed of representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the armies of 
the Contracting States. The main task of the Permanent Military Commission is to draw up plans of 
joint defense and their implementation in order to encourage the cooperation and coordination of 
the Contracting States’ armed forces. The Permanent Military Commission is headquartered in Cairo. 
 
• The Joint Defense Council is under the supervision of the Arab League Council and is composed of 
the Foreign Ministers and the Defense Ministers of the Contracting States. It is in charge of ensuring 
the collective security of the Contracting States, facilitating the cooperation and coordination of the 
armed forces and it supervises the work of the Permanent Military Commission. The Joint Defense 
Council adopts decisions by vote. A two-thirds majority is considered binding to all the Contracting 
States. 
 
In March 2006 the Council of the League of Arab States meeting at Summit level in Khartoum 
agreed on the Statutes of the Arab Peace and Security Council, which paves the way for the creation of new 
security organs. The Council, instituted by the Statutes, is composed of five member states (the two 
previous states chairing the League’s Council, the current Chair, and the two states due to chair the 
following sessions) represented by their Foreign Ministers. The League’s Secretary General also 
participates in the meetings of the Council. The Council meets twice a year at ministerial level prior 
to the meetings of the League’s Council or in extraordinary session upon request by a member state 
or by the Secretary General. It held its first meeting on 13 December 2007 where it discussed the 
rules of procedure of the Council and urged the Arab states that have not ratified the Statutes to do 
so.  
 
The Arab Peace and Security Council is responsible for proposing collective measures in case of 
aggression, developing an early warning system and exercising good offices, conciliation and 
mediation to prevent the escalation of disputes. It is also expected to make efforts with regard to 
post-conflict efforts and reconstruction, humanitarian action and cooperation as well as making 
proposals for the establishment of an Arab peacekeeping force when deemed necessary. The Council 
provides for the following organs: 
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• The Data Bank established by the Secretary General. The aim of the Data Bank is to collect 
information provided by member states and regional and international organizations to help the 
Council assess a situation. 
 
• An Early Warning System, which is to be composed of experts from the staff of the General 
Secretariat who will analyze the available data and information, monitor the evolution of a situation 
and submit their report to the Council. 
 
• A Board of Wise Personalities composed of prominent Arab personalities. Members of the Board are 
designated by the Chairperson of the Council and then chosen by the Secretary General, to 
undertake mediation, conciliation or good offices missions between conflicting parties. 
 
The Council can also be made responsible for setting up and dispatching civil or military observer 
missions to conflict areas. 
 
In 2004, the Resolution on Arab Coordination for Combating the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light 
Weapons was adopted during a ministerial council of the League in order to control the flow of arms 
in the Arab world. According to the resolution, member states are to coordinate their policies with 
regard to arms flow and more specifically illicit cross border arm trade in the region. The 
implementation of the program also gives an important role to the multiple national focal points as 
they need to monitor arm flows and disseminate information on small arms and light weapons to the 
other member states and to the Organization. 
RESOURCE CAPACITY 
The League of Arab States’ budget is drafted by the Secretary General before being submitted to the 
League’s Council. Each member state’s share of the budget is decided by a resolution adopted by the 
League’s Council. The budget of the General Secretariat in 2007 was around USD $35,7 million. 
Some of the institutions affiliated to the League of Arab States have autonomous budgets relying on 
the voluntary contribution of the member states. However, the Statutes of the Arab Peace and 
Security Council clearly indicate that the Council’s budget is to be drawn from the already strained 
budget of the General Secretariat. The League’s budget also suffers from arrears payments as some 
member states do not pay their full share to the Organization. 
 
The League also has two affiliated institutions, through which it carries out development projects. 
Since 1974 the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development has been lending money to 
finance economic and social projects. These projects aim to assist member countries in providing 
basic infrastructure services, institutional support and capacity building, promoting social 
development, developing educational and health services, and implementing emergency programs. In 
2006 the Fund awarded loans for a total of USD $1138 millions. The Arab Bank for Economic 
Development in Africa was established in order to strengthen economic, financial and technical 
cooperation between Arab and African countries (including those who are not members of the 
League). In 2007, the Bank extended loans and technical assistance operations to some African 
countries for a total amount of USD $68 million. 
 
The General Secretariat currently employs an estimated staff of 500 and a similar number of 
consultants working on a regular basis for the League. Moreover, the staff working for the Peace and 
Security Council is expected to be drawn from the staff of the Secretariat. 
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Peacekeeping 
The League has already been involved in different instances of issues pertaining to peace and 
security. Despite not having had specific provisions for the deployment of a peacekeeping force 
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before the adoption of the Statutes, the LAS deployed troops under the League’s umbrella. These 
peacekeeping operations are: 
 
• Palestine (1948 – 1949) – the refusal by Arab States to accept the partition of Palestine led them 
to consider the deployment of their armies in Palestine. The Israeli declaration of independence 
sparked the intervention by the member states under the League’s aegis. Contingents from Egypt, 
Iraq, Transjordan, Lebanon, Syria, as well as a small number of troops from Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen fought under the League’s umbrella. The intervening forces peaked at around 25,000 troops, 
with the majority being drawn from the Egyptian army (around 10,000). The Arab League also 
sponsored and supported the Arab Liberation Army, a military corps made up of volunteers coming 
from different Arab countries. In a cablegram sent by the Secretary-General of the Arab League to 
the UN Secretary-General it was stated that the aim of the intervention was the creation of a united 
Palestinian state. However, the intervention was marred by inter-Arab rivalries and failed to reach 
the goal set by the League. In 1949, Israel signed a set of armistices with the Arab states in which 
they agreed to withdraw their forces behind the Armistice Demarcation Line. 
 
• Kuwait (1961 – 1963) – an Arab League Force was deployed following the departure of the British 
troops whom had been present in Kuwait until it gained its independence. The League deployed its 
force following concerns expressed by the Kuwaiti head of state that Iraq would try to annex the 
former British protectorate. 3,000 men, consisting of troops from Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the United 
Arab Republic, Tunisia and Jordan, were deployed to protect the independence of Kuwait until 1963 
following Iraq’s recognition of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
 
• Lebanon (1976 – 1982) – originally known as the Arab Security Force (ASF), it became the Arab 
Deterrent Force (ADF) after a change in its mandate. The decision to deploy an Arab Force 
followed the Syrian intervention in Lebanon in June 1976. The League’s Council at ministerial level 
adopted a resolution to establish an Arab Force responsible for enforcing a ceasefire and promoting 
national reconciliation. Later on, a resolution was passed to transform the ongoing operation into a 
deterrent force. According to the resolution the ADF was to be composed of 30,000 men mainly 
drawn from Syria, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Libya, North and South Yemen and 
Sudan. 
 
Additionally the League of Arab States also set up a military commission in 1980 to monitor the 
ceasefire between North and South Yemen which it had helped reach in 1979. A similar mission 
had already been established earlier for the same conflict in 1972. A Joint military commission set up 
by the league also worked on Yemen following the intrastate conflict in 1994. 
 
Peacemaking and Peacebuilding 
The League of Arab States has also gained experience in peacemaking by undertaking mediation 
attempts to stop conflicts involving some of its member states. The League was thus involved in 
multiple mediation efforts on several occasions between Kuwait and Iraq (1961, 1973 and 1990) as 
well as between the warring factions in Somalia (the most notable efforts being in 1997 and 2006-
2007). The Arab League has also attempted to carry out a disarmament program in Somalia. In 1961 
the Secretary-General of the League mediated in the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait, which 
resulted in the deployment of an Arab League Force (see further). In 1962, a tripartite commission 
was found to facilitate the Agreement of Jeddah after the civil war in Yemen. In 1963 the League 
mediated in a dispute between Algeria and Morocco. In 1980, a commission was set up to facilitate 
the normalization of relations between Libya and Tunisia. In 1994 delegations from the League 
were sent to facilitate talks between armed forces in  North and South Yemen. In 1948, and later 
also in 1962, the League sent a commission of inquiry to Yemen to examine the internal situation. 
Good offices by the Secretary-General were used in 1961 in fostering dialogue after Syria’s secession 
from the United Arab Republic. This was also the case in 1961 for tensions between Iraq and 
Kuwait, in 1976 in Lebanon, in 1972 between North and South Yemen, and in 1992 with 
tensions between Sudan and Egypt.  
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Since 1948, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has also ranked high among its priorities. In March 
2002, the League endorsed the Beirut Declaration based on the proposal by Saudi Arabia. According to 
the declaration, the League’s member states would offer Israel formal recognition, normalization of 
relations, and peace agreements, should Israel withdraw from all territories occupied since 1967. It 
would also solve the Palestinian refugee problem and recognize the establishment of an independent 
Palestinian state.  
In 2002 ‘the Arab peace initiative’ was proposed by crown prince Abdullah from Saudi Arabia at the 
Beirut Summit of the League. The initiative obtained unanimous consent of all member states and 
was endorsed at the Riyadh Summit in March 2007. Jordan and Egypt were appointed by the League 
as its representatives to promote the initiative in meetings with Israeli officials. In July 2007, a 
delegation from the League visited Israel for the very first time. 
 
The League also involved itself in the recent political crisis in Lebanon. During their extraordinary 
meeting in the League’s ministerial council at the beginning of January 2008, the Arab ministers of 
foreign affairs charged the League’s Secretary General with activating the Arab initiative to end the 
dangerous crisis in Lebanon resulting from the dispute over the nomination of the President of the 
Republic. Mr. Moussa visited Beirut and Damascus on several occasions before reporting back to the 
Arab delegations to the League on the outcome of his contacts and visits. 
 
In regard to election observation, the League of Arab States sent observers to monitor elections in 
Algeria (1995), Comoros (2006), Djibouti (2006), Ethiopia (2005), Iraq (2005), Mauritania (2007), 
and Tunisia (2004). 
COOPERATION WITH THE UN 
The League of Arab States was set up before the United Nations was established. However, the 
Charter establishing the League already made provision for the future international organization. 
Nevertheless, it was only in 1950 that the League obtained Observer status at the United Nations 
General Assembly. Since then, exchanges and collaboration between the League and the UN have 
been frequent. The UN Secretary General regularly attends the League’s Summit to discuss with 
member states and officials of the organization. 
 
The various institutions that are affiliated with the Arab League, such as the Arab Organization for 
Agricultural Development, the Arab Women’s Organization or the Arab Atomic Energy Agency, 
have also a long tradition of collaborating with their UN equivalent. The UN and the League have 
also agreed to hold sectoral meetings between their affiliated institutions on a biennial basis to 
address priority areas of major importance to the development of Arab States. 
 
The UN and the League of Arab States held a General Meeting on Cooperation in Vienna in April 
2006, where the various areas of cooperation between the two organizations were discussed by 
senior officials. The topics discussed during the meeting included the maintenance of international 
peace and security, as well as economic and social issues. The League also expressed its interest in 
benefiting from UN expertise in the domain of peace and security, especially in regard to conflict 
prevention, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution. The two organizations agreed to 
strengthen their cooperation in a large variety of domains and to work together on projects linked to 
peace and security as well as development. This type of General Meeting on Cooperation is expected 
to be held once every two years in order to assess the level of collaboration between the two 
organizations and the progress of the projects that are being jointly implemented. 
 
In December 2003, in Cairo, the UN, through the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs 
(UNDDA), and the League of Arab States organized a joined conference on small arms and light 
weapons and on disarmament in the Arab states. The conference also offered an opportunity to 
review and discuss the implementation of the UN Program of Action on small arms in the Arab 
world that had been agreed with the League’s secretariat in 2001. The conference also paved the way 
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for the adoption of the Resolution on Arab Coordination for Combating the Illicit Trade in Small 
Arms and Light Weapons by the League in 2004. On the ground, the League and the UN have also 
been cooperating in implementing a disarmament program in Somalia and in ensuring a better 
monitoring of arms trade across borders in the Arab world. 
 
In October 1999, the League signed a cooperation agreement with the UNDP, which enforces 
cooperation in the fields of common interest. The agreement also enables the League to participate 
in UNDP meetings as an observer and gives the UNDP the possibility to participate as an observer 
in the meetings of the Arab Economic and Social Council and the technical and specialized 
committees, as well as conferences about issues of common interest. 
  
The Secretary General of the League has on various occasions expressed its interest in benefiting 
from UN expertise in a variety of fields including issues pertaining to peace and security. The League 
recognized information exchange, trainings, exchange of expertise and technical assistance as some 
of the areas through which the UN could improve the League’s efficiency. Capacity-building 
programs were also called for during the General Meeting on Cooperation between the two 
organizations, and on different occasions such programs have already been taking place, even if not 
yet in the field of peace and security. 
 
The LAS has been playing a very active role in UN High Level Meetings with the Regional 
Organizations since their inception, and namely through the work of its Secretary-General, Mr. Amr 
Moussa, who is a very strong supporter of the Regional-Global Security Mechanism. LAS has also 
been an active participant in the UNSC meetings with the Regional Organizations since their 
inception in 2003. 
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North Atlantic  
Treaty Organization (NATO) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 
The organization was established in April 1949, when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by 
representatives of 12 countries. Primarily NATO was formed to counter the treat of communist 
expansion in the post-World War II era. After the end of the Cold War, the organization has 
undergone a process of transformation, adapting to the changes in the security environment so as to 
continue ensuring the defense and security of its members102. At the beginning of the 1990s, NATO 
started to cooperate with states from the former Soviet Republic. Most of the former Soviet block 
countries signed the Partnership for Peace and showed interest to join NATO later on. Nowadays 
NATO counts 26 member countries (there is a possibility of membership enlargement in 2008). Its 
fundamental role is to safeguard the “freedom and security” of its member states by political and 
military means in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty and the principles of the UN Charter. 
The cooperation and commitment of member states is based on the common values of democracy, 
individual liberty, rule of law, and peaceful resolution of disputes.  With the signing of the Treaty, the 
member states agreed that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them all” (Art.5 of Treaty). The guiding principle by 
which NATO works is common commitment and mutual cooperation among sovereign states in 
support of the indivisibility of security for all its members.  
 
The fundamental security tasks of NATO are described in NATO’s Strategic Concept, which is an 
authoritative statement of the objectives of the organization, and which provides the highest level of 
guidance on the political and military means to be used in achieving them. The Alliance is committed 
to a broad approach to security, recognizing the importance of political, economic, social and 
environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defense dimension. In pursuit of its policy of 
preserving peace and enhancing security and stability as set out in the Strategic Concept, NATO will 
seek, in cooperation with other organizations, to prevent conflict, or, should a crisis arise, to 
contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law. This also includes the 
possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis response operations. 
 
NATO has a double-layered structure, consisting of civilian and military bodies. However, the key 
political decision-making body and the only body established by the North Atlantic Treaty is the 
North Atlantic Council (NAC). The Council brings together representatives of all member countries to 
discuss policy or operational issues. It provides a forum for wide-ranging consultation between 
members on all issues affecting their security. Meetings of the Council are chaired by the Secretary-
General. The Council meets at least every week at the level of permanent representatives, twice a 
year at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, as well as at the level of Ministers of Defense, and 
                                                
102 The member states of NATO are: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and United States. 
 
            
                   
Founded in 1949 (North Atlantic Treaty/Treaty of Washington) 
Headquarters in Brussels. 26 Members. 
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Mandate in Peace and Security:  
. North Atlantic Treaty, art. 2 and 5 (1949)  
. NATO Strategic Concept (1999) 
 
“To develop such a culture of cooperation, we all need to show 
pragmatism, imagination, and a greater understanding of each 
other’s capabilities”. 
JAAP  DE HOOP SCHEFFER 
NATO Secretary-General (2006) 
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occasionally at the Summit level with the participation of Prime Ministers and Heads of State and 
Government. The work of the NAC is prepared by subordinate committees like the Senior Political 
Committee, the Defense Planning Committee or the Nuclear Planning Group. There are more than 
300 committees supporting the three main committees. 
 
Civilian Structure 
• The Secretary General has three main roles: first and foremost, he is the chairman of the North 
Atlantic Council, the Defense Planning Committee and the Nuclear Planning Group as well as the 
chairman of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Russia Council, the NATO-Ukraine 
Commission and the Mediterranean Cooperation Group. Secondly, he is the principal spokesman of 
the organization and represents it in public on behalf of the member countries. Thirdly, he is the 
senior executive officer of the NATO International Staff. He is nominated by member governments 
for an initial period of four years. Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (Netherlands) took up his duties as NATO 
Secretary General on 5 January 2004, beginning an initial four-year term in office. The Secretary 
General is supported by a Deputy Secretary General and six Assistant Secretary Generals (NATO 
Handbook, 2007) 
 
The Secretary General is based at NATO headquarters in Brussels. National delegations and their 
permanent representatives, and diplomatic missions of partner countries, are also represented at the 
headquarters. Moreover, the International Staff works as an advisory and administrative body that 
supports the work of the national delegations at NATO headquarters at different committee levels. 
 
Military Structure 
• The Military Committee is the senior military authority in NATO under the overall political authority 
of the North Atlantic Council. It meets normally every Thursday, following the regular Wednesday 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council,. The Military Committee is under the chairmanship of an 
elected chairman (CMC) and is the primary source of military advice to the North Atlantic Council, 
Defense Planning Committee and Nuclear Planning Group. It brings together senior military officers 
who serve as their country’s military representative to NATO. The Committee is responsible for 
recommending to NATO’s political authorities measures considered necessary for the common 
defense of the NATO area and for the implementation of operations and missions. Its principal role 
is to provide military guidance to NATO’s two Strategic Commanders – Supreme Allied 
Commander Operations and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (NATO Handbook, 
2007) 
 
• Allied Command Operations (ACO), with its headquarters, SHAPE, near Mons, Belgium, is under the 
responsibility of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The main tasks are: contributing to the 
peace, security and territorial integrity of member states by assessing risks and threats, conducting 
military planning, and identifying and requesting the forces needed to undertake the full range of 
NATO missions. It contributes to the crisis management arrangements. In the case of aggression 
SACEUR executes all the military measures within the authority and capabilities of its command.  
 
• Allied Command Transformation (ACT) comes under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander 
Transformation (SACT), whose responsibilities can be summarized as follows: integrating, 
synchronizing and promoting NATO’s transformation efforts, in cooperation with ACO, with the 
operational activities and other elements of the command structure; conducting operational analysis 
at the strategic level, in cooperation with ACO, in order to identify and prioritize the type and scale 
of future capability and interoperability requirements and to channel the results into NATO’s overall 
defense planning process; exploring concepts and promoting doctrine development; conducting 
experiments and supporting the research and acquisition processes involved in the development of 
new technologies; managing resources allocated for NATO’s transformation programs; conducting 
training and education programs.  
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Both the SACEUR and the SACT are United States Flag or General Officers appointed by the US 
President and approved by the North Atlantic Council. 
 
The new command and control structure of NATO, agreed in 2003, functions on three levels: a) 
strategic level – in charge of the operational aspects including planning and conducting operations; 
b) component/tactical level – has six Joint Force Component Commands providing service-specific 
expertise to the operational level; and c) a specific transformation command level – oversees the 
transformation of NATO’s military capabilities.  
 
By adopting the 1999 Strategic Concept, crisis management is considered to be a fundamental security 
task of NATO. It can involve both military and non-military measures of response to a threat. 
NATO has different mechanisms in place to deal with crises: the top decision-making body - the 
North Atlantic Council - exchanges intelligence, information and other data, compares different 
perceptions and approaches, and harmonizes its views. The NATO Crisis Management Process 
represents a number of systems and structures which are available to deal with crises. The Process 
consists of four principal elements: the NATO Crisis Response System (NCRS), the NATO 
Intelligence Warning System (NIWS), NATO’s Operational Planning System and NATO Civil 
Emergency Planning Crisis Management Agreements. Depending on the nature of the crisis, 
different types of crisis management operations may be required: (i) collective defense crises: are 
referred to as “Article 5 operations”; (ii) crisis response operations: all military operations conducted 
by NATO in a non-Article 5 situation. They support the peace process in a conflict area and are also 
called peace support operations and include peacekeeping and peace enforcement, as well as conflict 
prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian operations; (iii) natural, technological or 
humanitarian disaster operations: to assist member and partner countries who are victims of 
disasters. 
 
The authority to initiate formal considerations on a possible NATO involvement in peacekeeping 
and peacemaking lies with the North Atlantic Council. This procedure takes place following the 
adoption of a UN Security Council Resolution. The political basis for a NATO peacekeeping 
operation was established by a decision at an Oslo meeting of Foreign Minister in 1992. They 
announced the readiness of NATO to support the peacekeeping operations. 
RESOURCE CAPACITY 
The financing of NATO is based on the member states’ direct contributions. The resources are 
allocated in accordance with an agreed cost-sharing formula broadly calculated in relation to member 
states’ ability to pay. Contributions of member states follow the principle of common funding. The 
common funding structure is diverse and decentralized. Certain multinational cooperative activities 
related to research, development, production and logistic support do not involve all and, in some 
instance, may only involve a small number of member countries. Common funding includes the 
NATO Civil and Military Budgets and NATO Security Investment Program.   
 
The Civil Budget for 2007 is USD $364,18 million and covers the operating costs of the International 
Staff at NATO Headquarters; the execution of approved civilian programs and activities; and the 
construction, running and maintenance costs of facilities including the personnel costs. The Civil 
Budget is funded by the contributions of the member country.  
 
The Military budget for 2007 is around USD $2 billion largely financed from the appropriations of 
Ministries of Defense. It covers the operating and maintenance costs of the international military 
structure. This includes the Military Committee, the International Military Staff, military agencies, the 
two Strategic Commands and Associated Command, Control and Information Systems, research and 
development agencies and the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Forces. 
 
The NATO Security Investment Program covers the major construction and control system investments 
needed to support the roles of the NATO Strategic Commands, which are beyond the national 
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defense requirements of individual member countries. In 2007, the NSIP budget was USD $1252,45 
million. 
 
The United States, Britain, Germany and France are the largest contributors to each segment, with 
payments ranging from 15 percent to over 23 percent into those budgets, while Belgium, Turkey, 
Denmark, Poland and the Netherlands pay under 2.75 percent. 
 
The civilian and military budgets, however, do not cover the cost of missions, which are financed 
under the principle that “costs lies where they fall”. In reality, this means that any country that sends 
a soldier or equipment on a NATO mission is responsible for meeting its own costs.  
 
There are approximately 4,200 people working at the NATO Headquarters: 2,100 members of 
national delegations and staff of national military representatives, 400 members of missions of 
NATO’s partner countries, 1,200 civilian members of the international staff or agencies located in 
the headquarters and 500 members of the International Military Staff.  
 
The process establishing the 25,000-strong NATO Response Force (NRF) was launched on 15 
October 2003 and reached full operational capability in November 2006. The NRF is a joint, 
multinational force with advanced technological capabilities, which is on alert and able to be 
deployed within five days notice, sustainable for up to thirty days or longer if re-supplied. 
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Peacekeeping 
From 1992 onwards NATO participated in several peacekeeping operations: 
 
• Bosnia and Herzegovina (IFOR/SFOR) (1995 - 2004) The NATO-led Implementation Force 
(IFOR) was responsible for implementation of the military aspect of the Dayton Peace Agreement 
with 60,000 troops. IFOR contributed substantially to the creation of a secure environment 
conducive to civil and political reconstruction. In 1996 IFOR was succeeded by the Stabilization 
Force (SFOR), which contained 32,000 troops. In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 
1088, SFOR became the legal successor to IFOR, its primary task being to contribute to the 
development of the secure environment necessary for the consolidation of peace. This operation was 
led by NATO for 9 years from December 1995 until December 2004, when responsibility was 
handed over to the EU. 
 
• Kosovo, Serbia (KFOR) (since 1999) The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) was deployed in the 
wake of a 78-day air campaign launched by NATO in March 1999 with the aim to stop and reverse 
the humanitarian catastrophe that was then unfolding. NATO’s initial mandate was to deter renewed 
hostility and threats against Kosovo by Serbian forces; to establish a secure environment and ensure 
public safety and order; to demilitarize the Kosovo Liberation Army; to support the international 
humanitarian effort; and to coordinate with and support the international civil presence. Today, 
KFOR focuses on building a secure environment in which all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic 
origins, can live in peace, and, with international aid, democracy and civil society, it is gradually 
gaining strength. At present, NATO has approximately 15,600 troops deployed in Kosovo – 16% 
are formed from the troops of NATO`s Partner Countries. KFOR’s presence remains crucial to 
guarantee security and stability in Kosovo as the diplomatic process led by the UN to define its 
future status moves forward. NATO has promised to support the security provisions of any final 
settlement.  
 
• Afghanistan (ISAF) (since 2003) It is the first NATO operation beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. 
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created following the UN Security Council 
Resolutions 1386, 1413 and 1444 to enable the Afghan Transitional Administration and the UN 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan to operate in the area around the capital Kabul. Later on the 
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mission was expanded to cover other parts of the country via Provincial Reconstruction Teams. 
NATO is seeking to assist the Afghan government in maintaining security within its area of 
operation, to support the government in expanding its authority over the whole country and to help 
provide a safe and secure environment. The troops under NATO command number 33,460 
members.   
 
• NATO became involved in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at the request of the 
Skopje authorities to help defuse an escalating conflict between the government and ethnic Albanian 
rebels to head off what might have degenerated into a full-scale war. Macedonian president Boris 
Trajkovski asked in June 2001 for NATO assistance to help disarm and demilitarize the National 
Liberation Army (NLA) and ethnic Albanian groups. NATO troops entered the country after 
signing a peace plan, the Ohrid Framework Agreement (13 August 2001). NATO`s presence in the 
country was divided into three operations. First – Essential Harvest was aimed at collecting and 
destroying of all weapons voluntarily handed in by the NLA. This operation included 3500 NATO 
troops. Second – Amber Fox, which included around 1000 troops, provided protection for 
international monitors from EU and OSCE who were overseeing the implementation of peace plan. 
Third – Allied Harmony was deployed in December 2002, aiming to minimize the risk of 
destabilization in the country, provide support to the monitors and assist to the government in 
assuming responsibility for security. The responsibility for these tasks was handed to the EU in 
March 2003, though NATO maintains its military and civilian presence. The Headquarters in Skopje 
has 120 personnel.  
 
• Between 1992 and 1995, NATO participated on operations to monitor, and subsequently enforce, 
a UN embargo and sanctions in the Adriatic, and to monitor and then to enforce the UN no-fly 
zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina. NATO also provided close air support to the UN Protection 
Force (UNPROFOR), and authorized air strikes to relieve the siege of Sarajevo and other threatened 
areas designated by the UN as safe areas. 
 
• Since May 2003 NATO has been involved in various ways in helping with Iraq’s transformation. 
On the request from the Iraqi Interim Government and under UN Security Council Resolution 
1546, NATO agreed to assist to the Interim Government with training Iraqi personnel inside as well 
as outside the country, and to support the development of security institutions in Iraq, which 
includes helping to build effective armed forces and providing equipment and technical assistance to 
them. In July 2004 NATO established a Training Implementation Mission. Today the Mission’s staff 
counts 200 members.  
 
• Together with the European Union, NATO has been assisting the African Union in expanding its 
peacekeeping mission in Darfur (Sudan) since July 2005, in an attempt to halt continuing violence. 
NATO is also providing staff capacity-building workshops for AU officers within the Deployed 
Integrated Task Force headquartered in Ethiopia. The training is based on strategic-level planning 
and focuses on technologies and techniques to create an overall analysis and understanding of 
Darfur, and to identify the areas where the application of AU assets can influence and shape the 
operating environment to deter crises. 
COOPERATION WITH THE UN 
The character of the relationship between NATO and the UN is expressed in the Preamble of the 
North Atlantic Treaty, which makes it clear that NATO operates within the framework of the UN 
Charter. Reference to the Charter can also be found in Articles 1, 5 7, 12 of the Treaty.  
 
NATO has a permanently deployed Liaison Officer to the UN Headquarters in New York, working 
within the Dept. of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).  
 
The relations between the two organizations remained limited until the beginning of the 1990s when 
both started to cooperate in crisis management operations in the western Balkans. Since then a 
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strong collaboration between both organizations has begun (see section on operational experience). 
NATO has been an active participant in the High-level Meetings process since its inception, namely 
in the preparation of these meetings through the Working Groups. Its Secretary-Generals have been 
consistent in attending every High-level Meeting since 1994, and NATO’s representation in the 
UNSC meetings has also been assured at the highest level since 2003. 
 
Cooperation between NATO and the UN has gradually increased during the 1990s and 2000s. 
Nowadays, the cooperation between the two institutions covers a variety of issues. Consultations 
between NATO and the UN’s specialized bodies now cover issues such as civil emergency planning, 
civil-military cooperation, combating human trafficking, action against mines and the fight against 
terrorism. For example, OCHA maintains a Liaison Officer on a permanent basis at NATO’s Euro-
Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre. 
 
Staff-level meetings between NATO and the UN have become frequent and a number of high-level 
visits take place each year. In 2004, a NATO-UN Round Table was held in New York. The same 
year, NATO’s Secretary General addressed the UN Security Council. 
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Organization of American  
States (OAS)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 
The Organization of American States (OAS) was established in 1948 (replacing the earlier Pan-
American Union) with the adoption of the OAS Charter (in effect since December 1951). Following 
the League of Arab States, it is the oldest regional organization in the world covering the totality of 
the American continent’s 35 member states103. In fact, the idea of regionalism in the Americas has its 
roots as far as the 1820s when Simon Bolivar envisioned an American region “united at heart”. The 
OAS explicitly states in its Charter that it is a regional agency for UN purposes (Chapter VIII). 
Among its main objectives are achieving an order of peace and justice; strengthening collaboration 
among states while defending sovereignty and territorial integrity; and promoting social, economic 
and cultural development in the continent. The internal structure of OAS is as follows: 
 
• The General Assembly is the principal decision-making body, convening annually to establish the 
work plan and the political agenda of the OAS.  
 
• The Permanent Council consists of the permanent ambassadors to the OAS. It is accountable to the 
General Assembly (GA) and responsible for implementing GA resolutions, which are passed by 
consensus. 
 
• The General Secretariat is the main coordination and implementation body, with its units managed 
under the office of the Secretary-General. José Miguel Insulza (from Chile) was elected for a five- 
year term as OAS Secretary General on 2 May 2005. 
 
• Furthermore, the OAS has established several specialized organizations such as the Inter-American 
Human Rights system (Commission and Court) and the Inter-American Defense Board, all of these bodies 
being accountable to the General Assembly. 
 
Beyond these organs, OAS has a number of other structures, through which it can operate in the 
field of peace and security: 
 
• The Office for the Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts (OPRC), part of the Department for Democratic 
and Political Affairs (under the Secretariat of Political Affairs in the General Secretariat) is the main 
body responsible for peace and security. The OPRC is responsible for peacebuilding, conflict 
prevention, and conflict resolution activities. The goal of the OPCR is to provide strategic political 
                                                
103 The OAS Member States are: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Canada Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba (excluded from participation since 1962) Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad 
and Tobago, USA, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
               
                       
Founded in 1948 (in effect since December 1951) (Charter of the OAS) 
Headquarters in Washington D.C, USA. 35 Member States 
www.oas.org 
 
Mandate in Peace and Security:  
. OAS Charter (1948), art. 2 a), c), d); art. 3 h), i); chapter V, art. 24-27 (Pacific 
Settlement of Disputes) and chapter VI, art. 28-29 (Collective Security). 
. American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (1948) 
. Declaration on Security (2003) 
 
 
 
“We have to move from a culture of competition  
to a culture of cooperation” 
 JOSÉ MIGUEL INSULZA 
OAS Secretary General, 7th HLM (2006) 
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analysis of complex situations (which may lead to the eruption of violent conflict). This office 
provides support and technical assistance to create and strengthen the national institutional capacity 
of member states, so that they can efficiently and successfully manage internal conflicts. As part of 
the OAS’ new preventive strategy, the OPRC is currently working on the development of a conflict 
analysis tool that will help the organization identify potential conflicts in the region and provide 
member states with improved technical assistance. 
 
• The Secretariat for Multidimensional Security, under the General Secretariat, coordinates OAS actions 
against terrorism, illegal drugs and other threats to public security. 
 
• The Permanent Council and the Secretary General both have ‘good offices’ capacity, and can therefore 
deploy missions for conflict prevention or peaceful settlement of disputes. 
 
The OAS can also use several of the mechanisms related to the application of Resolution 1080104. 
Resolution 1080 states that, “representative democracy is an indispensable condition for the stability, 
peace, and development of the region” and includes an automatic procedure to respond to 
democratic breakdown - allowing the OAS to undertake a wide range of collective activity so long as 
these actions are approved by the foreign ministers of its member states and/or the General 
Assembly. This resolution was enshrined in the Inter-American Democratic Charter in 2001.  
 
Moreover, the OAS can equally use the mechanisms related to the application of the Washington 
Protocol concerning breaches against democracy and constitutional continuity; and the Inter-American 
System of Human Rights protection (includes the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights). 
 
Beyond these organs, the OAS has a number of other structures, through which it can operate in the 
field of peace and security. The most significant body is the Office for the Prevention and Resolution of 
Conflicts (OPRC), part of the Department for Democratic and Political Affairs (under the Secretariat 
of Political Affairs in the General Secretariat). The OPRC is responsible for peacebuilding, conflict 
prevention, and conflict resolution activities. Its goal is to provide support and technical assistance to 
create and strengthen the national institutional capacity of member states, so that they can efficiently 
and successfully manage internal conflicts. 
 
Structural Prevention 
One of the principal contributions that the OAS makes towards structural conflict prevention is 
through democratic institution-building in member states. In 1991, the Unit for the Promotion of 
Democracy (UPD) was created within the General Secretariat to support the consolidation of 
democracy in the region.  The creation of the UPD opened up an institutional space within the 
Organization for the topic of conflict prevention and resolution and allowed for the development of 
programs aimed at responding to the member states’ specific needs. In the more than ten years since 
it was established, the UPD has become a key regional source of support for the efforts made by 
countries in the Inter-American system to defend, consolidate, and advance democracy. During this 
time, political conditions in the Americas have evolved, as have the challenges to democracy. The 
UPD, through specific actions in response to the mandates outlined for the Organization by the 
member governments, contributed to creating stable and lasting conditions for democracy in the 
hemisphere.  
 
Dispute Settlement  
The OAS Charter includes a mandate for peaceful settlement of disputes. In article 3.i it is stated 
that, “controversies of an international character arising between two or more American States shall 
                                                
104 AGRES 1080, June 5th 1991. Resolution 1080, on Representative Democracy stipulates the actions that the 
organization can take in case of “sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process or 
of the legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government in any of the Organization’s member 
states”. Available at www.oas.org/juridico/english/agres1080.htm.  
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be settled by peaceful procedures”. This mandate is further developed in Chapter V (“Peaceful 
Settlement of Disputes”, art. 24-27), which stipulates as peaceful procedures for the settlement of 
disputes: “direct negotiation, good offices, mediation, investigation and conciliation, judicial 
settlement, arbitration, and those which the parties to the dispute may especially agree upon at any 
time” (art. 25). 
 
Early Warning 
The General Secretariat of OAS does not have a specialized EW centre and/or unit at the time of 
writing. However, the Department of Democratic and Political Affairs through its Office for the 
Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts (OPRC), is working to enhance OAS’ capacity for early 
warning and response. The new preventive strategy aims at designing and implementing a 
comprehensive early warning mechanism, including the use of political analyses, data banks as well as 
the development and use of early warning indicators. It could be said, however, that the Inter-
American Human Rights System serves as an early warning mechanism that monitors human rights 
violations and draws attention to potential failures in the rule of law and/or democratic processes in 
the region. 
 
Peacemaking and Peacebuilding 
The OAS focuses on peacebuilding initiatives (undertaken by order of the political bodies of the 
OAS or upon the specific request of a member state) in preference over enforcement measures. The 
Organization has no peacekeeping or peace enforcement capability and may only initiate a peace 
mission in a member state if invited by its government. Over the past few years, the OAS has 
worked towards the development of actions and institutional capacity for dealing with the internal 
problems of member states. This support comes through new agreements, direct assistance for 
dialogue processes (including special ad-hoc missions), and local capacity building measures, which 
focus on direct support to assist member states in constructively managing conflict and consensus 
building (GOI). 
 
Collective Security 
The OAS Charter also envisages a collective defense mechanism, set out in article 3 h), which states 
that, “an act of aggression against one American state is an act of aggression against all the American 
states” and is further elaborated in Chapter VI (“Collective Security”, art. 28-29). 
RESOURCE CAPACITY 
The OAS is one of the largest intergovernmental organizations in the world – if measured in terms 
of membership. However, the organization remains in a relatively weak financial position. Frozen in 
the mid-1990s, the OAS’ total budget remained until 2006 at a modest USD $78 million. Its 
operations and programming are further hurt by the fact that a significant number of its members 
continue to be in arrears on their annual contributions (including the USA, Brazil and Argentina). 
The election monitoring missions of the OAS, a cornerstone of its operations, are funded 
precariously by voluntary contributions at the national level instead of a permanent fund within the 
OAS105.  
 
For the year 2008, OAS’s programmed budget has risen to USD $87,5 million. This regular budget is 
supplemented by USD $63,8 million in specific Funds and USD $6 million in Voluntary Funds, in a 
total of USD $157,3 million, of which USD $25,6 million is allocated to Democracy and Governance 
(including Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts) and USD $23,4 million is allocated to 
Multidimensional Security (terrorism, drugs and other threats to public security106.  
                                                
105 Cooper, Andrew and Thomas Legler (2006) Intervention Without Intervening: the OAS Defense and Promotion of 
Democracy in the Americas . Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p.33-34. 
106 OAS Approved Budget Program 2008. Available in www.oas.org/budget/default.asp. Visited 19 January 2008 
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The weak financial position has also led to a reduction of the human resources. From 676 staff in 
1996, the Organization went down to 506 employees in 2006107.  
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Even if the OAS Charter envisaged a ‘collective security’ mandate for the Organization, in practice 
the OAS is mainly concerned with preventive diplomacy and has no collective mechanism to 
undertake military operations. Its mechanisms for prevention and resolution of conflicts have 
developed mainly through its Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, i.e. via the promotion of 
democratization and human rights. Since its inception and during the first two decades of its 
existence, the OAS was frequently used as a forum for peaceful settlement of disputes (usually by 
consensus or compromise), seen as an optimal forum for addressing security concerns. The Rio 
Treaty and the OAS Charter were invoked in several cases (e.g. territorial disputes, missile crisis, 
military coups). This trend decreased in the 1970s and 1980s but its influence reappeared in the 
aftermath of the Cold War, now also with the invoking of Resolution 1080 on Democracy 
(mentioned above). More recently, the OAS has been undertaking peace and security activities in the 
areas of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, human rights monitoring, and peace-building. In the 
past, however, the OAS has also deployed peacekeeping operations. 
 
Peacekeeping 
In 1955, the OAS dispatched a committee of investigation (OAS Committee of Military Experts – 
Observers) to Costa Rica, who claimed that it was being “invaded” by Nicaragua. In 1957, the OAS 
also sent a Military Observers Group to address the interstate conflict between Honduras and 
Nicaragua. In 1965, after the US unilateral intervention in the Dominican Republic, the 
Organization (although condemning the US intervention) ended up sponsoring a regional 
peacekeeping force to the country, which formed the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) with 
troops from the US, Brazil, Honduras, Paraguay, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and El Salvador. In 1969, in 
the so-called “Soccer War” between Honduras and El Salvador, the OAS used heavy diplomatic 
pressure to bring the parties to a cease-fire, and deployed a peace commission (military observers) 
that moved back and forth between Tegucigalpa and San Salvador seeking to end the conflict. A new 
group of military observers was sent once again between 1976 and 1981 to supervise disarmament 
efforts. More recently, the OAS has also facilitated the cease-fire in Suriname through the OAS 
Special Mission to Suriname (1992-2000).  
 
Structural Prevention 
In 2001, the UPD established the Special Program for the Promotion of Dialogue and Conflict Resolution to 
assist member states in developing national and sub-regional capacities in dialogue, consensus 
building and conflict resolution. The mission of the Special Program is to contribute to the 
development of responses to deep-rooted socio-political conflicts and critical challenges facing 
member states and their societies. During the 2001-2004 period, the Special Program, among other 
activities, provided technical assistance to the Government of Bolivia for the “Design and 
Implementation of a Conflict Prevention and Resolution System in Bolivia”. Furthermore, it 
provided technical assistance in the areas of conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding to the 
governments of Guatemala, Panama and El Salvador, amongst others, within the framework of 
the “Central American Program for the Strengthening of Democratic Dialogue”.  
 
Pacific Settlement of Disputes 
The OAS promoted political reconciliation in Venezuela, along with CARICOM (territorial disputes 
between Venezuela and Guyana) in 1997. It also established a mission to support the peace process 
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in Colombia (MAPP/OEA) in 2004, and has sponsored discussions between Honduras and 
Nicaragua (2001) and Belize and Guatemala (2005) to help them resolve their territorial 
differences (confidence-building measures, brokering of agreements, envoy of civil verification 
missions).  
 
Peacebuilding 
The OAS has been heavily involved in peacebuilding activities, namely in the fields of DDR, truth, 
justice and reconciliation, rule of law, human rights, good governance and electoral assistance, 
criminal law, counter-terrorism and disaster relief. 
 
The OAS’ involvement in DDR activities includes past experiences in Suriname, Nicaragua and 
Guatemala. Furthermore, the OAS Mission to support the Peace Process in Colombia is currently 
undertaking DDR activities in that country (since 2004). In Nicaragua, the OAS International 
Support and Verification Mission (CIAV-OAS, 1990-1997) demobilized 22,000 ex-combatants and 
developed programs to help combatants and others affected by the conflict to reintegrate into the 
economic and political life of the country. In Suriname, the OAS Special Mission (1992-2000) 
facilitated a cease-fire, promoted the demobilization of former combatants, provided electoral and 
legislative assistance, mediated disputes between ethnic groups and the government over economic 
rights, and developed job-training programs for young people. Through the Department for the 
Promotion of Democracy, the OAS has been furthering the peace process in Guatemala since 1995 
(Program “Culture and Dialogue: Development of Resources for Peacebuilding in Guatemala – 
OAS/PROPAZ”)108.  
 
In Haiti, the International Civilian Mission for Haiti (MICIVIH, 1992-1999), in cooperation with 
the UN, monitored the human rights situation, provided technical assistance in judicial reform, 
facilitated human rights training for police officers, and organized civic education programs on 
citizen’s rights to local NGOs.  
 
The OAS has also managed several de-mining operations in Central America in the last 15 years, 
through its Mine Action Program (AICMA). AICMA’s first mandate was given in 1995 and since 
then the Program has operated in Ecuador (completion by 2004), Guatemala (concluded in 2005), 
Honduras (concluded in 2004), Nicaragua (2003-2005), Peru (completion by 2003), and Colombia 
(ongoing since 2003).  
 
Furthermore, OAS has been providing electoral assistance to a large number of countries, namely: 
Argentina (2003); Belize (1997); Bolivia (1997, 2002, 2004, 2005); Colombia (1994, 1997, 2002, 
2006); Costa-Rica (2006); Dominican Republic (1990, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006); 
Ecuador (1996, 1998, 2002, 2004, 2006) El Salvador (1991, 1997, 2004, 2006); Grenada (1999, 2003); 
Guatemala (1995, 1999, 2003); Guyana (1997, 2001, 2006); Haiti (1991, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2000, 
2004); Honduras (1989, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2005); Nicaragua (1990, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2001, 
2002, 2004, 2006); Panama (1994, 1998, 1999, 2004, 2006); Paraguay (1991, 1992, 1993, 1998, 2000, 
2003); Peru (1992, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2006); Saint Lucia (2006); Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines (2001, 2005); Suriname (1991, 1996, 2000, 2005); Venezuela (1992, 1993, 1998, 1999, 
2000, 2004, 2005, 2006).  
 
The effectiveness of the OAS to cope with its wide mandate and agenda must be assessed, 
considering the Organization’s limited resource capacity, as it has no common funding facility for 
emergency operations of any kind. The most serious challenge to OAS’s credibility concerns the 
issue of rapid response to democratic crises. The OAS tradition of consensual decision-making 
within a club-like atmosphere is particularly salient. On higher-profile issues where there are 
profound differences of opinion (as on the question of how to resolve a crisis) the process is prone 
to some considerable stalling if not immobilization. This was most obvious in the case of Haiti in 
                                                
108 Cooper, Andrew and Thomas Legler (2006) Intervention Without Intervening: the OAS Defense and Promotion of 
Democracy in the Americas. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p.27. 
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1994, over the issue of coercive intervention after the overthrow of President Aristide and the 
invocation of Resolution 1080. The OAS was only able to send a small grouping (18 members) of a 
civilian mission known as OAS-DEMOC. 
 
While the Organization has stepped up its efforts and made a series of amendments and changes to 
various juridical instruments in order to play a more central role in the resolution and prevention of 
intra-state conflict, there are several constraints remaining:  
 •  The lack of a coherent policy regarding the possible extent and role that the Organization 
 should have in intra-state conflict prevention and resolution at various levels;  
 • The funds and administrative capacity to undertake complex or comprehensive
 peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts in the region;  
 • The need to increase public awareness (among its member states as well as the 
international  community) of the Organization’s acquired expertise and successes in the 
peacebuilding and post- conflict reconciliation arenas. 
COOPERATION WITH THE UN 
Cooperation between the OAS and the UN was already foreseen when the Organization was created 
in 1948 (the OAS Charter declares the Organization as a regional agency according to the UN 
Charter). This cooperation is anchored in six formalized agreements: 
 • The General Cooperation Agreement with the UN Secretariat on 17 April 1995 (basic 
 information sharing and collaboration between the two organizations); 
 • The Cooperation Agreement with the UN Secretariat’s Disaster Relief Coordinator; 
 • Two MoUs with the Secretariat through DDA (2001) and DPA (2004 – electoral mission 
 in Haiti); 
 • Two MoUs with the Secretariat regarding the Mission in Haiti (1995 and 1997).  
 
Cooperation with the UN started strengthening in 1994 after UNGA’s resolution 49/5 (21 October 
1994) which called for further cooperation between the two organizations. Since then the OAS has 
been gradually developing and maintains a close operational relationship with the UN in the major 
peace and security thematic areas – peacekeeping (with DPKO), peace-building with (DPA) and 
humanitarian affairs (with OCHA).  The Office of the Assistant Secretary General is the liaison link 
between the OAS and the UN at the political level. At the operational level, the Office for the 
Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts of the Department of Democratic and Political Affairs is the 
liaison link with the UN in the fields of peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution. Some 
activities of cooperation include: staff training exchanges; joint international conferences; 
cooperation in field missions. The joint OAS/UN International Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) 
could offer one possible model for future cooperation. In addition, the deployment of separate but 
complementary missions (i.e. case of OAS/PROPAZ and MINUGUA in Guatemala), with one 
civilian mission providing assistance to implement peace accords and one peacekeeping/verification 
mission including DDR, human rights and verification functions could offer another model for 
future cooperation. 
 
Furthermore, the OAS has developed some collegial relations with other regional organizations even 
if not in a systematic way (e.g. liaison relationship with the AU every few years; working closely with 
the Francophonie in Haiti, with ASEAN on the ‘Community of Democracies’, and more recently, 
liaison has been established with CIS on counter-terrorism). The most regular and substantive 
contact is with the sub-regional CARICOM, through summit meetings and liaison between the 
secretariat heads. 
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Organization for Security and  
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 
The OSCE is the successor of the CSCE – the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe. 
After years of negotiations in the early 1970s, the 35 participating states of the CSCE adopted the 
Helsinki Final Act at a Summit Meeting in 1975. It was a breakthrough in the relationship between 
East and West and marked an important step towards the end of the Cold War. The collapse of 
Soviet communism in 1989-90 also changed the CSCE. At a Summit Meeting in Paris in November 
1990, the participants adopted the Charter of Paris for a New Europe which represented a decisive 
step towards a new era of East-West cooperation. At the Budapest Summit in December 1994, the 
institutionalization process was punctuated by the renaming of the CSCE to the OSCE, marking its 
transition from a Conference to a regional arrangement. A permanent secretariat was established and 
new institutions set up. With 56 participating states from Europe, Central Asia and North America, 
the OSCE forms the largest regional security arrangement in the world109. 
The OSCE is a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and 
post-conflict rehabilitation in its area. It has 19 ongoing missions or field operations in South-
Eastern Europe, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia. 
The Organization deals with three dimensions of security – the politico-military, the economic and 
environmental, and the human dimension. It therefore addresses a wide range of security-related 
concerns, including arms control, confidence and security-building measures, human rights, national 
minorities, democratization, policing strategies, counter-terrorism as well as economic and 
environmental activities. All 56 participating states enjoy equal status, and decisions are taken by 
consensus on a politically, but not legally binding basis. The institutional structure of the OSCE can 
be divided into (i) negotiating and decision-making bodies, (ii) operational structures and institutions, 
and (iii) OSCE related bodies:  
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Founded in 1994 (predecessor founded in 1975). 
Headquarters in Vienna, Austria. 56 member states. 
www.osce.org 
 
Mandate in Peace and Security: 
. Final Act (1975) 
. Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990) 
. Budapest Document (1994) 
. Lisbon Document (1996) 
. Istanbul Document (1999) 
 
          
“[O]ur two Organizations were born to work together.  (…) 
[T]he United Nations and the OSCE have jointly confronted 
challenges to peace and security.  Such collaborations 
complement our respective strengths, and enable us to learn 
from each other’s experiences.” 
KOFI ANNAN 
                         Former UN Secretary-General (2006) 
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Negotiating and Decision-Making Bodies 
• Summits/Ministerial Councils Summits are periodic meetings of heads of state or government of OSCE 
participating states that set priorities and guidelines at the highest political level. In between summits, 
decision-making and governing power lies with the Ministerial Council whose members are the 
Foreign Ministers of the OSCE participating states. The Ministerial Council usually meets once a 
year; 
• The Permanent Council is the main regular decision-making body of the Organization. It convenes 
weekly at the level of Permanent Representatives (Ambassadors) to discuss current developments in 
the OSCE area and to make appropriate decisions; 
• The Forum for Security Cooperation meets weekly to discuss and take decisions on military aspects of 
security in the OSCE area, in particular Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs); 
• High-level representatives of OSCE participating states meet once a year at the Economic and 
Environmental Forum to provide an annual focus for activities targeting major issues of economic or 
environmental concern.  
Operational Structures and Institutions 
• The OSCE Chairmanship rotates annually. The Foreign Minister of the country chairing the 
Organization also holds the post of Chairman-in-Office. The Chairman-in-Office (CiO) is assisted 
by the previous and succeeding Chairpersons to assure continuity of the Organization's activities. 
Together, the three Chairmen – present, past and future – form the OSCE Troika; 
 
• The 320 parliamentarians of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly are appointed by their national 
parliaments. The Assembly convenes several times each year to debate a wide variety of issues linked 
to human security in the OSCE region. Its main tasks are the promotion of parliamentary 
involvement in the activities of the OSCE and the facilitation of inter-parliamentary dialogue and 
cooperation; 
• The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is active throughout the 
OSCE area in the fields of election observation, democratic development, human rights, tolerance 
and non-discrimination, and the rule of law; 
• The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities was established in 1992 to identify and seek early 
resolution of tensions involving national minority issues that might endanger peace, stability or 
friendly relations between OSCE participating states. The High Commissioner is required to act in 
confidence, through silent diplomacy. The task of the High Commissioner is to prevent conflict by 
identifying and addressing tensions and risks of tensions involving national minority issues, through 
dialogue with governments and minorities, advice and recommendations on legislation and policies, 
and assistance through programs and projects. Knut Vollebaek (Norway) was appointed to the post 
for a three-year term on 4 July, 2007; 
• The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all OSCE 
participating states. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and promotes 
full compliance with OSCE press freedom commitments. Miklos Haraszti (Hungary) was appointed 
Representative effective from 10 March, 2004; 
• The OSCE Action against Terrorism Unit is the Organization's focal point for the coordination and 
facilitation of OSCE initiatives and capacity-building programs relevant to the struggle against 
terrorism; 
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• The Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) supports the Chairman-in-Office and other OSCE bodies in the 
fields of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. It 
plays a key role in supporting OSCE field operations; 
• The Section for External Cooperation is involved in dialogue and cooperation with partner states, and in 
maintaining institutional cooperation with partner organizations at headquarter level. In doing so, it 
employs the Platform for Cooperative Security, a tool aimed at further strengthening and developing 
mutual cooperation with competent organizations.  
OSCE Related Bodies 
• The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration was established in 1995. It provides a mechanism for the 
peaceful settlement of disputes between states. Currently, thirty-three states are party to the 
Convention; 
• The Joint Consultative Group deals with questions relating to compliance with the provisions of the 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 1990; 
• The central focus of the Open Skies Consultative Committee is to discuss all questions relating to 
compliance with the provisions of the Treaty on Open Skies of March 1992. The Treaty, which is 
designed to promote openness and transparency in military activities, established a regime of 
observation flights over the territory of its signatories. 
The OSCE also offers several additional tools and instruments relevant in the field of security: 
• The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (1994) is used as a point of reference by 
several Organizations and in the framework of the Partnership for Peace; 
• The OSCE Communications Network links capitals of participating states to foster timely information 
exchange and implementation of the Confidence- and Security-Building Measures  and other military 
treaties; 
• The OSCE fosters the exchange of information on armed forces and defense planning within 
different frameworks, such as the Annual exchange of military information (AEMI), the Global 
Exchange of Military Information (GEMI), and the Annual Exchange of Information on Defense 
Planning. 
RESOURCE CAPACITY 
On 2 February, 2007, the Permanent Council approved the OSCE Unified Budget for 2007, 
amounting to EUR €168.2 million (USD $246 million). In 2006, the approved budget amounted to 
approximately EUR €163 million (USD $236 million), nearly 72 percent of which went to field 
activities. In 2006, extra-budgetary contributions for additional activities amounted to approximately 
EUR €25 million (USD $37 million). 
 
The OSCE employs some 450 people in its various institutions and around 3000 in its field 
operations. Locally-contracted employees outnumber international seconded employees by roughly 
five to one. Seconded staff members are funded by their national administrations. 
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
The OSCE is one of the regional bodies in the world with largest field experience. OSCE Missions 
of Long Duration in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina began their work on 8 September, 1992, 
making them the first of the Organization's numerous field operations to be deployed. Since then, 
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the OSCE has gathered ample experience in preventive deployment, peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding. 
 
Preventive Diplomacy and Preventive Deployment 
• Macedonia, OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje (since 1992): is the Organization's 
longest-serving field mission. Originally established to help prevent the tension and conflicts in the 
former socialist Republic of Yugoslavia from spreading, it is now also involved in police matters and 
confidence-building activities;  
• OSCE Project Coordinator in Ukraine (since 1994): was established for the purpose of carrying 
out tasks related to the new form of cooperation between Ukraine and the OSCE. This cooperation 
consists of the planning, implementation and monitoring of projects between relevant authorities of 
Ukraine and the OSCE and its institutions; 
• Uzbekistan, OSCE Centre in Tashkent (1995-2005): promoted the implementation of OSCE 
principles and commitments as well as the cooperation of the Republic of Uzbekistan within the 
OSCE framework; maintained contacts with local authorities, universities, research institutions and 
non-governmental organizations; 
• Kazakhstan, OSCE Centre in Almaty (since 1998): monitors political, legal and economic 
developments with a view to maintaining stability in the country and the region. It also promotes 
OSCE standards and commitments within Kazakhstan; 
• Kyrgyzstan, OSCE Centre in Bishkek (since 1998): offers support in the economic, 
environmental, human and political aspects of security; 
• Azerbaijan, OSCE Office in Baku (since 1999): possesses a broad mandate which covers major 
areas of concern in all OSCE dimensions including the human, political, economic and 
environmental aspects of security and stability; 
• Turkmenistan, OSCE Centre in Ashgabad (since 1999): facilitates contacts and promotes 
information exchange with the Chairman-in-Office, other OSCE Institutions and OSCE 
participating states. The Centre also cooperates with international and local organizations and 
institutions; 
• Belarus, OSCE Office in Minsk (since 2003): the Office assists the Government of Belarus in 
the following areas: promoting institution building; consolidating the rule of law; developing 
relations with civil society, in accordance with OSCE principles and commitments; developing 
economic and environmental activities;  
• OSCE Project Coordinator in Uzbekistan (since 2006): promotes the implementation of OSCE 
principles and commitments and the cooperation of the Republic of Uzbekistan within the OSCE 
framework. 
Preventive Disarmament 
The Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) contributes to efforts of preventive disarmament by 
developing documents regulating transfers of conventional arms and establishing principles for non-
proliferation. Due to its legal status, the OSCE does not deal with arms control issues directly. 
However, it is currently involved in various politico-military activities ranging from Confidence- and 
Security-Building Measures aimed at fostering trust among member states, to projects providing 
assistance on the destruction of small arms and light weapons, including shoulder-fired missiles 
(known as MANPADS), as well as conventional ammunition. 
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While the FSC in Vienna provides a forum for political dialogue for diplomats from OSCE states, 
most of the practical work, including training and assistance in the safeguarding and destruction of 
ammunition and stockpiles of small arms, is conducted through the Conflict Prevention Centre 
(CPC) at OSCE headquarters and OSCE field operations in such countries as Moldova, Georgia and 
Tajikistan. 
Structural Prevention 
The OSCE has a number of tools at its disposal to collect and analyze the root causes of conflicts. 
These include its participating states, its various institutions, field missions on the ground, and a 
small analytical cell in the Secretariat within the Conflict Prevention Centre. Regional desks are a key 
analytical and programmatic tool, essential to the development of an integrated conflict prevention 
strategy. 
 
Peacemaking and Peace Enforcement 
Active peacemaking and peace enforcement is not permitted by OSCE regulations. The OSCE can 
only partake in Chapter 6 operations. Furthermore, the OSCE can only get involved with the full 
agreement of all parties. 
 
Peacekeeping 
• OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (1992-1993): embarked upon verification activities related to 
compliance of all parties in Kosovo with the requirements set forth by the international community 
with regard to the solution of the crisis in Kosovo.  
Peacebuilding 
• OSCE Mission to Estonia (1992-2001): supported integration and better understanding between 
the communities in Estonia; 
• OSCE Mission to Georgia (since 1992): assists the Government of Georgia in the fields of 
conflict settlement, democratization, human rights and the rule of law; 
• OSCE Missions of Long Duration in Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina (1992-1993): promoted 
dialogue between the concerned authorities and the representatives of the populations and 
communities in the three regions. It collected information on all aspects relevant to violations of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and promoted solutions to such problems. It also 
established contact points for solving problems;  
• OSCE Mission to Latvia (1993-2001): addressed citizenship issues and other related matters and 
offered advice on such issues to the Latvian government and authorities, as well as to other 
institutions and individuals;  
• OSCE Mission to Moldova (since 1993): facilitates the achievement of a lasting, comprehensive 
political settlement of the conflict in all its aspects, based on the consolidation of the independence 
and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova within its current borders. The reinforcement of the 
territorial integrity of the state goes along with an understanding on a special status for the Trans-
Dniester region; 
• Tajikistan, OSCE Centre in Dushanbe (since 1994): assists in the implementation of the peace 
process and acted as a guarantor of the Tajik Peace Agreement reached in June 1997. In this 
capacity, it works more particularly on political issues, return of refugees, and military questions; 
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• OSCE Mission to Ukraine (1994-1999): supported the work of the OSCE experts on 
constitutional and economic matters and reported on the situation in the Crimea; 
• OSCE Representative to the Joint Committee on the Skrunda Radar Station (1995-1999): 
monitored and coordinated the implementation of the Agreement between Latvia and Russia; 
participated in establishing the procedural and organizational modalities for the functioning of the 
Joint Committee;  
• OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya (1995-2003): promoted respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms; fostered the development of democratic institutions and processes; facilitated 
the delivery of humanitarian aid for victims of the crisis in that region by international and non-
governmental organizations; supported the creation of mechanisms guaranteeing the rule of law, 
public safety and law and order; promoted the peaceful resolution of the crisis and the stabilization 
of the situation; 
• OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (since 1995): the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords 
assigned to the mission the responsibility for elections, and human rights and regional military 
stabilization, with democracy-building added subsequently. These areas remain at the heart of its 
work today; 
• OSCE Mission to Croatia (since 1996): assists the government and other relevant civil-society 
groups in the fields of democratization, human rights, and the rule of law and supports the 
consolidation of internal peace; 
• OSCE Advisory and Monitoring Group in Belarus (1997-2002): assisted the Belarus authorities 
in promoting democratic institutions and in complying with other OSCE commitments;  
• OSCE Mission in Kosovo (since 1999): being the largest OSCE field operation, the mission 
forms a distinct component of the United Nations Interim Administration. It is mandated with 
institution and democracy-building and promoting human rights and the rule of law; 
• Armenia, OSCE Office in Yerevan (since 1999): contributes to the development of democratic 
institutions in Armenia, strengthening civil society and promoting OSCE standards and principles; 
• OSCE Mission to Serbia (since 2001): advises on the implementation of laws and monitors the 
proper functioning and development of democratic institutions and processes in Serbia. It assists law 
enforcement bodies and the judiciary in training and restructuring; 
• OSCE Presence in Albania (since 2003): provides assistance to Albanian authorities and civil 
society by promoting democratization, rule of law, human rights and by consolidating democratic 
institutions; 
• OSCE Mission to Montenegro (since 2006): provides support with the policy reform priorities 
and maintains a strategic partnership with civil society. It is engaged in supporting the reform 
processes, particularly on democratization, legislative reform, institution-building, police reform, and 
media reform. 
COOPERATION WITH THE UN 
The OSCE recognizes that the UN Security Council bears primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Thus, the UN is the OSCE’s primary partner 
organization. In 1992, the participating states declared the OSCE (at that time the CSCE) to be “a 
regional arrangement in the sense of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations”. In 1993, a 
Framework for Cooperation and Co-ordination between the United Nations Secretariat and the 
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CSCE was agreed upon, and in the same year the UN granted the CSCE observer status. Other 
arrangements between the two organizations include: a MoU (1993) on preventing and settling 
conflicts and practical implications of the OSCE as a regional arrangement; several MoUs (1998) 
between OSCE and UNHCR, OSCE and UNDP, as well as OSCE and IOM to act jointly on special 
arrangements; and a MoU between the OSCE, UNEP and UNDP on the Environment and Security 
Initiative (2003) establishing the ENVSEC Project Management Unit (PMU) for the overall 
administration and management activities. 
 
An OSCE document on the Cooperation between UN and Regional Organizations (SEC 
GAL/85/03 Vienna, 14 May, 2003) proposed a flexible framework for cooperation and suggested to 
develop a global approach to deal with current common challenges, with the UN being the 
coordinating centre. After 11 September, 2001, cooperation has been further enhanced to include 
active OSCE support for the work of the UN and its specialized bodies in the global efforts against 
terrorism.  
The shared UN-OSCE agenda includes: (i) ratification and implementation of the 12 Universal Anti-
terrorism Instruments and other initiatives to combat terrorism; (ii) conflict settlement and 
peacebuilding; (iii) early warning and conflict prevention; (iv) small arms and light weapons; (v) 
border management; (vi) environmental and economic aspects of security; (vii) anti-trafficking; (viii) 
democratization and human rights; and (iv) freedom of the media.  
The two organizations maintain close contacts and cooperation through elaborate mechanisms of 
high-level dialogue, as well as coordination and information-sharing at staff-level: 
 
• OSCE takes part in the annual high-level tripartite meetings between the respective Chairpersons 
and Secretaries General of the OSCE and the COE, and since 1993  with the Director General of 
the United Nations Office at Geneva, which is preceded by target-oriented meetings at staff level;  
• The organization is a constant participant, at the highest level, in the High Level Meetings between 
the UN and regional organizations, since their inception in 1994; and equally in the annual UN 
Security Council meetings with regional organizations on thematic issues related to peace and 
security, since 2003; 
• OSCE has observer status in the UN General Assembly, while the UN is invited to participate in 
the OSCE Ministerial Council and in the Summit meetings. UN representatives are frequently 
invited to address the OSCE Permanent Council. For instance, the UNSG regularly addresses the 
Committee of Senior Officials and OSCE Summits; 
• Representatives of relevant UN entities are invited to participate in main annual OSCE events, 
including the Permanent Council, the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, the Economic 
Forum and the Annual Security Review Conference;  
• Annual UN-OSCE staff-level meetings serve as a venue for exchanging information and 
coordinating activities; and informally, there are direct contacts between both Secretariats on joint 
statements; 
• OSCE proposals are submitted to UN Committees (contributions to reports) and the OSCE 
Chairman-in-Office reports to the UN Security Council (e.g. on Nagorno-Karabakh, Ossetia) and to 
the UNGA; 
• Furthermore, at the operational level, OSCE field operations cooperate closely with UN agencies 
and missions. For example, the OSCE Mission in Kosovo is an integral part of the UN Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK), and the OSCE Mission to Georgia supports the United Nations conflict 
settlement efforts in Abkhazia, Georgia.  
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Organization of the  
Islamic Conference (OIC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 
The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) was established in Rabat, Morocco, on 25 
September, 1969. The Charter of the organization was adopted three years later during the third 
Islamic Foreign Minister Conference, held in Rabat in February 1972. According to the Charter, the 
organization aims to take necessary measures to support international peace and security, founded 
on the principle of justice. It also aims at strengthening Islamic solidarity among member states; 
promoting cooperation in the political, economic, social, cultural and scientific fields; and 
encouraging “the struggle of all Muslim people to safeguard their dignity, independence and national 
rights”. The principles guiding the Charter of the Organization include non-interference in the 
internal affairs of the member states, the observation of the sovereignty, the independence and 
territorial integrity of each state, and the peaceful settlement of any dispute arising between member 
states through negotiation, mediation, conciliation and arbitration. OIC members also pledge to 
refrain from resorting to force or threatening to resort to the use of force against the unity and 
territorial integrity or the political independence of any one of them. The OIC currently has 57 
member states and 5 observer states coming from South America, Africa, the Middle East, Europe 
and Asia110. In March 2008, in Dakar, the OIC adopted a new charter unanimously set to replace the 
1972 version and it includes the principles of democracy, good governance and human rights. The 
main bodies of the OIC are: 
 
• The Conference of Kings and Heads of State and Government, or Islamic Summit Conference, convenes 
every three years but it may also decide to meet whenever the interest of Muslim Nations warrants. It 
is the supreme authority of the OIC. It determines the policy of the organization and elects the 
Chairman of the organization who holds office until the next Summit;  
 
• The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers (ICFM) is conveyed every year and brings together Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs or their officially accredited representatives. An extraordinary conference can be 
held at the request of any member state or at the request of the Secretary General, if approved by 
two-thirds of the member states. The ICFM adopts resolutions on matters of common interests and 
supervises the implementation and progress made in regard to the policies adopted by the 
                                                
110 The current member states are: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Benin, Brunei-
Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Gabon, The Gambia, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Palestine, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Yemen. The observer states are: Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Central African Republic, Thailand, Russia, and Turkish-Cyprus. 
            
                    
Founded in 1969 (First Islamic Summit Conference).  
Headquarters in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. 57 member states 
www.oic-oci.org/oicnew/home.asp  
 
Mandate in Peace and Security: 
. Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (1972/2008) 
. Convention on Combating International Terrorism (1999) 
. Ten-year Plan of Action (2005) 
 
 
The Islamic world has immense human and material resources which 
could be used to develop Joint Islamic Action. Therefore, the adoption 
of the OIC Ten-Year Program of Action has been very timely. 
EKMELEDDIN IHSANOGLU  
Secretary General of OIC (2007) 
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conference. The ICFM also adopts the OIC budget and appoints the Secretary General, for a four 
year mandate renewable once, and the assistant Secretaries General. Decision are reached by a two-
third majority vote; 
 
• The General Secretariat is headed by a Secretary General and also comprises four Assistant Secretary 
General. The current Secretary General is Dr. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu of Turkey, who started his 4-
year term in January 2005. The Secretariat is the executive organ of the OIC and is charged of the 
actual implementation of the decisions adopted at the Islamic Summit Conference and of the ICFM 
resolutions. The Secretariat supervises multiples specialized committees and organs that are 
established on an ad hoc basis, as well as the affiliated institutions and the standing committees. The 
Ten-year Plan of Action adopted in Mecca in 2005 empowered the Secretary General to prepare a 
new Charter in order to reform the OIC. It also established a mechanism for the follow-up of 
adopted resolutions by creating an Executive Body, comprising the Summit and Ministerial Troikas, 
the OIC host country, and the General Secretariat. 
 
Within the Secretariat a series of Specialized Committees have also been established in order to deal with 
specific conflicts and political issues. These Specialized Committees act as technical organs through 
which the OIC involves itself in peacemaking efforts either under its own initiative, upon the request 
of any of its member states, or under a decision of its Summit or Ministerial Conferences. The 
Specialized Committees include: 
 
• Ad-hoc Committee on Afghanistan, the OIC also has an external office for Afghanistan located in 
Kabul; 
• Ministerial Committee of Seven on Muslims in Southern Philippines, which manages the negotiations 
between the Government of the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF); 
• Six Member Committee on Palestine, which is chaired by the Secretary General of OIC; 
• Various Contact-Groups working on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Jammu and Kashmir, Sierra Leone, 
Somalia, the reform of the UN and the expansion of the Security Council. 
 
The OIC also has various different subsidiary organs that engage in a wide variety of activities, 
ranging from research centers and universities, to the Islamic Solidarity Fund and its waqf (religious 
endowment). 
 
Following its first Conference for Combating International Terrorism in 1999, the OIC adopted the 
Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism. 
This convention pushes for more collaboration among member states to prevent and combat 
international terrorism. The provisions made by the Convention include the development and the 
strengthening of measures to control arm flows between the member states. The Convention also 
calls for increased intelligence exchange among OIC members. The contracting states are also 
required to establish and share databases that collect and analyze data on terrorist elements, groups, 
movements and organizations, and monitor developments of the phenomenon of terrorism and 
successful experiences in combating it. 
 
The Ten-year Plan of Action adopted in Mecca in 2005 also makes specific calls for strengthening 
the role of the OIC in conflict prevention, confidence-building, peacekeeping, conflict resolution 
and post-conflict rehabilitation. Moreover, the current Secretary General, the Open Ended Working 
Group on the Review of the Charter, and some member states such as Turkey, Indonesia and 
Pakistan have appealed for the creation of a peacekeeping force operating under the chapter VIII of 
the UN Charter. 
RESOURCE CAPACITY 
The finances of the OIC are derived from contributions from member states. The Permanent 
Financial Committee prepares and controls budgets in accordance with the rules adopted by the 
Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers. In 2007, a budget of USD $17.6 million for the General 
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Secretariat was agreed. This amount excludes the budget of the subsidiary organs such as the Islamic 
Fiqh Academy (USD $2.1 million), the Statistical, Economic, and Social Research and Training 
Center for Islamic Countries (USD $2.5 million), and the Islamic Center for Development and Trade 
(USD $1.5 million). 
 
The Islamic Solidarity Fund for Development, a subsidiary organ of the organization established in 
May 2007, is financed through voluntary contribution from the member states. The capital of the 
Fund is targeted to be USD $10 billion in the form of a Trust. The Islamic Solidarity Fund for 
Development aims at combating poverty and its causes and tries to help Islamic countries in the 
world, and more specifically in Africa, to meet the Millennium Development Goals. 
 
The Organization of the Islamic Conference, alongside its various subsidiary organs and affiliated 
institutions, accounts for a staff of around 1500 persons. The Secretariat, based in Jeddah, has a staff 
of 140. 
 
Despite encompassing some of the countries contributing the highest number of troops to UN 
peacekeeping operations, the OIC does not have any peacekeeping facility or staff working 
specifically on peacekeeping. 
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Peacemaking 
Given the absence of a clear mandate, the operational experience of the OIC is limited in regard to 
peacekeeping. However, the OIC has been much more successful in peacemaking through the usage 
of quiet diplomacy including good offices and mediation by the Secretary General, the appointment 
of special envoys, as well as by convening emergency meetings on a case-by-case basis. The OIC has 
thus managed to be involved in conflict resolution through the establishment of specific committees 
to tackle with issues affecting member states or Muslim communities in non-member states. The 
OIC has used this mechanism to mediate in the following conflicts: 
 
• Israel-Palestine: the OIC was historically founded in reaction to events in Jerusalem, and the 
organization has given special attention to the Israel-Palestine issue since its inception. The OIC has 
mostly supported the Palestinian Authority, but it has also stressed the need for both parties to 
comply with UN resolutions and has made an effort to get the two parties to negotiate and 
implement a peace process;  
 
• Southern Philippines: the OIC became involved in the peace process to solve the conflict 
between the Moro separatists and the Government of the Philippines in 1972. The Secretary General 
and the Quadripartite Ministerial Committee (later to become the Ministerial Committee of Seven on 
Muslims in Southern Philippines) produced fact-finding reports and also called upon other 
international organizations to mediate the conflict. The OIC benefited in this instance from the 
important involvement of Libya; 
 
• Iran-Iraq war: a special committee, which became known as the Islamic Peace Committee, was set 
up after the third Islamic Summit in 1981. The inflexibility of the warring states did not help the 
work of the committee, and the OIC was unsuccessful in its mediation endeavors; 
 
• Afghanistan: in 1980, and following the first extraordinary session of the Islamic Conference of 
Foreign Ministers, the OIC established a ministerial committee with a mandate to promote peace 
and national reconciliation among the Afghan people. The Ad-Hoc Committee on Afghanistan also 
aims at promoting an intra-Afghan peace process and mobilizing assistance for the reconstruction 
and rehabilitation of the war-torn Afghan society; 
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• Bosnia and Herzegovina: the OIC Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina, established in 
1992, provided support to the peace process to resolve the conflict in the Balkans. The Sarajevo 
Declaration of the Friendship and Partnership adopted by the Enlarged Ministerial Meeting of the 
OIC Contact Group on Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Declaration on Bosnia adopted by the 
Ministerial Meeting of the Contact Group, both supported the Dayton Peace Agreement as well as 
the Action Program of the Peace Implementation Council for Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1999, the 
mandate of the Contact Group was enlarged to tackle the issue of Kosovo; 
 
• Jammu and Kashmir: the OIC Contact Group on Jammu and Kashmir has been involved in the 
resolution of the disagreement between India and Pakistan and has been promoting peace 
negotiations between the two countries since 1994. The Contact Group also delegated fact-finding 
missions to Jammu and Kashmir. The OIC has repeatedly called for the implementation of UN 
resolutions on the Jammu and Kashmir conflict. 
 
Peacebuilding 
The OIC has also been involved in peacebuilding effort in countries affected by conflicts. Through 
the Contact Groups on Sierra Leone and on Somalia, the OIC has involved itself in various 
humanitarian aid and development projects to help the local population. The ICFM created a Sierra 
Leone Reconstruction Fund to which OIC member states can make voluntary contributions in order 
to aid the Government of Sierra Leone in the domains of reconstruction, capacity-building, and 
rebuilding state structures in Sierra Leone. 
COOPERATION WITH THE UN 
The OIC has a long history of cooperating with the UN. The UN enjoys observer status at the OIC. 
In 1975, the OIC became an observer at the General Assembly and has opened offices in New York 
and in Geneva. Moreover, regular consultations between UN agencies and the OIC have taken place 
at different levels on important economic, political, social and humanitarian matters. For example, a 
MoU on technical cooperation in the field of Human Rights was signed between the OIC and 
UNHCR in 2006. The OIC had already signed a MoU with the United Nations Office of the High 
Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small 
Island Developing states (UN-OHRLLS) in 2005. Similarly, UNESCO, UNICEF and the Islamic 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO) have been collaborating and working 
together on various programs and projects. 
 
A General Meeting on Cooperation between the UN and the OIC was held in Rabat in July 2006. 
The meeting allowed the two organizations to review existing cooperation as well as the political 
issues of mutual concern. Special attention was given to the question of conflict prevention and 
resolution, countering terrorism, promotion of human rights, and the building of a culture of peace 
and dialogue between civilizations. With regard to the implementation of its Ten-year Plan of 
Action, the OIC has also stressed the importance of collaborating with the various UN organs and 
agencies. 
 
The UN has reached an understanding to provide capacity-building support to the OIC General 
Secretariat in the domain of human rights, electoral assistance, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, 
disarmament, terrorism, human trafficking, refugees, drug trafficking, organized crime and early 
warning. In this regard, the OIC and the OHCHR have finalized a draft agreement prepared by the 
OHCHR to assist the General Secretariat in building its capacity in the human rights area. 
Additionally, the UNHCR has organized training workshops and seminars on human rights and 
refugees issues. The OIC and the UN agreed to improve their coordination through the OIC's 
participation in inter-agency missions; the first such missions were established with regard to the 
situation in Sudan and in Darfur. Moreover, the OIC and the UN have agreed on staff exchanges at 
the directorial and desk officer level on an annual basis. The first exchanges were expected to occur 
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in 2007. Additionally, it was agreed that Consultative Meetings between the OIC, the Department of 
Political Affairs and the UN Mission to NY would be held no less than three times per year. 
 
Furthermore, the OIC has been a constant participant in the High Level Meetings between the UN 
and regional and other intergovernmental organizations since their inception in 1994, and also a 
participant in some UNSC meetings (namely in 2003, 2006, and 2007). 
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Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 
The Pacific Islands Forum is an intergovernmental organization, aiming to enhance cooperation 
between the independent countries of the Pacific Ocean and represent their interests. It was founded 
in 1971 as the South Pacific Forum, but in 2000 the name was changed to better reflect the 
geographic location of its 16 member states111 which are located in both in the north and south 
Pacific. The decisions of the Forum are implemented by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 
(PIFS), which grew out of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC). Together 
with its role in harmonizing regional positions on various political and policy issues, the Forum 
Secretariat has adopted technical programs in economic development, transport and trade.  
 
The constitutive treaty for the PIF Secretariat currently in force is the Agreement Establishing the 
Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (30 October, 2000). In 2004, as part of a range of 
recommendations to reform the Forum and strengthen regional cooperation and integration, leaders 
decided that its constitutive Agreement should be reviewed to reflect the new purposes and 
functions of the Forum (Auckland Declaration). As a result, the Pacific Plan was endorsed in 
October 2005, as was the new Agreement Establishing the Pacific Islands Forum (27 October, 
2005), which enshrined in law what had been agreed in policy and providing the needed legal basis. It 
also clearly established the PIF as an intergovernmental organization in accordance with international 
law. This Agreement will, however, only be in force when it is ratified by all sixteen members of the 
Forum– a process that is still pending. 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, security was not on the agenda of the Pacific organization. It was the 
Solomon Islands crisis and the Biketawa Declaration of 2000 that made the organization take a turn. 
Following the events in Fiji and the Solomon Islands, a special Forum Foreign Ministers Meeting 
was held in August 2000 in Apia, Samoa, to discuss the Fiji and Solomon Islands crises and to 
examine how the Forum could respond to similar problems in the future. This led to the 
establishment of a regional mechanism to respond to conflict situations in the region. As such, the 
Biketawa Declaration is a regional response to emerging threats to democratic principles, 
governance, human rights and the rule of law, having significantly broadened the organization’s 
mandate and widened its focus by placing regional security policy issues as a top priority. It is the 
premier regional mechanism that mandates a regional approach in meeting the challenge of long 
term peacebuilding and preventing the outbreak or recurrence of violent conflicts. 
  
                                                
111 The Forum’s member states are: Australia, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, 
the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. Since 2006, associate members territories are New Caledonia and French Polynesia. 
            
                     
                
Founded in 1971 (as South Pacific Forum). In 2000 it was named Pacific Islands 
Forum (Agreement Establishing PIF Secretariat) 
Headquarters in Suva, Fiji. 16 member states. 
www.forumsec.org 
 
Mandate for Peace and Security:  
. Biketawa Declaration, Article II (2000) 
. Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security (2002) 
. Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration (2005) 
. Agreement Establishing the Pacific Islands Forum (2005, ratification pending) 
“Our limited economic resource base and our remote location across the 
Pacific Ocean (…) make it imperative that we collaborate with the United 
Nations system (…)” 
 Papua New Guinea [on behalf of PIF], UNGA (2006)   
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With the Pacific Plan and the Agreement Establishing the PIF, the Forum established as its main 
purpose the strengthening of regional cooperation and integration with the shared goals of economic 
growth, sustainable development, global governance and security. The concept used is the human, 
multidimensional one, with no specific reference to conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peacemaking 
or peacebuilding. The decision-making organs of PIF are: 
 
• The Forum Leader’s Meeting is the pre-eminent decision-making body of the Forum, meeting 
annually. Special meetings can also be convened by the member states  as necessary; 
 
• The PIF’s administrative arm is the PIF Secretariat (headed by the Secretary General), based in Suva, 
Fiji. It implements the decisions formulated by the leaders, facilitates the delivery of development 
assistance to member states, and undertakes the political and legal mandates of the organization’s 
meetings. The current Secretary General is Greg Urwin (from Australia) serving his second three-
year mandate since 2007. The divisional structure of the PIF Secretariat is comprised of four main 
sections: Political, Legal and International; Economic and Social Development; Trade and 
Investment; and Corporate Services. The Political, Legal and International Division is also divided 
into four sections: Governance, Political Security, Law Enforcement, and International Relations. As 
a result of the Pacific Plan, however, the PIF is undergoing a restructuring towards eight programs, 
viz. Political and Security Governance; Good Governance; Sustainable Development; Enabling 
Mechanisms; Communications and Information; Trade; Economic Growth; and Corporate Services;   
 
• The Forum’s Official Committee (made up of representatives from all Forum governments) gives 
general policy directions to the Secretariat and oversees its activities, while reporting and giving 
recommendations to the Forum Leaders; 
 
• The Council of Regional Organizations in the Pacific (where the Secretary General is a permanent 
chair), brings together eleven main regional organizations in the Pacific Region (the Fiji School of 
Medicine, the PIF Fisheries Agency, the Pacific Islands Development Program, the University of the 
South Pacific, and the PIF Secretariat, among others). 
 
The Forum has no formal rules governing its operations or the conduct of its meetings. The agenda 
is based on reports from the Secretariat and decisions by the leaders are reached by consensus and 
are outlined in a Forum communiqué, from which policies are developed and a work program is 
prepared. The annual Forum meetings are chaired by the heads of government of the host country, 
who remain as Forum Chair until the next meeting. 
RESOURCE CAPACITY 
The Suva-based Secretariat has close to 100 employees who are responsible for facilitating, 
developing, and maintaining cooperation and consultation between the member states. The 
Secretariat is funded by contributions from member governments and donors, with a total budget of 
FJ $36 million (USD $23 million) in 2006.  
 
The organization’s capacity to take on an intensive peacemaking exercise is limited in what concerns 
personnel, expertise and financial matters. The PIF does not have or plan to have access to a 
standing regional armed force or police force capacity, and has no rapid deployment capacity. 
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Structural Prevention 
The PIF’s capacity to collect and analyze information regarding the ‘root causes’ of conflicts before 
they erupt is limited. However, a recent initiative to launch a comprehensive multifaceted study of 
land management issues in the context of conflict prevention is being undertaken (Land 
Management and Conflict Minimization Project). That is conceivably a 5-10 year multi-stakeholder 
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exercise, and will require extensive resources from within and outside the region. One individual 
within the organization has capacity in conflict analysis for particular situations and efforts will be 
made to extend that capacity throughout the organization, and within the region. In addition, efforts 
are being made to develop a conflict minimization strategy which includes a conflict impact 
assessment framework for all of the organization’s development activities. It could potentially 
expand to other Forum agencies, a peacebuilding and conflict prevention mainstreaming strategy, 
and development of a database of actors engaged in assistance activities in this arena. 
 
Early-warning 
The PIF has a mandate to monitor security issues as they develop, but currently, its mechanisms to 
provide early warning is ineffectual. Efforts to improve early warning mechanisms are being 
developed, essentially through the use of indicators. However, there are ongoing discussions  on the 
direct applicability of early warning indicators for the type of low-level conflicts that arise in the 
region (i.e. indicators might not provide the nuanced approach required to identify small scale but 
potentially high consequence incidents. Also, indicators rely to a high degree on good data, whose 
availability is a major problem in this region). Accordingly, the improvement of political analysis and 
assessment from both within the organization and from external networks, and possibly through 
retainer with an academic institution, is being considered. However, the PIF needs assistance in 
developing its Early Warning information system.  
 
Preventive Deployment 
Preventive deployment of troops or police personnel in times of crisis is not directly authorized 
under the constitution of the Forum, however it could be a measure agreed to if necessary by leaders 
under the Biketawa Declaration, or by an individual member on request of the member state 
concerned. The Forum has not deployed any troops and/or police into a crisis situation. However, 
police officers were assigned by individual countries to the Solomon Islands prior to the Regional 
Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), as part of the ‘regional’ solidarity to bring  
normalcy to the country.  
 
RAMSI: Solomon Islands 
RAMSI is seen both as a conflict prevention and a peacemaking  measure (securing law and order, 
disarmament, prosecution of conflict offenders), developed to address structural prevention issues 
(strengthening of core institutions – finance and budget control, courts, prisons and police services) 
moving eventually into a development phase of capacity building. Conceived as an intervention 
under the Biketawa Declaration, RAMSI was always intended to be a regional operation, under the 
auspices of the Forum and led by Australia. In terms of representation in the Mission, RAMSI has 
achieved a strong regional nature, particularly in the police and military arms. As of late 2006, all 
Forum members were contributing personnel to RAMSI. There have been a number of mechanisms 
through which RAMSI has been accountable to the Forum, including through regular reporting to 
Forum leaders and Foreign Ministers112. 
 
Peacemaking and Dispute Settlement 
Inter-state disputes are rare, and if they arise they tend to do so over specific issues which are most 
often dealt with bilaterally (e.g. the delimitation of maritime/continental shelf boundaries; trade 
issues). The Forum takes decisions on inter-state disputes by consensus. Meetings can be called by 
heads of government, Foreign Ministers or at official’s levels.  
 
The PIF has had limited engagement in peacemaking per se, in that up until the Biketawa 
Declaration, any intervention was, and still is to a great degree, dependant upon an invitation from 
the member state concerned. Under the Biketawa Declaration, there is an increased potential to 
intervene without the request of a member state, but to invoke this option against the will of the 
                                                
112 RAMSI Review Task Force Final Report, 17 June 2007. 
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member state concerned would be an unlikely event. Peacemaking efforts are addressed at a bilateral 
level or through a small group of regional actors independently of the PIF, e.g. the Bougainville and 
Solomon Islands peace processes were both initiated bilaterally (New Zealand in Bougainville and 
Australia in the Solomon Islands).  
 
The Good Offices function has been employed on many occasions, mainly through the 
establishment of ad-hoc Eminent Persons Groups (to undertake situation analyses) and Ministerial 
Missions (e.g. the Forum Ministerial Mission to New Caledonia, ongoing since 1993). Where 
appropriate, the collective support of neighbors of the region is encouraged to address security 
concerns and to provide a framework to address state failure. 
 
Peace Enforcement 
The PIF Secretariat does not have a specific “statutory” authority for robust peacekeeping in 
member countries, but it is given constitutional authority through members' ratification of its 
constituent Agreement, and a declaratory authority as agreed by its members. The Biketawa 
Declaration of 2000 was used to engage in peace enforcement in the Solomon Islands, under the 
Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. It was initially deployed as a conflict prevention 
mission, but its mandate was extended  to peacekeeping and peace enforcement. 
 
Peacebuilding – Election Monitoring 
The major peacebuilding operation was carried out in Nauru. In 2004, at the PIF Summit in Apia, 
the Forum “strongly supported Nauru’s request for Forum assistance under the Biketawa 
Declaration recognizing Nauru’s economic crisis and the threats this posed to its security and 
national stability”113 and established the Pacific Regional Assistance for Nauru (PRAN) covering 
many aspects of governance, economy and finances, social development and environment and 
population. 
 
Election observation activities have also been a current activity of the Forum, namely in Nauru and 
in Papua New Guinea in 2007, and in the Solomon Islands in 2006. In 2007, the PIF has also carried 
out a technical assessment of the election to be held in Fiji in 2009). 
COOPERATION WITH THE UN 
In the past, the PIF experienced some difficulties in getting attention from the UN and, thus, PIF-
UN relationship is still in its early stages. Contact tended to run along sectoral lines, such as climate 
change and development issues, and less on the overall institution-to-institution relationship. The 
Biketawa Declaration however, provides prospects for cooperation between the Forum and other 
international and regional organizations, such as the UN and the Commonwealth in the areas of 
preventive diplomacy and post-conflict peacebuilding and other related activities.  
 
Liaison with the UN is managed through an International and Regional Issues Adviser (formerly 
International Issues Adviser), but substantive issues are often dealt with at an individual Adviser 
level.  This has led to increased and more regular consultation between the Forum and the UN.  
 
Furthermore, the PIF has become a regular participant in the High Level Meetings since 2001, 
although not in the Security Council meetings with regional organizations (the PIF has not been 
invited to attend these meetings). The UN attends Forum-related meetings and vice-versa. 
Concerted effort from both the UNDPA and the PIF resulted in the first regional officials' meeting 
on peacebuilding and conflict prevention in April 2005. This was the first such engagement 
emanating from the High Level Meeting between the UNDPA and the PIF.  
 
                                                
113 Forum Communiqué, 35th PIF Summirt Apia, Samoa, 5-7 August 2004, para. 26. 
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There have been no joint field operations between the UN and the PIF specific to a post-conflict 
area. The recent electoral monitoring mission to Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, was, however, a 
multi-organizational effort. Coordination and collaboration on that exercise could have been 
improved. Furthermore, a common conflict prevention database is currently being developed 
internally within the PIF and will later engage with UN agencies.  
 
The PIF has not engaged with other regional or sub-regional organizations on peace and security 
missions, with exception to short-term assignments (electoral monitoring) with the Commonwealth 
of Nations and UN Staff in Bougainville (Papua New Guinea), Nauru and the  Solomon Islands.  
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Shanghai Cooperation  
Organization (SCO) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was established on 15 June, 2001 in Shanghai, China. The 
organization was formed on the basis of the so-called “Shanghai Five”, a forum which was created in 
1996 by Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with the aim to start a dialogue on 
trust and disarmament in the border regions of the five countries. The five signed the Shanghai 
Agreement on Confidence Building in the Military Fields in the Border Area (26 April, 1996) and the 
Agreement on Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas (24 April, 1997). The 
cooperation among the states gradually extended to cooperation in the sphere of politics, security, 
diplomacy, trade, and culture. At the summit on the occasion of the Fifth anniversary of the 
organization, the leaders of the Shanghai Five and the president of Uzbekistan decided to strengthen 
their cooperation and signed the Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization. The Charter of the newly established organization was signed in St. Petersburg 
(Russia) on 7 June, 2002.  Mongolia (since 2004) and India, Iran and Pakistan (since July 2005) are 
observers to the organization.114 115 On 16 August, 2007, the member states signed the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization's Treaty on Long-Term Good Neighborly, Friendship and Cooperation. 
For the moment, it is still unclear what the significance of this Treaty is since the text has not been 
made public. 
 
The main goals of SCO are: i) strengthening mutual trust and good-neighborly friendship among the 
member states; ii) encouraging effective cooperation among the member states in political, economic 
and trade, scientific and technological, cultural, educational, energy, communications, environment 
and other fields; ii) devoting themselves jointly to preserving and safeguarding regional peace, 
security and stability; and iv) establishing a democratic, fair and rational new international political 
and economic order. The main areas of cooperation are security and the economy. The security 
cooperation used to encompass mainly border safety, but nowadays it includes the fight against 
terrorism, separatism and extremism, which is described in documents as a fight against “three 
evils”. 
 
The Organization is based on the so-called “Shanghai Spirit”, which is mentioned in the Declaration 
on the establishment of SCO, and explained as a model of inter-state relations and regional 
cooperation with as its main principles:  non-alignment, openness to the rest of the world, mutual 
trust and benefits, equality, consultations, respect for diversified civilizations, and mutual 
development. SCO organs are: 
 
• The Council of Heads of State is the supreme, decision-making body of the organization. It determines 
the SCO's priorities and major areas of activity, and it holds its regular meeting once a year; 
                                                
114 The request by the USA for observer status was turned down. 
115 The SCO holds regular meetings with Afghanistan through the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group. 
                  
               
“The goals proclaimed by the Organization in the fields of security, regional and 
world politics echo the most pressing tasks facing the international community. 
Therefore it is no accident that the SCO appears attractive to many partners” 
          BOLAT NURGALIEV  
SCO Secretary-General 
Founded in 2001 (The Declaration on the Establishment of SCO)  
Headquarters in Beijing, China. 6 member states. 
www.sectsco.org 
 
Mandate in Peace and Security:  
. Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism (2001) 
. SCO Charter, Preamble and art.1 (2002) 
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• The Council of the Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) adopts the budget and takes decisions on key 
economic issues. The Council meets once a year; 
 
• The Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the day-to-day activities of the 
organization. The Council is also responsible for the preparation of the meetings of the Council of 
Heads of State. The Council meets a month prior to the meeting of Council of Heads of States; 
 
• The Council of National Coordinators serves as the coordination mechanism within the SCO 
framework. It coordinates and manages the routine activities of the Organization. The Council 
makes preparations for the meetings of all the other Councils’ meetings. The Council holds a 
meeting at least three times a year.     
 
According the decision of the Council of Heads of States and the Council of Heads of Government, 
the meeting of heads of branch ministries and/or agencies of the member states will take place on 
regular basis. 
 
The organization has two permanent bodies:  
 
• The Secretariat, which is in charge of the budget, personnel, institutional functions, operating 
procedures, and technical support of the organization’s activities. It was launched on 15 January, 
2004. It is headed by a Secretary-General, who is appointed for a three-year term; and four Deputy 
Secretaries General. Since 1 January, 2007, the Secretary-General is Bolat Kabdylkhamitovich 
Nurgaliev (Kazakhstan). The headquarters of Secretariat are in Beijing, China;  
 
• The Regional Antiterrorist Structure (RATS) with its headquarters in Tashkent (Uzbekistan) was 
launched on 17 June, 2004. The Council is the decision-making and leading body of RATS. Its main 
objectives and functions are: i) maintaining working contacts with the main administrative body of 
the SCO member-states and strengthening coordination with international organizations on matters 
of struggle against terrorism, separatism and extremism; ii) participating in preparing drafts of 
international legal documents on matters of struggle against terrorism, separatism and extremism, 
and taking measures to establish, together with the UN Security Council and its antiterrorist 
committee, international and regional organizations, the mechanism of effective regulation of global 
challenges and threats; iii) gathering and analyzing information, provided by the member states, on 
matters of struggle against terrorism, separatism and extremism, creating a databank of antiterrorist 
structure, and presenting considerations on building up cooperation by the Organization in struggle 
against “three evils”; and iv) preparing and holding scientific-research conferences, and exchanging 
experience on matters of struggle against terrorism, separatism and extremism. 
RESOURCE CAPACITY 
In 2004, Zhang Deguang, Secretary-General of the new SCO Secretariat, told the press that the SCO 
annual budget totaled USD $3.5 million, of which USD $2.16 million was allocated to the Secretariat. 
The rest was the budget of the SCO regional anti-terror center, the other permanent SCO organ. 
According to Zhang, China and Russia shoulder 24 percent of the annual fee each, while Kazakhstan 
bears 21 percent, Uzbekistan 15 percent, Kyrgyzstan 10 percent, and Tajikistan 6 percent. 
 
The Secretariat has 30 permanent employees.  
 
The financing of RATS is shared between the member states, with Russia and China providing 25 
percent each, Kazakhstan 21 percent, and the other members proportionally less. The initial 2004 
budget was USD $3.1 million. The RATS has 30 staff members. 
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OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
The activity which has been most elaborated by the organization is collaboration on defense issues, 
energy security, and the fight against terrorism, where the latter is guided by the Shanghai 
Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism (2001). To strengthen the efforts 
and aims of the SCO to combat terrorism, the organization undertook a joint anti-terror drill named 
”Peace Mission 2007” in the beginning of August 2007 (9-17 August). The mission began in Urumqi, 
the capital of China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region, and then moved to Chelyabinsk in the Ural 
mountain region of Russia. It was the first drill in the history of the organization attended by the 
troops of all member states. Previous drills were undertaken on bilateral level between China and 
Russia, particularly “Peace Mission 2005”, attended by the other SCO members, acting as observers. 
The trilateral antiterrorism exercise “Vostok-Antiterror 2006” was carried out in July 2006 between 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and administered by RATS. 
 
On 15 May, 2006 the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs adopted regulations on SCO Observer 
missions at presidential and/or parliamentary elections, as well as referendums. Observers are 
dispatched according to a decision of Secretary General and after obtaining an invitation from a 
particular member state. In October 2007, the Observers Mission participated in the referendum 
undertaken in Kyrgyzstan. In November/December 2007 the preparation and conduct of 
parliamentary elections in Russia was monitored by SCO observers. 
COOPERATION WITH THE UN 
The SCO acquired the status of General Assembly observer on 2 December, 2004 (GA Resolution 
59/48). Afterwards, the SCO established contacts with ESCAP, UNDP and other subordinate UN 
departments.  
 
Besides its presence in the UN General Assembly Meetings as an observer, the SCO has also 
participated in the High Level Meetings between the UN and the Regional and other 
Intergovernmental Organizations since 2003. As for the Security Council Meetings with the Regional 
Organizations, the SCO has not yet been invited to attend. However, the organization is mentioned 
often by UNSC members (such as China and Russia) and might be invited to future meetings. 
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Southern African  
Development Community (SADC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 
The Treaty that laid the foundation for the SADC was signed in Windhoek, Namibia, on 17 August, 
1992, and entered into force on 30 September, 1993. SADC replaced the Southern African 
Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC), which was established in April 1980 by the 
governments of the nine Southern African countries of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe116. The goal of the SADCC was to foster 
regional economic cooperation, and diminish economic dependence to apartheid states.  
 
The resolutions of the ‘SADC Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security’, held in Windhoek in 
July, 1994, paved the way for the formal involvement of the SADC in the field of security, conflict 
mediation and military cooperation117. Two years later, SADC Foreign Ministers recommended the 
establishment of a SADC Organ for Politics, Defense and Security, which would allow for more 
flexibility and timely response, at the highest level, to sensitive and potentially explosive situations. 
The Organ was formalized in the Gaborone Communiqué of 28 June, 1996. According to its 
mandate, the Organ operates in seven clusters: in military issues; peacemaking, peacekeeping and 
peace enforcement; conflict prevention, management and resolution; crime prevention; intelligence; 
foreign policy; and human rights. In 2001, once tension abated amongst SADC members118, the 
heads of state and government signed the Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation at 
a Summit in Blantyre, Malawi, which clarified the goals and determined the structure of the Organ. 
According to the Preamble of the Protocol, the SADC operates in peace and security under Chapter 
                                                
116The current member states of SADC are: Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Seychelles (withdrew in 2003 and re-joined in 2008), Tanzania, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
117 Between 1992 and 1994, the SADC Secretariat coordinated the formulation of a regional policy on peace and 
security. The SADC’s Framework and Strategy document called for the forging of common political values based 
on democratic norms, the creation of a non-militaristic security order, and the establishment of mechanisms for 
conflict prevention, management and resolution. This process culminated in the SADC Workshop on Democracy, 
Peace and Security. 
118 For instance, at the SADC Summit in August 1997, South African President Nelson Mandela, then acting 
Chairman of the SADC, threatened to resign if the SADC Organ was not brought under the control of the central 
SADC Chair. This dispute between Mandela and Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe, who headed the SADC 
Organ, led the SADC Summit to suspend its Organ. Laurie Nathan describes the reasons for the early straitjacketing 
of the Organ: absence of common values, institutional weakness, and lack of commitment. See “Organ Failure: A 
Review of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security” in Liisa Laakso (ed.), Regional Integration for Conflict 
Prevention and Peacebuilding in Africa: Europe, SADC and ECOWAS, Helsinki: University of Helsinki. See also 
L.M.Fisher and N.Ngoma (2005). “The SADC Organ: Challenges in the New Millennium”, ISS Occasional Paper 114. 
Founded in 1992 (Treaty of SADC).  
Headquarters in Gaborone, Botswana. 14 member states.  
www.sadc.int 
 
Mandate in Peace and Security: 
. Treaty of SADC, art. 11(1992);  
. Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (2001); 
. Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on Politics, Defense and  
  Security Cooperation (2001) 
. Mutual Defense Pact (2003) 
 
 
“(…) the political and security agendas of SADC and 
the African Union are not mutually exclusive” 
PAKALITHA BETHUEL MOSISILI 
Chairperson of the SADC Organ (2004) 
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VIII of the UN Charter. In this light, it reaffirms the primary responsibility of the UN Security 
Council in maintaining international peace and security.  
 
In order to give some strategic direction and fulfill the Organ's capacity, the SADC has produced, in 
2001, an Indicative Strategic Plan, divided into four sectors: political, defense, state security, and 
public security, which pinpoints the challenges, determines the objectives, and suggests 
strategies/activities to address them. As concerns the prevention and resolution of conflicts, the Plan 
encourages the contribution of civil society, suggests the development of appropriate policies for the 
social reintegration of ex-combatants, and recommends the definition of common standards to 
identify conflicts. In the field of democratization and human rights protection, the Plan suggests 
establishing an SADC Electoral Commission, and indicates the need to create a Regional 
Commission for the promotion of, and the respect for, human rights. Finally, the Plan establishes a 
new sub-structure within the SADC Secretariat: the Department for Politics, Defense and Security, 
which is comprised of a Directorate for Politics and Diplomacy, a Directorate for Defense and 
Security, and a Strategic Analysis Unit, also responsible for the early warning Situation Room. 
 
Also, in 2003, the SADC adopted a Mutual Defense Pact, in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, whereby, “An 
arm attack against a State Party shall be considered a threat to regional peace and security and such 
an attack shall be met with immediate collective action” (Art.6-1). By taking this step, the SADC 
became constitutionally equipped to operate not only as a Chapter VIII organization, but also as an 
alliance organization, with latitude of action under Art.51 of the UN Charter. 
 
The main decision-making bodies of SADC are: 
 
• The Summit of Heads of State and Government is the ultimate policy-making institution of the SADC. It 
is responsible for the overall policy direction and controls the functions of the Community; 
 
• The Troika system, effective since the 1999 Maputo Summit, consists of the Chair, Incoming Chair 
and the Outgoing Chair of the SADC. Other member states may be co-opted into the Troika as and 
when necessary. This system has enabled the Community to execute tasks and implement decisions 
expeditiously, as well as provide a policy direction to SADC institutions in between regular SADC 
meetings; 
 
• The Council of Ministers consists of ministers from each member state, usually from the Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs and Economic Planning or Finance. The Council is responsible for overseeing the 
functioning and development of the SADC, and ensuring that policies are properly implemented. 
The Council usually meets twice a year in January, and just before the Summit in August or 
September;  
  
• The Integrated Committee of Ministers had its inaugural meeting in March 2003 in Luanda, Angola. It is 
mandated by the Summit to oversee the work of the Secretariat. It serves as an umbrella policy organ 
for all SADC Program of Action activities and bears responsibility for the implementation of the 
Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan. It reports directly to the Council of Ministers. At 
least two ministers from each member state are expected to attend the Integrated Committee of 
Ministers meetings. The Integrated Committee of Ministers is expected to meet at least twice a year; 
 
• The Secretariat is the principal executive institution of the SADC, responsible for the strategic 
planning, coordination and management of SADC programs. It is headed by an Executive Secretary, 
Tomáz Augusto Salomão from Mozambique (who was appointed at the Botswana Summit in August 
2005 for a period of four years). The Botswana Summit also appointed João Samuel Caholo of 
Angola as Deputy Executive Secretary, for a period of four years; 
 
• The Organ on Defense, Politics and Security Cooperation is responsible for promoting peace and security 
in the region. It reports to the SADC Summit and is headed by a troika. The SADC Summit and 
Organ Troikas are mutually exclusive. A Ministerial Committee comprised of the ministers responsible 
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for foreign affairs, defense, public security and state security from each of the member states reports 
to the Chairperson, and is responsible for the coordination of the work of the Organ and its 
structures. Ministers of Foreign Affairs of each member state perform the functions of the Organ 
relating to politics and diplomacy within the Inter-state Politics and Diplomacy Committee. Ministers for 
Defense, Public Security and State Security work through the Inter-state Defense and Security Committee. 
  
The Organ is currently chaired by Angola (until mid-2008), and will be followed by Lesotho. 
Associated with these institutions, the Regional Peacekeeping Training Center, located in Harare, became a 
full-fledged SADC organ in August 2005. The SADC's goal is to transform it into a Center of 
Excellence for training in peace support operations, thus enhancing its capacity to respond to 
conflict and to maintain stability within the region. So far, however, the Center is almost at a 
standstill because of a lack of funding, even if some courses have been held in 2007-2008119. 
 
Unlike the AU and ECOWAS, the SADC does not, therefore, have a Peace and Security Council, or 
a committee with reduced membership that acts on behalf of member states. Instead, all countries 
are involved within its peace and security framework below the heads of state level. The function of 
the SADC and Organ troikas is to serve as a ‘steering committee’ so that decisions ultimately depend 
upon agreement at Summit level. These security institutions are important steps towards the 
operationalization of peace and security in the sub-region, but they remain mostly empty structures 
waiting to be filled through the implementation of policies and actions. 
  
Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement 
Although the organization recognizes the strict respect for sovereignty and the territorial integrity of 
each member state (Preamble of Protocol), it has a mandate to prevent, contain and resolve not only 
inter-state, but also intra-state conflicts (Protocol, Art.2-e; Art.11-1c), through peacekeeping or peace 
enforcement. This enforcement capacity derives from Article 53 of the UN Charter and it 
presupposes authorization from the UN Security Council (Protocol, Art.11-3d). In 2004, the 
Interstate Defense and Security Committee met in Maseru, Lesotho, and mandated the Ministerial 
Defense Sub-Committee to assemble a technical team to plan the setting up of an SADC Standby 
Brigade (SADCBRIG). The SADC is currently preparing procedures for the establishment of this 
joint military unit. Although this Standby Brigade, created under the framework of the African 
Standby Force, was officially launched in Zambia, in August 2007, it faces some obstacles: (i) a lack 
of physical headquarters; (ii) largely dysfunctional national armies with different military doctrines; 
(iii) a lack of civilian a dimension (e.g. police, rule of law); and (iv) a lack of a clear cut strategy and 
doctrine (the size and type of national contributions abide more by national constrains than by any 
SADCBRIG strategy). Even though some states in the southern region have engaged in common 
regional military exercises120, none has been conducted under the frame of SADCBRIG.  
 
Currently, SADCBRIG is led by a South African General. The only physical structure of 
SADCBRIG is the Planning Element. Currently, it has a staff of 12, even though the goal is to add 3 
people from the Troika/Presidency and 3 from the Troika/Organ (18 in total). The Planning 
Element is subdivided in different sections: operations, logistics and communications. Although it is 
difficult to forecast the shape of SADCBRIG, it is likely to become a loose force that will only be 
mustered when there is a compelling need to do so. If so, it will often be dependent on the national 
interests of the major players in the region. 
 
                                                
119 According to the Center, the following considerations have been taken into account during the planning of this 
year’s training calendar: (i) avoidance of duplication between national training and regionally coordinated training; 
(ii) answer the SADC’s Standby Force’s training needs; (iii) deepening integration in the region in the area of 
Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation; and (iv) preparations for possible deployment as provided in 
deployment scenarios of the SADC Standby Force. In 2007-2008, the Center held the following courses: civil 
military coordination; conflict management and resolution; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-
combatants (DDR); the SADC peace support course; basic French for peacekeepers; and the law of armed conflict.  
120 Blue Hungwe (1997, in Zimbabwe), Blue Crane (1999, in South Africa), Tanzanite (2002, in Tanzania); Air-
Borne Africa (2002, in Botswana), Exercise Thokgamo (2005, in Botswana). 
 137 
Conflict Prevention 
The SADC is also mandated to engage in operational conflict prevention through “preventive 
diplomacy, negotiations, conciliation, mediation, good offices, arbitration, and adjudication by an 
international tribunal” (Protocol, Art. 11-3a). However, it still lacks a conflict prevention strategy 
based on its endogenous security dynamics. On the contrary, some embassies in the region – such as 
UK and US – have developed their own conflict prevention guidelines. No major conflict prevention 
activity has been carried out by the SADC. 
 
In the late 1980s, the SADC created a regional early warning system (REWS) to advance information 
on food security through analysis and monitoring of food crop production prospects, food supplies, 
and requirements in order to alert member states and the humanitarian community of impending 
food shortages in sufficient time for appropriate interventions to be made. Later in 2001, the SADC 
Organ adopted a new agenda and provided for the establishment of an, “Early warning system in 
order to facilitate timeous action to prevent the outbreak and escalation of conflict” (Protocol, 
Art.11-3b). This conflict warning system is to be linked with REWS121. Presently, the system is being 
developed and it is based on classified intelligence information. However, no involvement of civil 
society has been established. The SADC is in the process of creating a Situation Room and recruiting 
the necessary analysts.  
 
Overall, the organizational capacity of the SADC in peace and security is lukewarm. First, it still lacks 
a clear vision on how to address the insecurity facing the region and, second, it has been wrecked by 
divisions among its members. In addition, none of the potential leaders in the region – South Africa 
and Zimbabwe – are playing a leading role. The first is because of its apartheid history and short 
experience in the international scene, while the latter is due to its severe national problems.  
RESOURCE CAPACITY 
The SADC Secretariat is small, politically weak, and donor dependent. Yet the SADC is in the 
process of rapid expansion of its staff, headquarters, and budget plan. In the Council of Ministers 
Meeting held in Lesotho in March 2007, the Secretariat budget for the year 2007/2008 was approved 
in the amount of USD $45.3 million. For the year 2006/07, the estimated revenue and expenditure 
for SADC institutions totaled USD $40.4 million, financed by a contribution of USD $16.5 million 
from the member states, and through grants of USD $23.8 million from the international 
community. 
 
The headquarters of the organization, in Gaborone, are going through a significant overhaul. Upon 
its completion, it will house 250 personnel, and is expected to cost the SADC USD $25 million, 
which will be amortized over 15 years through member state contributions. However, for the time 
being, the staff of the SADC include approximately 200 people, of which only about 30-40 are 
committed to issues of peace and security. 
 
It is equally important to retain the fact that the European Commission will make EUR €135 million 
available to the SADC, under a joint regional indicative program to support regional economic 
integration122. EU support for hard infrastructure will be through national indicative programs as 
well as the EU-Africa Partnership for Infrastructure, which is presently under development. 
Approximately 80 percent of the SADC’s budget comes from external donors, largely from the EU. 
Despite the fact that peace and security are not focal sectors in EC interventions, the EC planned to 
fund an Integrated Peace and Security Program (with a nominal allocation under RIP 6 million). The 
proposed intervention is supposed to have 2-3 components: a successor of the SADC Regional Drug 
                                                
121 Following an instruction from the Ministerial Committee of the Organ meeting in Maputo in July 2003, the 
ISDSC approved the conceptual principles on which the SADC early warning system is to be based. In July 2004, 
the 25th meeting of the ISDSC mandated a team of experts from the SADC and Organ troikas to initiate the 
establishment of the regional early warning system, which has not yet been finalized. 
122 X EDF RSP/RIP (2007-2013) 
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Control Program; assistance to the regional peacekeeping training centre; and measures for 
controlling the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in southern Africa. 
OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Peacekeeping and enforcement 
Although the SADC has adopted a comprehensive and fairly agile organizational structure to handle 
issues of peace and security, it still has a limited record in the field. In the area of peacekeeping and 
enforcement, SADC’s interventions have been as follows:  
 
• Lesotho (1998): on 22 September, 1998, South African troops entered Lesotho to prevent 
mutinous soldiers of the Royal Lesotho Defense Force (RLDF) from staging a military coup. The 
South African contingent was part of a SADC Combined Task Force. Their objectives were to 
prevent a military coup, to disarm the mutineers, and to create a safe and stable environment for the 
diplomatic initiative to find a peaceful solution to the political crisis in Lesotho. However, because of 
the way in which the intervention was authorized, structured and deployed, it has been marred by 
overall criticism. Critics point out that the intervention was a South African intervention aimed at 
entrenching the rule of the governing Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) party. The 
intervention in Lesotho did not have the approval of the UN Security Council; 
 
• Democratic Republic of Congo (1998): the military intervention in DRC by Angola, Namibia 
and Zimbabwe has also been widely discussed, and views differ as to the appropriateness of the 
action. The participating countries argued that they where acting on the basis of collective self-
defense. The fact that only some members of SADC participated has sparked controversy. There 
were claims of an intense internal rivalry in SADC. The intervention by only three member states 
was facilitated by the fact that until its 2002 restructuring, the Organ had more independence from 
the rest of the SADC's institutions. The military intervention was only retroactively recognized by 
the SADC. The intervention in DRC did not have the approval of the UN Security Council. 
 
Peacemaking 
Besides peacekeeping and enforcement, the SADC has also been active in peacemaking. For 
instance, in October 1994, SADC members strongly pressured Mozambican RENAMO leader 
Afonso Dlakhama not to withdraw from the elections in Mozambique. Also in the late 1990s, the 
presidents of South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe paid ‘fatherly visits’ to King Mswati III of 
Swaziland to advice him not to curb popular democratic demands. 
 
Finally, the SADC also has experience with election observation. It observed elections in Botswana 
(2004), Democratic Republic of Congo (2006), Lesotho (2002, 2007), Madagascar (2006), Malawi 
(2004), Mauritius (2005), Mozambique (2005), Namibia (2000, 2004), Tanzania (2005), Zambia 
(2001), Zambia (2006), and Zimbabwe (2002, 2005). In 2004, it adopted the SADC Principles and 
Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections. 
COOPERATION WITH THE UN 
The SADC participates in the High Level Meetings between the UN and Regional Organizations 
(for the first time in the 4th HLM in 2001). Additionally, the UN Department of Political Affairs has 
the practice of holding consultations with the SADC delegation during the regular session of the 
General Assembly, when SADC sends a delegation. The SADC gained observer status at the UN 
General Assembly on 2 December, 2004 (A/RES/59/49).  
 
In 2001, the Department for Disarmament Affairs consulted with the SADC to establish an 
appropriate framework of cooperation between the two organizations in disarmament-related issues. 
This cooperation covers the following areas: the establishment of regional transparency mechanisms 
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with respect to small arms and light weapons holdings and transfers, including databases for 
information sharing; the social reintegration of ex-combatants and the implementation of weapons 
collection projects; the provision of specialized disarmament training to government officials in the 
region; and assistance in the mobilization of financial and technical resources to implement the 
above activities. 
 
The Department of Peacekeeping Operations continues to strengthen its cooperation with SADC in 
support of peace efforts in the sub-region, including those aimed at enhancing the African 
peacekeeping capacity. The Department participated in a number of sub-regional peacekeeping 
seminars and exercises. In March 2000, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research 
(UNITAR), in collaboration with the SADC’s Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, implemented 
an annual UNITAR-RPTC Training Program to Enhance Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding in 
Harare, Zimbabwe. Following the contested elections in Zimbabwe, however, donors withdrew 
support for the Centre. 
 
In addition, the FAO is cooperating at the regional level with the SADC's Early Warning System, the 
SADC Food Security Unit, and its Regional Communication for Development Centre. The FAO 
also launched a regional program covering SADC member states on the preparation of drought 
mitigation and prevention strategies. The World Food Program's (WFP) sub-regional office in 
Mozambique provides technical and financial support to SADC countries in the area of vulnerability 
assessment and the building of disaster management capacity. The WFP has provided food aid to 
some one million people in Angola and to some 70,000 Angolan refugees in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, in addition to implementing a large program of food aid and development 
projects for over a million people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo itself. 
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 a) ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 
 
The organizational capacity of a UN partner to undertake peace and security depends on two 
aspects: (i) the constitutional provisions according it the mandate to become active; and (ii) the 
institutional mechanisms through which it can function and exercise that mandate. All organizations 
surveyed, with the exception of CPLP, CARICOM, and the Commonwealth, have adopted 
constitutional provisions to engage in peace and security. Often, it is the founding document of 
the organization that accords it the capacity to operate in this area (e.g. the Constitutive Act of the 
AU; the Charter of the CSTO; the Treaty of the EU; or the Charter of the OIC). However, most 
organizations have adopted more specific legal protocols that supervise and establish benchmarks on 
how the organizations operate in peace and security. For instance, in Africa, the AU has adopted the 
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council; and ECOWAS the 
Protocol for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, whereas in 
other regions, PIF has adopted the “Biketawa Declaration”, CIS has signed the Concept of 
Prevention and Resolution of Conflicts in the Territory of CIS Member States, and LAS has adopted 
the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Between Arab States. These 
specific conventions either cover the full spectrum of conflict or focus on specific sectors. Of all 
organizations surveyed, only the CPLP, CARICOM and COMSEC have not adopted any legal 
framework to engage in peace and security. Even if they have operational experience in these areas, 
the organizations have neglected the need to adopt constitutional provisions. There are no 
indications that they will rectify the situation soon.  
 
In terms of structure, all organizations surveyed in this study have proved to have an appropriate 
organic structure. In terms of the division of power and labor, the pinnacle is usually centered on the 
Summit of Heads of State and Government (designated, for instance, as ‘Assembly’ in the case of 
the AU, the OAS and IGAD, ‘Conference’ in ECCAS, or ‘Meeting’ in COMSEC), which lays out the 
general guidelines and provides strategic orientation. Under its strict dependency, a ministerial organ 
composed of Defense Ministers and/or Foreign Ministers of all member-states is generally tasked 
with implementing the decisions emanating from the Summit, and to elaborate work programs in 
their respective areas of intervention (e.g. the ‘Council of Ministers’ of the ECCAS or IGAD, the 
‘Executive Council’ of the AU, or the ‘Ministerial Committee’ of the SADC). In conjunction with 
this ministerial organ, some organizations have established a committee composed of only Defense 
officials that examine all technical and administrative issues and evaluate the prerequisites for 
intervening in conflicts (e.g. the ‘Defense and Security Commission’ of the ECOWAS and ECCAS, 
or the LAS' Permanent Military Commission). Larger organizations, such as the AU, ECOWAS, or 
LAS, have set up a more executive organ – which does not include all member states – responsible 
for the formulation and implementation of key political decisions associated with conflict 
prevention, peacekeeping, or enforcement. In the case of ECOWAS, it is the ‘Mediation and Security 
Council’ that fulfills this role, in the AU this function is attributed to the ‘Peace and Security 
Council’, whereas in LAS it is the ‘Arab Peace and Security Council’.  In the case of the AU, 
ECOWAS, and the EU, which have ventured into the realm of supra-nationality, a Commission 
which manages day-to-day tasks and implements the organizations’ policies was also created.  
 
Apart form the general organic structure of the organizations, it is important to assess their 
organizational capacities in the specific areas of conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace 
enforcement, and peacebuilding: 
 
Conflict Prevention 
 
1. Almost all organizations undertake conflict prevention measures. The AU, IGAD and 
ECOWAS in Africa, and the EU in Europe, maintain conflict prevention centers with early 
warning systems in place, including in the field in some cases. The EU, specifically, has 
developed a sophisticated conflict prevention mechanism for early warning on potential 
conflict areas on a global basis. However, it lacks a mechanism for its own member states.  
This is based on the political assumption, borne of experience, that its unique integration 
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movement has successfully rendered the prospect of conflict among its own member states 
unthinkable. Other organizations, such as the SADC, ECCAS, OAS, IOF, PIF, or the LAS, 
have a legal mandate to establish early warning measures, but they are either still non-existent 
or dysfunctional. Indeed, the LAS has been mandated by its 2006 Statutes of the Arab Peace 
and Security Council to set up an early warning mechanism, which has not yet materialized. 
The OAS does not have a specialized EW unit, but is working to enhance its capacity in this 
area under its new preventive strategy through political analysis, data banks, and the 
development of indicators. The EW mechanisms of the ECCAS and SADC, on the other 
hand, suffer from grave financial and human limitations, which have led to virtual paralysis;   
 
2. Other regional and sub-regional agencies have informal methods of monitoring potential crisis 
spots within their jurisdictional zones. Specifically, the OSCE – despite various declarations 
stressing the importance of EW – does not have, or plan to have, a specialized full-time EW 
unit, nor does it use specific EW indicators or parameters to assess potential crisis areas. It 
does, however, have desk officers mandated to monitor countries and regions for EW 
indications, and it has used external consultants and public databases to this end. It does 
acknowledge the need for improvement in its EW – through greater focus and resources.  The 
CoE lacks a specific mandate for EW, but its various standard-setting and monitoring bodies 
(in human rights, minorities and democracy) contribute to an overall regional knowledge base 
in this respect. The CPLP, although not exclusively geared to early warning, has used in one 
instance a temporary mission in a crisis situation operating as an early warning mechanism. 
The IOF has established both a Conflict Prevention, Conflict Management and Peace 
Consolidation Division, and an Observatory which monitors democracy, rights and freedoms;  
 
3. It is widely recognized that early warning is an essential part of an effective conflict prevention 
strategy.  Progress in institutionalizing an effective early warning function in the organizations, 
however, has been hampered for some time by various sensitivities, namely: (i) the use of 
official intelligence in an otherwise transparent forum; (ii) the sanctity of the principle of 
sovereign equality; and (iii) concern that an explicit and shared identification of a potential 
crisis situation may be a negative instrumental factor in worsening the situation;123 
 
4. Among all organizations, the EU has perhaps the most advanced EW system in the world, 
involving the EU Check-List of countries and regions that relies on mission reporting, and 
open-source information for Brussels-based desk analyses using the EW indicators;  
 
5. Only a few organizations are involved in structural conflict prevention (i.e. addressing the root 
causes of conflicts). So far, only the EU, OAS, and the CoE have developed programs that 
target baseline issues such as democratization, human right protection, environmental security, 
and economic welfare;  
 
6. There is no system yet in place for liaising between the United Nations and its partners in 
conflict prevention.  This militates against efficient coordination in the early detection of 
emerging crises and policy formulation in preventive measures.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
123 The 2000 Brahimi Report recommended an early warning information and analysis unit for the United Nations: 
“The Secretary-General should establish an entity, referred to here as the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis 
Secretariat (EISAS), which would support the information and analysis needs of all members of ECPS; for 
management purposes, it should be administered by and report jointly to the heads of the Department of Political 
Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).”  Report of the Panel on UN 
Peacekeeping Operations, A/55/305-S/2000/809, Recomm. 5. 
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Peacemaking 
 
7. Most organizations have adopted legal provisions and have attained substantial institutional 
strength in peacemaking. The legal provisions to engage in peacemaking can either be found in 
the founding document of an organization (e.g. chapter V of the OAS Charter), or in specific 
protocols that supervise and commit member states in this area (e.g. the CoE’s European 
Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes);  
 
8. The organizational capacity in peacemaking varies widely from organization to organization. 
We may find organizations that have developed an adequate organic structure, which could be 
illustrated by the establishment of panels of eminent people (the AU, ECOWAS, LAS, 
ASEAN/ARF), the deployment of representatives of the Secretary General with adequate 
headquarters’ support (the AU, IOF); COMSEC Secretariat’s Good Offices Section; the OAS 
Permanent Council; the Specialized Committees of the OIC; or the office of the OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities. In these cases, peacemaking is interpreted as a formal 
endeavor. Some other organizations have a more informal and consensus-oriented approach 
to peacemaking, such as the IGAD, CIS, and ASEAN. Finally, others, such as the ECCAS, 
CPLP, LAS, CARICOM, carry out peacemaking activities more by chance than by design – 
such as whenever international pressure or local dynamics compel them to intervene;  
 
9. Over the same crisis, the United Nations often coordinates its peacemaking initiatives with 
those of its partners. In some cases, however, effective coordination has been acknowledged 
to be lacking. No organized system is in place to ensure effective and continuous coordination, 
although the capacity appears to exist in terms of secretariat resources for liaison purposes.  
 
Peacekeeping 
 
10. Only a limited number of UN partners engage in peacekeeping activities. Some lack the 
juridical competence, others possess the competence but make the political judgment against 
undertaking such responsibilities. Some, however, have acquired the juridical competence and 
exercised the political will to engage in peacekeeping measures within their jurisdictional zones, 
notably the AU, CIS, ECOWAS, LAS, OSCE, PIF, and the SADC. The CSTO is currently 
developing its peacekeeping capacities. The nature of the existing forces (Collective Forces of 
Rapid Deployment) is related more to collective defense than peacekeeping. Currently, only 
the EU, NATO, CIS and the CSTO have the mandate to undertake peacekeeping missions 
outside their jurisdictional zones, on a potentially global basis, on behalf of the United Nations. 
For the EU and NATO, the extra-jurisdictional mandate is exclusive, whereas the CIS and 
CSTO may operate both intra-territorially and extra-territorially;  
 
11. Some organizations which do not have a peacekeeping nor an enforcement capacity have been 
encouraged to establish such a mechanism. In the case of ASEAN, numerous proposals have 
been put forward to provide the organization with a military role. However, ASEAN leaders 
have rejected the proposals and contended that bilateral arrangements are the most viable 
strategy instead. Nevertheless, ASEAN is currently undertaking a study on the feasibility of a 
regional peacekeeping force. The IOF, on the other hand, although not holding an 
autonomous military capacity, sponsors the military training of peacekeepers through the 
RECAMP and PAIM programs; 
 
12. The United Nations remains the natural leader in peacekeeping measures. However, because it 
has not been granted an adequate resource capacity by UN member states, however, it is 
unable to undertake all mission requirements on a global basis. A trend is underway, therefore, 
for hybrid, bridging or support arrangements to be developed, in which the UN and a regional 
partner will ‘twin’ in a peace mission or a partner will undertake a preliminary mission pending 
a UN take-over; or will provide the ‘hard’ security function for a ‘soft’ UN peacebuilding 
mission.  
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Peace Enforcement 
 
13. The same two intergovernmental partners (the EU, NATO) that are prepared to undertake 
peacekeeping missions beyond their jurisdictional zones are also prepared to undertake peace 
enforcement missions (on behalf of the United Nations with a Security Council-derived 
mandate) beyond their jurisdictional zones and on a potentially global basis. Beyond these, 
only the CIS and the CSTO have an enforcement capacity. CIS has exercised this capacity, for 
example, in Tajikistan. CSTO remains inexperienced in this area. 
 
14. However, the UN Secretary-General’s new vision of global security, comprises a ‘network of 
effective and mutually-reinforcing multilateral mechanisms' – ‘regional and global’ not yet 
being developed in terms of a uniform juridical and resource capacity across all regions. Of all 
regions, an interlocking system of peacekeeping and enforcement capacity is under 
development only in Africa, although the Pacific has shown a capacity to deploy on an ad hoc 
basis. No such internally-focused regional capacity exists elsewhere – either in Europe, the 
Arab world, Asia or the Americas. 
 
 
Peacebuilding 
 
15. All UN partners play a role, of some type and magnitude, in peacebuilding.  This augurs well 
for the involvement of regional partners in the work of the UN Peacebuilding Commission; 
 
16. However, even if they have some operational experience in peacebuilding (see below), their 
organizational capacity is low, and this is reflected in their legal mandate and the organizational 
structure. Beyond the OSCE, CoE and the EU, only one organization, the African Union, has 
developed a clear program in peacebuilding and post-war reconstruction. In this way, it has 
produced a compelling Handbook on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development. And 
although the organization has only one staff person working on this area (within the Conflict 
Management Division), the AU is breaking new ground. However, the peacebuilding capacity 
of most organizations (COMSEC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IOF, the SADC) is confined to 
election observation. Some of them have adopted specific protocols to regulate their 
observation missions (AU). The AU has adopted a Declaration on the Principles Governing 
Democratic Elections in Africa, the IOF the Defining Principles Guiding Election 
Observation, and the SADC has approved its Principles and Guidelines Governing 
Democratic Elections; 
 
17. The two organizations with the strongest peacebuilding capacity are the EU and the OSCE. 
Both have deployed missions as a way to pacify, democratize, humanize and improve life in 
societies emerging from crisis or violence. The OSCE’s work in peacebuilding is coordinated 
by the Permanent Council and implemented, primarily, by the field missions. In the EU, the 
DG RELEX (Commission) is tasked to supervise and guide the work of the organization in 
peacebuilding, even if there is a strong inclination to transfer responsibility to the EC 
Delegations. Interestingly, the EU has recently created a Peacebuilding Partnership portal, 
intended to allow interested organizations and entities  working in the fields of conflict 
prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding  to provide to the Commission, on a 
voluntary basis, information regarding their areas of activity. 
 
In the case of Africa, a note of alert should be given to the organizational framework between the 
AU and the sub-regional Organizations (i.e. ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, ECCAS). Despite the recent 
adoption of a MoU, the relationship still needs to be strengthened by clarifying the precise role of 
each organ. The AU has established its African Standby Force on the basis of the existing Regional 
Economic Communities, nevertheless, some of these sub-regional organizations still have the 
possibility to develop their own and independent peace and security agenda. For example, it will be 
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possible for the ECOWAS military component to deploy even without an AU mandate, while in the 
Horn, IGAD’s CEWARN is independent from the EASBRIG framework. Problems may also arise 
because of the overlapping memberships of some African countries. Angola, for example, is a 
member of both ECCAS and the SADC. It is taking part in the process of slowly establishing a 
standby force in Central Africa, while also taking part in the Southern Africa Standby Force.  
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b) RESOURCE CAPACITY 
 
The discrepancy between organizations is wider when looking at resource capacity – measured in 
terms of financial and human resources. If we only compare same type of organizations, the 
noteworthy difference is evident. The study has surveyed eight regional organizations and 
arrangements: the ASEAN, AU, CIS, COE, LAS, PIF, OAS, and OSCE. Even if we take into 
consideration the idiosyncratic nature of the political context, the local level of welfare, and the 
historical background of these organizations, the differences in terms of financial power and human 
resources are palpable. It is clear that the comparisons are also difficult to make because some of the 
organizations may have a large budget but, in fact, the source of capital comes from donors. Others 
have a small budget to run their Secretariat, but if their work is carried out by field missions, it might 
not reflect the size and capacity of these organizations. Nevertheless, the comparisons are warranted. 
Of the regional organizations, the European ones have the largest financial and human capacity. 
Among regional organizations in the world, the Council of Europe has the largest budget: USD $395 
million, followed by the OSCE with USD $246 million, the AU with USD $133 million, the OAS 
with USD $88, the LAS with USD $36 million, the PIF with USD $23 million, and, at the bottom, 
CIS and ASEAN with USD $9 million. As far as human resources are concerned, the OSCE ranks 
highest, with a number of staff that reaches 3450 people. It is followed by the Council of Europe 
with 2140, the AU with approximately 700, OAS and LAS with roughly 500, ASEAN and CIS with 
around 250, and PIF with 100.  
 
In terms of the sub-regional organizations, i.e. CARICOM, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD, SADC, 
and the SCO, the discrepancies are more salient. Of all these organizations, ECOWAS is the one 
with highest financial capacity with a regular budget of USD $121 million. Indeed, ECOWAS is one 
of the organizations that has been attracting more donor funds although we judge that they have not 
been allocated in a systematic manner. All other sub-regional organizations in the world have a lower 
capacity: SADC with USD $45 million, ECCAS with USD $18 million, CARICOM with USD $10 
million; and finally SCO and IGAD around $3 million. With regard to human resources, most of the 
sub-regional organizations surveyed have been able to supply rigorous quantitative data on the 
number of staff. Nevertheless, if the analysis is based on the estimates, ECOWAS has a staff of 
approximately 300; the SADC, 200; CARICOM, 180; and ECCAS, SCO and IGAD employ roughly 
only 30-50 people.  
 
The other intergovernmental organizations surveyed – coined in this way because they are either 
‘alliance organizations’ (collective defense) operating outside their area of jurisdiction, or because 
their criteria for membership does not abide by any geographical criteria, such as the COMSEC, 
CPLP, CSTO, EU, IOF, NATO, or OIC – have very heterogeneous resources. Out of the 3 
transnational organizations, the COMSEC, CPLP and IOF, it is the French speaking community that 
has the largest financial capacity, with a budget reaching USD $101 million, followed by the 
Commonwealth with USD $27 million, and the Portuguese-speaking Community with a meager 
USD $1.7 million. Of all organizations surveyed, the CPLP is the one with the lowest financial 
capacity. In terms of human resources, CPLP employs only 20 people, whereas COMSEC and IOF 
have a staff of approximately 250-350 people. Of the alliance organizations, NATO is by far the 
most capable organization, with a staff of 4200 working at headquarters and a civilian budget of 
USD $364 million. Finally, the European Union is the largest and wealthiest of all organizations 
surveyed. With only 27 member states (about half the size of the IOF, OIC, COMSEC or the 
OSCE), the EU has grown into a powerful civilian (but progressively also military) organization that 
employs 25000 people and has a budget of USD $188.5 billion.  
 
A statistical analysis of the organization’s resources is warranted but it should not be exclusive. 
Often, even if the organization has an adequate budget, its physical resources (headquarters’ working 
conditions) are very poor. This is the case, for example, at ECOWAS, IGAD, and the AU. A 
qualitative assessment on human resources is equally justifiable. And as it is the case with the AU, 
CARICOM, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD, LAS, OIC, and SADC, the staff lacks the appropriate 
training and motivation to work in difficult conditions. And even if it is not always the case, 
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appointments are recurrently based on political and national affiliations, rather than on professional 
experience and merit. 
   
Furthermore, one must be careful when comparing the financial and human resources of 
organizations with such different mandates and natures as the ones here studied. An organization 
that is devoted solely to cooperation in peace and security can have a much lower budget and 
number of staff and still be more efficient in this field than an organization that devoted itself largely 
to economic integration. One example is the case of CARICOM, whose budget and number of staff 
is relatively high, but is in fact very limited if one takes into consideration that these resources are 
being used for economic integration (in the creation of a single market, for example). 
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c) OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE  
 
Most of the organizations have only recently incorporated a security mandate. However, they already 
have considerable operational experience in conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace 
enforcement, and peacebuilding: 
 
 
Conflict Prevention 
 
1. At least three organizations have considerable experience in structural conflict prevention: 
the EU, the CoE and the OAS. For instance, the EU (and its member states) is the largest 
aid donor in the world. Through partnerships signed with ACP countries and also with its 
neighbors in Northern Africa and Central Europe, the EU has established development 
programs that aim to prevent the outbreak of conflict. The CoE, through its Intercultural 
Dialogue and Conflict Prevention Project (started in 2002), intends to help policy-makers, 
civil society and all who play a part in culture to devise a policy of dialogue that respects 
every aspect of cultural diversity. With this in mind, the CoE undertook an analysis of the 
sources of conflict between cultural and religious communities, and the mechanisms that stir 
such conflict, in order to define cultural activities with a preventive aim and to identify 
actions to promote reconciliation. On the other hand, the OAS has, for instance, established 
a Special Program for the Promotion of Dialogue and Conflict Resolution; 
 
2. In terms of early warning and operational conflict prevention, ECOWAS and IGAD are at 
the forefront. The first has experience in working with civil society organizations and has set 
up four Zonal Bureaus in Banjul, Ouagadougou, Monrovia, and Cotonou. IGAD also has 
plenty of experience in the field, namely in collecting primary data through its field monitors. 
Although both mechanisms have been set up only recently, they have integrated an extensive 
network of field actors who assist the organizations in becoming strong conflict prevention 
entities with robust empirical experience.  
 
 
Peacemaking 
 
1. Either operating under Chapter VI or Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, regional and other 
intergovernmental organizations have attained considerable peacemaking experience. The 
major difference between organizations does not lie in the extension of the experience 
(usually ample), but in the quality. In fact, only some organizations have a clear mandate and 
a strong organizational capacity in peacemaking. The OIC, for example, has set up 
Specialized Committees to engage in Israel-Palestine, the southern Philippines or in Jammu 
and Kashmir; whereas the representatives of COMSEC’s Secretary General have been 
involved in numerous conflicts, such as in Tonga, the Maldives, Kenya or Guyana. The 
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities has also mediated conflicts in the 
FYROM and in the Baltic states;  
 
2. However, the involvement of other organizations in peacemaking has been on a periodic 
and ad hoc basis. They lack a clear strategy for peacemaking, and their interventions are 
primarily driven by reputation, pressure, or impulse. ASEAN’s mediation of the South China 
Sea dispute, and in  Cambodia, and Myanmar; CARICOM’s interventions in Venezuela, 
Haiti, or Guyana; the CPLP’s role in Sao Tomé and Guinea Bissau; or ECCAS' involvement 
in Sao Tomé are illustrative of peacemaking activities carried out with minimum 
organizational and legal support. And, they are often confined to the dispatch of special 
envoys or the issuing of political statements (notably in the case of ASEAN).  
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Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement 
 
3. Regional and other intergovernmental organizations are able to deploy missions under 
Chapters VI, VII or VIII of the UN Charter. Since the first military intervention (LAS in 
Palestine, 1948), intergovernmental organizations have deployed approximately 20 missions. 
These include the LAS (Palestine, Kuwait, Lebanon, Yemen), ECOWAS (Liberia (twice), 
Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone), the AU (Burundi, Somalia, Sudan, Comoros), 
PIF (Solomon Islands), CIS (Tajikistan; Georgia, South Ossetia; Georgia, Abkhazia; and 
Moldova), the SADC (Lesotho and the Democratic Republic of Congo), NATO (Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Afghanistan and the FYROM), the EU's peacekeeping missions (Bosnia and 
FYROM), and the OSCE (Kosovo); 
 
4. These deployments vary widely in terms of type and ambition. Often, the trigger of the 
intervention has more to do with the interests of the intervener than with the need on the 
ground to intervene. As an example, one can remember the intervention of the SADC in 
Lesotho and Democratic Republic of Congo, which were fueled by the economic and 
geostrategic interests of South Africa (in the case of Lesotho), Angola and Zimbabwe (in the 
case of the Democratic Republic of Congo). Also, ECOWAS’ interventions in Liberia were 
propelled by Nigeria’s national agenda, just as Russia’s interests led to the interventions of 
the CIS in Tajikistan, Georgia and Moldova. 
 
 
Peacebuilding 
 
5. The peacebuilding capacity of the majority of the organizations is centered on election 
observation. For example, COMSEC, IOF and ECOWAS have significant experience in 
election observation. However, election observation is generally not integrated into a 
comprehensive peacebuilding policy, but simply regarded as a temporary and self-contained 
political exercise; 
 
6. Other organizations, however, have a more comprehensive experience. For instance, the 
CoE, itself a post-conflict organization, has helped build up fledgling post-conflict and post-
totalitarian countries (the Federal Republic of Germany, 1950; Spain and Portugal, 1970s; 
Central and Eastern European states, 1990s). The CoE is involved in standard-setting, 
monitoring, and supervision of compliance on human rights and good governance issues. It 
also provides expertise on draft legislation, training, and awareness-raising activities. Also, 
the OSCE plays a significant role in all peacebuilding activities, most notably in the rule of 
law, human rights, good governance, anti-crime and counter-terrorism operations, and 
weapons management.  It also has been involved in humanitarian and refugee work in 
Albania and in the DDR, and in truth and reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the Arab 
world, the LAS has experience in several areas: viz. (i) humanitarian assistance is generally 
carried out through NGOs (e.g. humanitarian assistance to Palestine and Darfur); (ii) a 
program for the disarmament of weapons is being carried in Somalia; and (iii) disaster relief 
efforts are carried out in cooperation with the Red Crescent. There have also been efforts in 
collaboration with the UN and the AU in the areas of disarmament and weapons 
management. The OAS has been heavily involved in peacebuilding activities such as: (i) 
DDR (past experiences in Suriname, Nicaragua and Guatemala); (ii) truth, justice and 
reconciliation, through the work of the former Unit for the Promotion of Democracy 
(UPD); (iii) rule of law through the work of the Department of Democratic and Political 
Affairs; (iv) human rights, through the work of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (IACHR); (v) good governance and electoral assistance through the work of the 
Department of Democratic and Political Affairs; (vi) criminal law (trafficking, laundering) 
through the work of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Commission (CICAD); (vii) counter-
terrorism through the work of Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), and 
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(viii) disaster relief through the work of the Office for Sustainable Development and 
Environment. Both the EU and NATO are heavily engaged in all peacebuilding activities. 
The OIC has had a fairly satisfactory experience in humanitarian assistance, electoral 
assistance and disaster relief;  
 
7. Both the OSCE and the EU have substantial experience in deploying peacebuilding 
missions. The EU has been involved in 14 missions so far (e.g. Afghanistan, Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Democratic Republic of Congo or FYROM), whereas the OSCE has deployed 17 
missions (e.g. Albania, Croatia, Moldova, and Georgia). 
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d) RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
General Recommendations 
 
1. A ‘UN-Regional and Other Intergovernmental Partnership’ could be formalized through an 
agreement between regional and other intergovernmental organizations and the UN Secretary-
General, with a list of partners invited to attend the High Level Meetings being developed, in a 
manner similar to the process of gaining observer status at the UN General Assembly; 
 
2. The role of each organization – whether it has the mandate and capacity in the various aspects 
of international peace and security (early warning, conflict prevention, peacemaking, 
peacekeeping, enforcement and peacebuilding) – could be declared at the 8th High Level 
Meeting. This would be a precursor to proceeding towards the introduction of more 
formalized agreements between the United Nations and partners, as called for in the report of 
the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change; 
 
3. A Capacity Working Group could be established by the 8th High Level Meeting with the task 
of developing, by 2015, a ten-year capacity-building program for ensuring uniform strength of 
the partnership, across both thematic and geographical lines; 
 
4. There is an immense potential in the different early warning systems already in place at the 
regional level. At a time when UNDPA is implementing a plan to reorganize and strengthen its 
capacities for conflict prevention, the development of a regional-global early warning database 
could have substantial results for the renewed efficiency of both global and regional 
organizations in this field. In October 2006, UNDPA launched the ‘Peacemaker’ database. 
This database could be followed by similar work with the regional organizations on early 
warning. 
 
 
Specific Recommendations 
 
 
Africa 
 
1. In the African context, there are important discrepancies between the level of readiness and 
the progress towards the establishment of peace support capabilities among the various 
African sub-regions. Northern Africa stands out as the only sub-region that does not have 
any regional standby force or even any plans to implement one in the near future. Among 
the other regions, central Africa, through ECCAS, is still lagging behind. Western Africa, 
through ECOWAS; eastern Africa through EASBRICOM (previously led by IGAD); and 
southern Africa through the SADC; appear as the only regions that will have a solid peace 
and security component including the capacity to intervene at hand. The AU should, 
thereby, increase the level of supervision of its PSOD (Peace Support Operation Division) 
on the establishment of the sub-regional brigades. The sentiment in the sub-regional 
organizations is that the brigades are being created with no effective accountability from the 
African Union; 
 
2. Therefore, effective liaison and coordination with the sub-regional brigades is required 
through the appointment of liaison officers each per brigade and the setting up of an 
effective communication link between the AU and the standby brigades; 
 
3. When the ASF Policy Framework was created, it was assumed that the UN would continue 
to be the premier organization providing security on the continent. The ASF would fill the 
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initial gap until the UN is ready to assume responsibility. Consequently, the ASF's readiness 
time varies between 14 to 90 days. Yet, experiences from AMIS suggest that a smooth 
transition within a limited time frame shall not be taken for granted, thus illustrating the 
importance of looking at sustaining capabilities. This leads to new ambitions in terms of 
training requirements, staff manning, equipment and strategic lift capabilities; 
 
4. After a long and arduous process, the MoU between the AU and the African regional 
economic communities was signed in December 2007. All signatories should take advantage 
of the momentum and work to give a pragmatic orientation to the document. This includes: 
(i) the identification of major gaps in capacity among the REC’s with the intention of 
ensuring, as far as possible, equal progress, (ii) the formulation of specific capacity building 
projects with detailed budget description and cost estimate resulting in comprehensive 
coordinated contribution agreements, (iii) the possible rotation of personnel between the AU 
and the African sub-regions, and (iv) maximizing the leverage created by the recent 
establishment of liaison offices by the sub-regions at AU headquarters.  
 
 
Americas 
 
1. The OAS must continue reinforcing the links between democracy, peace and development 
in its region, namely the political and developmental sides of conflict prevention and 
peacebuilding. Because OAS interventions are sensitive for the member states if seen as a 
response to a conflict, one important avenue could be to de-stigmatize the idea of conflict 
prevention, so that it is not seen as an intrusion; 
 
2. In this sense, the OAS could strengthen its efforts on structural prevention measures, in 
cooperation with the UNDPA and UNDP country offices, focusing on in-country staff 
coordination. Further coordination could help also identify the so-called “yellow countries” 
(countries showing signs of developing instability or crisis) at an early stage, so that broad 
and light conflict prevention programs are put in place which further encompass the needs 
of the citizens, and are seen to be more development-related; 
 
3. CARICOM has been attending the UN High Level Meetings regularly since 1996 (at SG 
level), and wants to become an important partner of the UN for peace and security. 
Nevertheless, it is presently primarily focused on economic integration, which is reflected in 
its organizational structure and mandate. In order to better match its goals in this field, 
CARICOM could focus on an organizational reconfiguration, developing specific peace and 
security structures, namely by creating a conflict prevention/good governance department 
with a broad mandate to respond to political instability. 
 
 
Asia-Pacific 
 
1. ASEAN has not attended the last two High Level Meetings between the UN and regional 
and other intergovernmental organizations. In order to strengthen its role in peace and 
security and its cooperation with the UN, ASEAN could focus on this cooperation at the 
formal level, by assuring its presence in the HLMs, and choosing to discuss peace and 
security issues more openly – not only with the UN, but also with other regional 
organizations;  
 
2. As the issues of peace and security have been more successfully discussed at the ARF 
(ASEAN Regional Forum), a further recommendation could be to have an ASEAN-ARF 
joint representation at the High Level Meetings. This would require further cooperation 
between ASEAN and northeast Asian countries, and hopefully contribute to a better 
representation of these two regions (north and southeast Asia);  
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3. In the Pacific, as the question of non-interference is a fundamental political principle, the 
PIF could focus its efforts on the long-term responses to instability, linking security and 
development closely, and focusing on the de-stigmatization of the idea of conflict 
prevention, as was recommended above for OAS; 
 
4. In this region, the major threat to stability seems to be related to environmental hazards. 
This encourages a multidimensional approach to security, which illustrates in a clearer way 
the need for the reinforcement of cooperation with the UN. 
 
 
Central Asia 
 
1. Notwithstanding the fact that the CIS is accepted by the UN as a regional organization 
under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, conflicts affecting its member states are still 
enduring, which penalizes its reputation and legitimacy. Therefore it is important to clearly 
define the aims and the future tasks of the organization and its position in the region. 
Nowadays, it seems that the CIS is primarily a consultation forum for its member states 
rather than a fully-fledged working body. The CIS should move towards the effective 
materialization of its political resolutions;  
 
2. The CSTO is a young organization which has not clearly declared its status yet.  Even if it 
has gained observer status in UN’s General Assembly, its aims are not clearly spelled out. 
The CSTO should, in the near future, decide if it will concentrate on soft security issues, or 
hard security issues, and whether it will become a collective defense alliance, or if it will 
focus on internally-generated security problems;  
 
3. It is important to better define the border between the CIS and the CSTO. Sometimes, the 
CSTO is reported as the Collective Security Treaty Organization of CIS, and therefore as a 
sub-organ of the CIS, when the organizations have indeed different membership. At the 
same time, even if the UN accepts both organizations as independent bodies, the overlap 
between them is significant. Recently, for example, the CSTO  canceled its plan of 
broadening the Forces of Rapid Response (supposed to operate in emergency situations of a 
technological or environmental nature) because a similar structure is functioning within the 
CIS framework; 
 
4. At the last Summit, the CSTO’s Heads of State adopted two important documents which 
will pave the way for the creation of its collective peacekeeping forces. The latest 
information from the CSTO shows that the actual aim is to establish these forces on a 
permanent basis, which would turn the CSTO into the first international organization with 
permanent peacekeeping forces. Although the creation of this mechanism is still at a 
preparatory phase – as the adopted documents need to be ratified by member states – the 
Organization should intensify its consultations with the UN in this field;  
 
5. The CSTO should also work on its public relations, especially in order to become more 
known in non-Russian speaking parts of the world. Although the basic documents and 
information covering the creation of the Organization are available in other languages (e.g. 
English), they are out of date, are not comprehensive, and are poorly translated from 
Russian.  
 
 
Europe 
 
1. The Council of Europe has a long tradition and expertise in the field of standard-setting, 
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monitoring and supervision of compliance on human rights and good governance within 
post-conflict and post-totalitarian countries. A continuous and increased exchange of 
expertise between the organization and the UN is desirable; 
 
2. The CoE has been considered to be a dormant organization in this field, even if it has the 
largest and more complete European membership. If the CoE chooses to further develop its 
functions in the field of the peaceful settlement of disputes (especially in the areas 
encompassed by its membership that are still unstable, such as eastern Europe, southeastern 
Europe, the Caucasus and central Asia), the organization may be able to strengthen its image 
in order to be considered as the main European regional organization in the field of 
peacemaking;  
 
3. The OSCE is one of the regional organizations with the world’s strongest field experience, 
especially in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. For the latter, the OSCE can be a 
valuable partner for the UN Peacebuilding Commission. While the EU has shown its 
interest, together with the OIC to become a preferred partner of the Peacebuilding 
Commission (and is considered as such at the moment), the OSCE has not yet made the 
same step; 
 
4. The EU has been considered as the sui generis actor in the regional-global partnership for 
peace and security, as it sits 3 times at the table in the High Level Meetings. The EU could 
envisage the possibility of strengthening its unity at the High Level process by choosing a 
single representation that coordinates the voices of Council, Presidency and Commission. 
This might be possible with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, when the EU will have a 
High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and should be followed by the 
final coordinated and unique EU representation at the High Level Meetings, but also in its 
cooperation with the UN at the highest level. 
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e) Selected UN Documents 
 
 
 
• S/RES/1769 (31 July, 2007) was the resolution that established UNAMID. 
 
• S/RES/1706 (31 August, 2006) was the resolution on the situation in Sudan mandating UN assistance to AMIS. 
 
• S/RES/1631 (17 October, 2005) was the first resolution adopted by the Security Council on regional 
organizations. S/PV.5282 and Resumption 1 (17 October, 2005) were the records of the open debate and the 
adoption of resolution 1631. 
  
• S/RES/1625 (14 September, 2005) was a declaration on the effectiveness of the Security Council's role in conflict 
prevention, calling for the strengthening of cooperation and communication between the UN and regional and sub-
regional organizations in accordance with Chapter VIII. 
  
• S/RES/1674 (28 April, 2006) was a Resolution on the protection of civilians in armed conflicts. 
  
• S/RES/1497 (1 August, 2003) recognized the role ECOWAS played in implementing the June 2003 ceasefire and 
cited Chapter VII. 
 
• S/RES/1467 (18 March, 2003) and 1209 (19 November, 1998) addressed the proliferation of small arms and light 
weapons in West Africa and in the whole continent respectively and recognized the role of regional organizations in 
this endeavor. 
  
• S/RES/1464 (4 February, 2003) welcomed the actions of ECOWAS in response to the violence in Côte d'Ivoire 
in 2002 with reference to Chapter VII and Chapter VIII. 
 
• S/RES/1366 (30 August, 2001) addressed the issue of DDR in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding mandates and 
stated that preventing armed conflict was a major part of the Council's work that could benefit from existing 
regional preventive mechanism. 
 
• S/RES/1265 (17 September, 1999) and S/RES/1296 (19 April, 2000) expressed the Council's willingness to take 
measures to protect civilians in armed conflict and to consider how peacekeeping mandates, including through 
regional organizations, might better address the negative impact of conflict on civilians. 
 
• S/RES/1197 (18 September, 1998) was on the need for the UN to provide support to regional and sub-regional 
organizations and to strengthen coordination between the UN and those organizations. 
 
 
 
 
 
• S/PRST/2007/42 (6 November, 2007) addressed the role of regional and sub-regional organizations in the 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
 
• S/PRST/2007/22 (25 June, 2007) and S/PV.5705 and resumption 1 (25 June, 2007) regarded threats to 
international peace and security. 
 
• S/PRST/2007/7 (28 March, 2007) and S/PV.5649 and resumption 1 (28 March, 2007) was a Council debate on 
relations between the UN and regional organizations, particularly the African Union discussed the relationship 
between the UN and regional organizations. 
 
• S/PRST/2007/1 (8 January, 2007) and S/PRST/2007/3 (20 February, 2007) focused on threats to international 
peace and security and on the role of the Security Council in supporting security sector reform. 
 
• S/PRST/2006/55 (19 December, 2006) endorsed the phased approach towards a hybrid AU-UN force agreed 
upon by the AU Peace and Security Council. 
   
  Presidential Statements 
   
  Security Council Resolutions 
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• S/PRST/2006/39 (20 September, 2006) welcomed the progress made in realizing the goals of resolution 1631 and 
urged contributions to the capacity building of regional organizations and sub-regional organizations, particularly of 
the AU and African sub-regional organizations. S/PV.5529 (20 September, 2006) was the open debate on 
cooperation between the UN and international and regional organizations in maintaining international peace and 
security. 
 
• S/PRST/2005/20 (26 May, 2005) was a Statement by the President of the Security Council on Post-conflict 
peacebuilding that stressed the importance of extending the partnership between the UN and African regional 
organization. 
 
• S/PRST/2004/44 (19 November, 2004) recognized the importance of strengthening cooperation with the African 
Union in order to help build its capacity to deal with collective security challenges. 
 
• S/PRST/2004/27 (20 July, 2004) was the statement after the Council's debate on cooperation between the United 
Nations and regional organizations in stabilization processes. 
 
• S/PRST/1998/35 (30 November, 1998) reaffirmed the increasingly important role of regional arrangements in 
maintaining peace and security. 
 
• S/PRST/1998/28 (16 September, 1998) set general standards for peacekeeping and stressed the need to be fully 
informed of peacekeeping activities carried out by regional or sub-regional organizations. 
 
• S/PRST/1994/22 (3 May, 1994) said that regional and sub-regional organizations should be taken into account 
when setting up new peacekeeping operations. 
 
 
 
 
 
• S/2007/640 (29 October, 2007) was the letter from the Permanent Representative of Indonesia forwarding the 
concept paper on the relationship between the UN and regional organizations in the maintenance of international 
peace and security. 
 
• S/2007/499 (17 August, 2007) was the letter dated 13 August, 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
President of the Security Council which touched upon the Deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation 
in Somalia and United Nations support for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). 
 
• S/2007/179 (30 March, 2007) was the letter dated 29 March, 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
President of the Security Council which presented the Joint statement of the Fourth General Meeting of 
representatives of the Caribbean Community and the United Nations system. 
 
• S/2007/148  (14 March, 2007) was the letter from the Permanent Representative of South Africa forwarding the 
concept paper on the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations, in particular the African 
Union, in the maintenance of international peace and security. 
 
• S/2005/828 (22 December, 2005) was the letter containing a report on a seminar held by the Working Group on 
cooperation between the United Nations and African regional organizations in the field of peace and security. 
 
• S/2005/567 (8 September, 2005) was the conclusions of the sixth high-level meeting between the Secretary-
General and regional organizations. 
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• S/2007/307/Rev.1 (5 June, 2007), S/2007/517 S/2007/517/Corr.1 (30 August, 2007), S/2007/596 (8 October, 
2007), S/2007/653 (5 November, 2007) and S/2007/759 (24 December, 2007) were reports of the Secretary-
General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur. 
 
• A/61/204 and S/2006/590 (28 July, 2006) A regional-global security partnership: challenges and opportunities. 
 
• A/60/891 (18 July, 2006) was a progress report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on the 
prevention of armed conflict. 
 
• S/2005/740 (28 November, 2005) recommended the Council adopt a new resolution to reflect the new challenges 
to the protection of civilians and called for more support to regional organizations so that they can facilitate the 
necessary security environment for humanitarian and protection activities. 
 
• A/59/2005 (21 March, 2005) In larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all 
 
• A/60/182 (1 August, 2005) and A/59/285 (20 August, 2004) are progress reports on the causes of conflict and 
promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa and called for the UN to enhance the analytical 
capacity of regional organizations. 
 
• S/2005/86 (11 February, 2005) and S/2004/200 (12 March, 2004) are reports on ways to combat sub-regional and 
cross-border issues in West Africa and recognize the role of ECOWAS and other regional arrangements in this 
endeavor. 
 
• A/59/591 (30 November, 2004) and A/50/711 - S/1995/911 (1 November, 1995) are reports on improving 
African peacekeeping capacity including through the reinforcement of the role of regional organizations. 
 
• A/59/565 (2 December, 2004) and Corr. 1 (6 December, 2004) was the report of the High-Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change. 
 
• S/2001/574 (7 June, 2001) was the Secretary-General's first comprehensive report on conflict prevention and that 
stressed the importance of regional arrangement in the maintenance of peace and security. 
 
• A/54/63 - S/1999/171 (12 February, 1999) is the Secretary-General's report on enhancement of African 
peacekeeping capacity 
 
• S/1998/318 (13 April, 1998) was the Secretary-General's report on the causes of conflict and the promotion of 
durable peace and sustainable development in Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 
• A/RES/60/1 (24 October, 2005) was the World Summit Outcome Document. 
 
• A/RES/49/57 (9 December, 1994) was the Declaration on Enhancement of Cooperation between the United 
Nations and Regional Arrangements and Agencies in the Maintenance of International Peace and Security. 
 
 
 
 
 
• S/PV.5735 and resumption 1 (28 August, 2007) was the discussion on the role of the Security Council in conflict 
prevention and resolution, in particular in Africa. 
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• S/2006/961 (6 December, 2006) contained the 30 November AU-PSC communiqué on the phased approach 
towards a hybrid AU-UN force in Darfur. S/PRST/2006/55 (19 December, 2006) endorsed the phased approach 
towards a hybrid AU-UN force agreed upon by the AU Peace and Security Council. 
 
• S/PV.5529 (20 September, 2006) were the records of the latest open debate on cooperation between the UN and 
international organizations in maintaining international peace and security. 
 
• S/2006/610 (3 August, 2006) was the concept paper circulated by Ghana for the debate on peace consolidation in 
West Africa and that called for the development of a more complementary relationship between 
ECOWAS/AU/UN and other regional organizations. 
 
• S/2005/833 (30 December, 2005) contained the latest annual report of the Council Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa. 
 
• S/PV.5282 and S/PV.5281 (Resumption 1) (17 October, 2005) were the records of the open debate and the 
adoption of resolution 1631. 
 
• S/PV.5261 (14 September, 2005) were the records of the Council summit meeting and the adoption of resolution 
1625. 
 
• S/PV.5007 and S/PV.5007 (Resumption 1) (20 July, 2004) were the records of the open debate on cooperation 
between the UN and regional organizations. 
 
• S/PV.4739 and S/PV.4739/Corr.1 (11 April, 2003) were the records of the Council open debate with the AU, 
ECOWAS, EU, League of Arab States, OSCE and OAS. 
 
• S/2002/979 (29 August, 2002) were recommendations from the Working Group on Conflict Prevention and 
Resolution in Africa regarding Groups of Friends, coordination between the Security Council and the AU, and 
peacebuilding in Guinea Bissau. 
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